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ABSTRACT 
 
REVOLUTIONS WITHOUT REVOLUTIONARIES? 
SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS AND REGIME RESPONSE IN EGYPT  
 
David Faris 
 
Ian S. Lustick 
 
Does the Internet change the balance of power between authoritarian regimes and 
their domestic opponents? The results of this case study of Egyptian digital activism 
suggest that the Internet has important effects on authoritarian politics, though not 
necessarily the kind we have come to expect from popular accounts of online activism. In 
this dissertation, I argue that what I call Social Media Networks can trigger informational 
cascades through their interaction effects with independent media outlets and on-the-
ground organizers. They do so primarily through the reduction of certain costs of 
collective action, the transmission capabilities of certain elite nodes in social and online 
networks, and through changing the diffusion dynamics of information across social 
networks. An important secondary argument is that while states, including Egypt, have 
become more adept at surveillance and filtering of online activities, SMNs make it 
impossible for authoritarian countries to control their media environments in the way that 
such regimes have typically done so in the past. Case studies of media events in Egypt 
between 2006 and 2008 explain how SMNs undermine the process of authoritarian media 
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control and why the independent press is critical for claims-making and the building of 
shared meaning. However, the power of SMNs is not capable of challenging the 
entrenched repressive capacity of determined states, nor can SMNs be substituted for the 
difficult work of grassroots organizing. I arrive at this conclusion through a case study of 
the April 6th Youth Movement, which staged nearly identical strikes on April 6th, 2008, 
and April 6th, 2009, with divergent results. Therefore, the dissertation concludes that even 
though SMNs may lead to richer information environments with increased capacity for 
organizing, the technologies themselves are not determinative of political outcomes. 
Finally, by studying the use of digital tools by Muslim Brothers and Baha’is, the 
dissertation argues that SMNs can provide critical public space and create discursive 
focal points for political and religious minorities. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. 
 – John Perry Barlow 
 
The discursive voices of the new media are fascinating, but their political importance 
has yet to be demonstrated. 
 – Augustus Richard Norton 
 
In February 2010, discussion of the upcoming presidential elections in Egypt 
centered around the potential candidacy of Mohamed ElBaradei, the former head of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. ElBaradei, a Nobel Laureate who commanded 
broad respect inside Egypt for his achievements, had been living abroad in Vienna for 
decades. When ElBaradei’s flight arrived in Cairo on February 19th, hundreds of 
supporters met him at the airport and greeted him like a savior. ElBaradei had caused a 
stir earlier in the month when he hinted that he might run for president if the election 
were to be genuinely democratic, rather than the farce that had taken place in 2005. 
Observers, however, anticipated that power would be handed off from the ailing and 
aging dictator Hosni Mubarak to his son and heir apparent Gamal, in another rigged 
election. It was in this context that a group of young Egyptians started a “fan” page on the 
social networking site Facebook dedicated to ElBaradei’s potential candidacy. Before 
long this group had over 150,000 members (out of roughly 2 million Egyptians on 
Facebook at the time). ElBaradei’s decision to participate or not participate in the election, 
and the swift growth of his dedicated Facebook group, renewed debates inside and 
outside the country about the effect of social networking sites like Facebook – and other 
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forms of “social media” like blogs, Twitter, and text-messaging – on politics in Egypt. In 
other words observers were asking, yet again, a question to which scholars have sought 
the answer for years: Is the Internet inherently a tool of democratization?  
Unfortunately much of the research on the impact of the Internet in the Middle 
East has been somewhat anecdotal. Driven by popular press coverage of the latest 
application (like Twitter) or perceived success of online activism in places like Iran, our 
understanding of the impact of these technologies seems to change with every new 
protest or Facebook group. The goal therefore should not be to ask what the impact of 
Mohamed ElBaradei’s Facebook group will be, but rather to generate robust theories that 
can help us understand events as they happen and make probabilistic predictions about 
the future. It is with that goal in mind that this dissertation seeks to explain the impact of 
the Internet in authoritarian countries through a single case study of Egypt, and to answer 
the following research questions: First, does the use of social media lead to more 
collective action in authoritarian societies?  Do social media generate media coverage of 
sensitive events and issues in authoritarian societies? What is the effect of social media 
on socially or politically marginalized groups in Egyptian society? And finally, why do 
some states (like China) seem more successful at controlling the effects of social media 
than others? These questions intersect with several distinct literatures in the field of 
political science, which I will review below before proceeding to an outline of the case 
selection, methodology, and chapter organization. 
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1.1 The Political Context of Social Media Networks in Egypt 
In addition to addressing questions in the field about the Internet and politics, this 
dissertation also engages with debates about the durability of authoritarianism. Given that 
the Egyptian state has responded to the threat of online activism with the similar 
strategies with which it has approached the control of the political sphere – Observers 
seem to be in general agreement that the Egyptian political system is quite stable 
(Carothers 2002; Kassem 2004; Lust-Okar 2005; Brownlee 2007; Bellin 2005; Cook 
2007; Heydemann 2007). Dissenters from this consensus are few (see Alaasar 2009). 
Brownlee (2007) argues that the single-party system in Egypt provides incentives for 
individual elites to pursue opportunities with the NDP rather than joining the opposition, 
thus providing for long-term systemic stability. Lust-Okar (2005) sees Egyptian domestic 
stability as predicated on an ingenious divide-and-rule strategy which has kept the 
opposition off-guard and at loggerheads. Like a number of other semi-authoritarian 
regimes, Egypt allows a number of legal parties to operate and organize in the political 
system. These parties include the reconstituted Wafd, and among their many privileges 
are setting up and running their own newspapers. But one of the more popular 
organizations, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood1 -- is allowed to participate only 
indirectly, and has not been recognized as a political party. In fact since the election of 
Hamas in Palestine in 2006, the Brotherhood has been targeting aggressively by the 
regime, believing that international events have granted the regime new license in 
eliminating the group’s political influence. The crackdown on the Brotherhood included 
the arrest and prosecution of dozens of senior members of the group’s leadership in 2007-
 
1 Or Muslim Brothers, depending on the translation.  
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2008. Overall, by allowing certain parties access to power and privilege, the regime has 
driven a wedge between the opposition camps. As a result, just when the regime seemed 
the weakest (in the mid-1990s) the legal opposition groups became less likely to push for 
reforms in alliance with the excluded opposition (Lust-Okar, 2005, 147-148).  
Kassem (2004) argues that the Egyptian regime is personal, and quite successful 
at that. Bellin also views Middle East regimes, and Egypt in particular, as enjoying 
“robust and tenacious” coercive apparatuses. Heydemann argues that authoritarian 
regimes in the region, including Egypt, have survived and thrived by what he calls 
“upgrading authoritarianism” – selectively creating openings in the electoral arena and 
the economic sphere while pursuing closer relationships with foreign powers that share 
their lack of interest in human rights and democracy (Heydemann 2007, 7). While El-
Ghobashy (2007) and Rutherford (2008) find some possibilities for change in the 
increasing density of civil society and judicial oversight, respectively, neither sees 
democratization as particularly likely. Hanna (2009) argues that the architecture of 
electoral control erected by the Mubarak regime makes any challenge to Gamal’s 
ascendancy, and any long-term change, difficult at best, while Cook (2009) argues that 
“the underlying patterns and processes of Egyptian politics” will prevent further 
liberalization. Regardless of where each particular author locates Egyptian authoritarian 
stability, the regime enjoys as close to a consensus in political science circles as there is 
in the discipline – façade democracy works for the Mubarak regime, the coercive 
apparatus is strong, resilient, and co-opted, and there are no clear-and-present dangers to 
its authority on the horizon. Most of all there seems to be wide agreement that the 
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mobilization capacity of the various opposition groups is very low, and thus a change of 
regime or democratization is highly unlikely. 
The biggest jolt to Egyptian authoritarianism in recent years was perhaps the 
formation of Kefaya (The Egyptian Movement for Change), a broad-based coalition of 
leftists, Islamists, and other opposition figures. Kefaya has always been difficult to 
categorize, and very little has been published about the movement since its inception in 
2004. As the anonymous blogger Baheyya writes, Kefaya: 
fits none of the available models found in the (admittedly dessicated) 
Egyptian political landscape. It’s not an “opposition party”, it’s not an NGO, 
it’s not a professional association, it’s not a solidarity committee, it’s not a 
party-in-waiting (like Wasat and Karama), and it’s not a grassroots initiative 
(Baheyya 2005). 
 
Shorbagy argues that this movement sprung out of the detritus of the legal-but-severely-
restricted political parties, on the one hand, and the illegal Muslim Brotherhood on the 
other. Lacking an accepted, institutional voice, opposition politics in Egypt had come to a 
standstill during the early years of the new century (Shorbagy 2007, 175). Kefaya, a word 
with a unique meaning in the Egyptian context (it is colloquial for “Enough!”), included 
figures from across the political spectrum, galvanized to prevent Mubarak from assuming 
a fifth term as President of Egypt. This appeared to be the only focal point of agreement 
in the group. As Baheyya writes, “The only consensus is that Mubarak must go; 
everything else is up for debate” (Baheyya 2005).  However, eventually this unwavering 
opposition to the Mubarak regime began to appear in the popular mind as an absence of 
any alternative, positive vision for the future (El-Amrani 2006). The emergence of 
Kefaya, as well as the nascent and perceived opening in the political system following the 
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larly 
or movement (1035).  
                                                
U.S.-led war against Iraq, appeared to combine for a combustible situation, one that was 
ripe for organizing a counter-movement against the state. As leading blogger Issandr El-
Amrani noted, in 2005 “there was so much happening and there was a lot of attention on 
Egypt because President Bush had decided to highlight Egypt as a place to 
democratize.”2  And for a time it did appear as though Kefaya was galvanizing people in
a way that had not happened in a long time – their street protests were bold, and 
undertaken without the regime’s permission, which in any case remains quite hard to 
obtain (Shorbagy 2007, 190). However, these protests eventually become rote, and easy 
enough for the regime to disrupt by banning them or interfering with them, and arresting 
activists after the fact. El-Mahdi (2009) argues that while the Kefaya movement 
eventually fizzled, it ignited dissent in other quarters of Egyptian public life, particu
in the lab
1.2 The Egyptian Media Context 
But Kefaya was not only important in and of itself – it also provided the 
institutional foundation for a new means of expression in the country, the growth of 
blogging as a tool for dissent and opposition. The appearance of blogs on the Egyptian 
scene in 2004 coincided with a larger opening in the press environment, which meant that 
opportunities for expression, oversight, and dissent multiplied almost overnight. For 
years Egyptians had been subject to a moribund local print press, with the government-
run dailies and their fawning coverage of the President more or less the only game in 
town. While the state had legally licensed the opposition parties to run their own 
newspapers, these organs were not trusted sources of news, since their affiliation with the 
 
2 Interview with Issandr El-Amrani, Cairo Egypt. February 16th, 2008.  
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state in the form of acquiescence to its rules made them suspect in the eyes of many. That 
left Egyptians dependent on international press organs like Al-Jazeera – but regardless of 
the undeniable impact of satellite TV, there was still a conspicuous missing link in the 
press environment, since no one was on the ground honestly covering local Egyptian 
political issues in a way that earned widespread public trust. This was all to change in 
2004, when the independent (as opposed to “opposition”), privately-owned daily 
newspaper Al-Masri Al-Youm was launched by Hisham Kassem. As we will see in 
Chapter 3, the existence and growth of the independent press allowed a kind of nexus to 
form between activist bloggers and human rights agitators – they fed into one another, in 
the sense that bloggers link to and talk about the stories printed in the independent press, 
while the journalists in the independent press often rely on bloggers as sources. Al-Masri 
Al-Youm was a daily newspaper unlike anything that had been seen in Egypt in decades3 
– a privately-financed affair that was free to criticize the regime, make money, and 
publish hard-hitting investigative journalism. It may be that the kind of criticism carried 
in the pages of the newspaper emboldened bloggers to do the same on their new Web 
sites. And crucially this new nexus of blogger-journalist-activist created new kinds of 
networks – networks that the regime may never have seen before in this form.  
The growth of communication on the Internet is also, not coincidentally, a major 
concern of scholars. Each information revolution – be it print, film and television, 
satellite broadcasting, radio, and now the Internet – has been met with both the great 
hopes of revolutionaries and opposition leaders, and the realities of state hostility to free 
 
3 This is not to suggest that there were not other newspapers prior to Al-Masry Al-Youm which carried 
criticism of the regime, but these papers were linked to certain political parties and did not enjoy the kind 
of readership and respect eventually garnered by Al-Masry Al-Youm.  
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expression. This has long been the case in Egypt, whose film censorship office once 
employed the renowned novelist Naguib Mahfouz (Starkey 1998, 413). Egyptian film 
long served as a political battleground for ideas that could not be expressed in the public 
sphere. But in fact the censorship of films – particularly Western films – actually 
stretches back to the period of de facto British rule (Vitalis 2000, 278). The pre-
revolutionary regime seemed in particular to fear films that depicted revolutions (Vitalis 
2000, 279). The post-revolutionary regime’s belief that uncensored films present a 
political and social threat to the regime’s continued hold on power can be seen even 
today in the recent controversy over the film version of the best-selling novel The 
Yacoubian Building, a book which unflinchingly depicts corruption, homosexuality, 
torture, and other desultory features of Egyptian political and social life. Censors clipped 
parts of the film. But that was not enough for more vociferous critics, who wanted the 
movie banned altogether.  
But greater things were expected from the print media and radio in the Middle 
East and Egypt. Lerner chronicled the Nasser-era state’s takeover of print and broadcast 
media almost immediately upon its assumption of power: 
Nasser, then has converted his earlier view that Egyptian society 
was not “ready” for mass participation into a more daring 
hypothesis – that he can use the mass media to achive national 
consensus without unduly raising public demands for full 
participation. This feat hinges upon effective control of the media, 
along with all other channels of access to the Egyptian mass (1958, 
251).  
 
Modernization theory’s expectation that rising literacy and increased access to media 
would change entrenched “traditional” social attitudes is mirrored by the regime’s fear of 
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those attitude changes and its insistence on manipulating them. Part of this strategy was 
the regime’s nationalization of newspapers in 1960, muzzling what had once been a 
relatively free-wheeling discursive arena (Jankowski 139). Lerner argues that Egyptian 
newspapers were brought under “central directive” long before that (1958, 254). While 
the decades have eroded the state’s desire and capacity to thoroughly regulate the print 
media, the atmosphere is still fairly well-regulated. As for radio, Lerner argues, though 
that the Egyptian State Broadcasting’s (E.S.B.) Voice of the Arabs (Sowt al-Arab) may 
have been instrumental in fomenting revolutionary Nasserist fervor across the region in 
the late 1950s (1958, 255-258). But the regime’s desire and capacity to carry out state 
censorship and official control over these relatively new (to Egypt) forms of mass 
communication are the important factors. 
One of the central conceits of modernization theory was the idea that the spread of 
mass communication and the changes in attitudes might presage a greater role for 
ordinary individuals in the political universe.  Mass media and the rise of literacy had the 
chance to make public opinion “a real factor instead of a fine phrase in the arena of world 
politics” (Lerner 1958, 54). These hopes presage later enthusiasm about the Internet and 
its potential to change entrenched attitudes about gender and politics. Lerner and other 
advocates of democratization did not see, or did not want to see, that mass 
communication could also be used by the defenders and articulators of tradition to 
safeguard against more “cosmopolitan attitudes” brought by foreign media and economic 
influence. This reality is especially stark today in Egypt, where for every secular, 
cosmopolitan liberal blogging about government abuses, there are probably a dozen 
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Islamists using the Internet, newspapers, DVD’s, cassette tapes and other media forms to 
propagate ideas that Lerner and other modernization theorists would find “traditional.” 
This reality underscores the idea that new technologies are value-neutral and can be used 
by anyone to accomplish most any social goal. 
1.3 The Internet and Activism in the Middle East 
Recent scholarly work theorizes that the Internet and its associated tools and 
applications might reduce the costs of collective action. Rheingold (2003) argued that the 
coordinating capacity of tools like text-messaging might allow activists in authoritarian 
countries to mobilize and avoid the repressive arm of the state. Shirky argues that what he 
calls “social tools” spur group-formation and collective action by reducing the costs of 
communication and removing “two old obstacles – locality of information, and barriers to 
group reaction” (Shirky 2008, 153). Karpf (2009) argues that these mechanisms allow for 
new and unexpected forms of political organization and contestation. A competing 
tradition holds that states have largely been successful at shutting  down online dissent 
(Mozorov 2009; Deibert et. al. 2008; Zittrain 2008; Boas and Kalathil 2003). Others, 
while recognizing the reduction in organizing costs and communication, argue that digital 
technologies have little effect on the institutions of authoritarianism (Faris and Etling 
2008). Still others, while recognizing the way that the Internet empowers non-state actors, 
feel that regimes allow certain kinds of expression and deliberation online but refuse to 
change underlying structures, or worse, use that information for repressive purposes 
(Mozorov 2009b). Few studies, however, have investigated the effects of the Internet on 
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collective action in the Middle East, a region which is often regarded in the discipline as 
somehow exceptional. 
Many scholars dismiss the Internet and Internet activism as chimerical and 
unimportant in the Middle East, particularly with limited access for most of the region’s 
citizens and restrictions on the availability of certain web sites. Lynch argues that limited 
accessibility has hampered the ability of the Internet to affect public affairs in the Arab 
world (2005 50). And contrary to expectations, dictators have managed to design 
sophisticated systems of controls that serve to prevent the free flow of information 
(Lynch 2005, 51). Given these limitations, researchers must ask whether the Internet and 
the new political influence of blogs has any traction at all in these societies. But the fact 
that states – particularly China – have responded so forcefully to the information 
potential of the Internet indicates that at least one savvy regime perceives a genuine threat. 
And while a very low percentage of the region’s inhabitants might own personal 
computers with internet connections, the proliferation and low-cost of internet cafes in 
major metropolitan centers means that even people of limited means can gain internet 
access – and that news might be cheaper to obtain in cyberspace than in print. Along with 
other forms of new media like satellite TV, it can be argued that the Internet helps 
eradicate states’ “hegemonic control over the flow of information” (Hofheinz 2005, 78).  
But regimes fear (and attempt to control) these other methods of mass 
communication as well. What is unique about the Internet? Anderson argues,  
In these respects, the Web is comparable in a contemporary 
context to early printing presses in the world of the scriptorium: it 
escapes the world of editors and arbiters of thought and 
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interpretation by displaying the materials of interpretation and 
providing alternative organizations for them (Anderson 2003 50).  
 
Anderson was writing about Islam on the Web, but his comments could apply to any 
political writing and organization on the Internet – overwhelmingly populated by blogs, 
political organizations, or online magazines – in almost any context. The Internet allows 
political commentary and organizing in real time and fosters the creation of online 
communities and pressure organizations. Just as satellite television and call-in shows 
have undermined state control over the media and democratized the regional discourse in 
the Middle East, blogs4, chat rooms, and message boards have done the same -- and are 
available to anyone who can afford the comparatively low cost of internet access. And 
with the sheer number of blogs and web pages – as many as a million new web pages a 
day (Dreyfus 2001, 8) – state censors will be perpetually challenged to keep up. Even in 
states that can claim to have successfully filtered internet content, it would be impossible 
for governments to fully censor all political blogging and content. That said, free 
expression risks a serious response from the state. As Bucar and Fazaeli note in the 
Iranian context, “When blogging is at its most politically powerful, it risks its greatest 
punishment” (2009, 414). 
Some scholars of the region have come to optimistic (in the sense that they 
believe the Internet is altering the balance of power between states and oppositions) 
conclusions about the potential impact of the Internet. In a statistical analysis, Best and 
Wade (2005) argue that Internet penetration is associated with an identifiable increase in 
 
4 A blog is a agent-created Web site in which authors post entries in a journal-like format that are displayed 
with the most recent entry first. Blogs can be maintained by individuals, groups of individuals, or even 
corporations, governments, and political campaigns (author’s definition). 
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democracy across the world (21). The authors identify a number of what they call 
“democratic regulators” that might allow the Internet to increase the level of democracy 
in a given country. Encryption technology allows regime opponents to organize and 
communicate in secrecy; the increasing cheapness of Internet access allows organizations 
and dissidents to better communicate, inform, and organize; and the Internet’s 
architecture disallows “governments such as the United States from implementing back 
doors in the Internet to allow wiretapping” (Best and Wade 2005, 20). While they caution 
that each of these possible benefits has an authoritarian analogue (filtration software, 
political increases in the price of Internet access, etc.), they argue that overall the Internet 
has been beneficial – although they specifically note that there has been no such positive 
effect in the Middle East, perhaps because during the course of the study the region did 
not become at all more democratic. Meier (2009) argues that in some contexts, the 
Internet does seem to lead to more collective action outcomes – strikes, demonstrations, 
and protests, but that this finding depends on the level of Internet penetration. In higher-
connectivity societies, the Internet does indeed lead to more collective action. In lower-
connectivity societies, on the other hand, this does not appear to be the case. 
Rahimi (2003) lists occasions where new media technologies have helped 
undermine authoritarian regimes, including the use of email bulletins as resistance in 
rural Zimbabwe (1). He also points to the most likely use of the Internet as a form of 
resistance to authoritarian regimes – the exposure of corruption and abuses. His case 
study of Iran indicates that while the state has struck back against Internet activists in the 
context of a formerly-loose environment, it has been unable to shut down dissent entirely, 
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making the Internet a new site of contestation over political issues that remain red-lined 
offline.  Similarly in Saudi Arabia, Teitelbaum (2003) argues that the Internet “creates a 
more level playing field for the opposition” (237). He also notes that despite the Saudi 
regime’s successful overall attempt to control Web content, the censoring of sites has 
only led to dissent being transferred to other electronic arenas like email and chatting. 
The rise of mobile technology since that time makes it increasingly likely that dissent 
also takes place through SMS and other mobile technologies. He also notes the Internet’s 
utility in crossing traditional social boundaries, like gender. Meanwhile, Wheeler argues 
that the Internet could lead to incremental changes in authoritarian societies through 
changes in democratic habits attained through interaction with other people, and through 
the creation of a democratic public sphere (Wheeler 2006, 5). Because of these 
interactions and the concomitant reshaping of individuals’ politics and beliefs, she 
ultimately believes the state is “fighting a losing battle” (17). 
Lynch describes the contours of the public sphere created out of such interactions: 
The Arab public sphere can mobilize public outrage, pressure leaders to 
act through ridicule or exposure, shape the strategic incentives for rational 
politicians, and even incite street protests. But it cannot, in and of itself, 
act (2005, 54).  
 
Lynch is referring mainly to the international public sphere created by al-Jazeera and 
other Arab satellite television networks. Television, as noted years ago by Neil Postman, 
is a passive medium (Postman 1985). With the exception of the few individuals whose 
calls are taken by talk show hosts, satellite television and the “new Arab public” 
generated by it, are not interactive. If Postman is correct that television culture is an 
inherent attack on print culture, then democratic enthusiasts should be happy to see the 
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satellite television phenomenon accompanied now by an explosion in online writing and 
activism. And therein lies perhaps the crucial difference between the new Arab public 
and the new Arab cyberpublic – while the Internet may be available to far fewer citizens 
than satellite TV, it is also by its nature a far more interactive medium. One of the central 
features of most political blogs is the “comments” function, where readers respond to 
posts – often acrimoniously – and help shape the scope and direction of the debate on 
each site. Wheeler argues that such back-and-forth encounters, even in the context of 
continued authoritarianism, can have positive feedback effects in terms of democratic 
culture (Wheeler 2006a, 14).  
The Internet is also said to facilitate organization on specific issues. This kind of 
organization has been termed “Issue ad-hocracy” (Berman and Mulligan, 2003, 84). 
Groups of disparate activists may form around narrow issues but develop into a larger 
coalition based on shared interests – interests that they may not have been previously 
aware of, and which were brought together by online activism. In other words, the 
Internet is a tool that makes these kinds of meetings and happenstances possible – in part 
because of its own unique technological characteristics, and in part because of the ways 
states have been unable to entirely clamp down. 
On the other hand regimes have also been quite successful in responding to the 
threat of Internet activism – one need look no further than the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
where the Green Revolution of 2009 has turned into a bloody stalemate that still favors 
the repressive apparatus of the state (Morozov 2009). So while the Internet is 
conceptualized in the popular imagination as a central hub that anyone can plug into, the 
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reality is far different. In fact, contrary to expectations, ruling regimes have been able to 
design sophisticated schemes to filter Internet content before it reaches end users – 
including bloggers, activists, and their readers. While the Internet was designed to be a 
medium that eluded centralized control – based on the military origins of the technology 
– it has since evolved in ways that make such control possible. Boas (2005) details what 
he refers to as the “architectural constraints” on Internet access constructed by China and 
Saudi Arabia, as opposed to institutional constraints like law, social norms, and the 
market. In contrast to institutional constraints, architectural constraints seek to actually 
interpose the power of the state between Internet providers and their users. Zittrain (2008) 
details the ways that software companies and states have designed hardware and 
applications that make it easier for governments to censor and monitor their citizens.  
While the Internet itself does not censor – as Boas writes, “the core of the network 
performs simple data transfer functions that do not require knowledge of how the ends 
are operating” – it is possible in some ways to intercept information. The Internet is 
“much less a single network of individual users as it is a network connecting separate 
computer networks” (Boas 2005). Since most individuals access the Internet through 
service providers, states have managed to route all ISPs through a central state server 
which can, with varying levels of effectiveness, intercept content deemed to be 
objectionable by political or cultural authorities. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s 1.46 
million Internet users can sign up with different providers, but all providers access the 
Internet through the same centralized state portal. Control of the vastly larger number of 
users in China is more complicated, but operates on the same general principle. These 
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techniques have allowed China and Saudi Arabia to establish what Boas calls “effective” 
control – not perfect by any means and capable of being thwarted by savvy and 
determined users, but enough to satisfy the “social, economic, and political goals” of the 
regime (Boas 2005).  
The Open Net Initiative, which monitors the extent of government filtering of the 
Internet globally, argues that there are still no formal attempts to filter or block Web sites 
in Egypt (2009). Boas and Kalathil note that Egypt, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, has no 
formal mechanism to control or filter Internet content (Boas and Kalathil 122). What 
Egypt does do quite effectively is harass and repress bloggers and other practitioners of 
online media. In fact all three of the journalists in prison at the time of this writing are 
bloggers, and the regime arrested more than 100 bloggers in 2008 alone (Open Net 
Initiative). Still, the lack of architectural control mechanisms means that individuals have 
still been willing to engage in activism online, and in many cases seem willing to suffer 
prison time. Thus if Web activists could have an effect on authoritarian structures, we 
should be able to see this effect in Egypt, which has a liberal Internet structure. The 
Egyptian government, as of the publication of that research, still appeared to view the 
commercial and administrative potential of the Internet as greater than the potential for 
political unrest and opposition coordination.  
Perhaps no country in the region has seen a bigger impact from blogging and 
other forms of Internet activism than Egypt. Even beyond their domestic influence, 
Egyptian bloggers -- particularly those writing in English -- have become important parts 
of the discourse in the West, and may have an influence beyond domestic affairs. Many 
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activists choose to remain pseudonymous because of security concerns in the repressive 
atmosphere of contemporary Egypt. But their ability to coordinate demonstrations and 
garner international attention to their causes has not escaped the notice of outside 
observers (Levinson 2005; Shapiro 2009; Faris 2008). The country’s bloggers and 
Facebook activists have been the focus of numerous journalistic accounts, but as of yet 
have not been the subject of a systematic scholarly study. This dissertation seeks to fill 
that lacuna.  
 1.4 Methodology and Case Selection 
The dissertation employs a single-case study design and focuses on political 
events in Egypt between 2005 and April 2009. This time period was chosen because it 
coincides with the decision of the Egyptian regime to hold multi-candidate presidential 
elections and thus was a time of increased expectations about levels of political openness. 
Given the difficulty in obtaining quantitative data about the use of social media networks, 
and the particular difficulty of conducting social network analysis in authoritarian 
countries where respondents are likely to be unwilling to provide data about their social 
networks, this study employs a qualitative research design. Open-ended interviews were 
conducted with dozens of prominent bloggers, journalists, human rights activists, and 
others in Cairo, Egypt on a number of field visits between October 2007 and June 2009. 
In addition to those interviews, I used the American University in Cairo’s print media 
database, the Middle East Monitor, to conduct both qualitative and basic quantitative 
research in the Egyptian print media. On several occasions, I was able to conduct 
participant observation with the activists I was studying, most notably on April 6th, 2008, 
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during general strike organized via Facebook group. On other occasions I was privy to 
meetings and conferences organized by online activists, and invited to share in their 
conclusions. Finally, I conducted process tracing through reading individual blogs and 
the Web sites of electronic media organizations. 
The selection of individual cases for study in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 was also driven 
in part by circumstance. When I arrived in Cairo in August 2007, the project primarily 
envisioned this as a study of the Egyptian blogosphere, based on observations I made in 
the summer of 2006 while visiting Zamalek, the posh neighborhood on the Nile in central 
Cairo. During the course of my first set of interviews with bloggers, beginning in October 
2007, I kept hearing again and again that I needed to check out other new technologies 
that were being put to use by Egyptian activists, notably Twitter and the social 
networking site Facebook. Twitter at the time was a complete novelty to me, and it 
wouldn’t be until the spring of 2009 that global audiences saw this application – which 
allows users to send short, 140-character messages to one another – used in an 
authoritarian country for activism. The ideas that came out of these interviews, in a 
follow-the-evidence fashion, now form of the core of my qualitative analysis, and 
changed the focus of this project from blogs to the larger world of networked social 
media. Those insights quite literally would not have been possible without the initial 
conversations with activists on the ground.  
Many of the cases investigated in this study were uncovered via the interview 
process, by asking activists to explain the impact of social media technologies, and 
asking them to cite specific cases where they believed the technology had an impact. This 
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process was in many ways haphazard, and open to the charge of selection on the 
dependent variable. However, in each case, I was able to investigate the record of the 
public sphere to test whether events were really being driven by the technologies, or by 
other factors. This rigorous process led me to reject the perceived importance of digital 
media in certain cases, particularly in the April 6th Movement, which forms the core of 
Chapter 4.  
Of course, some of these research choices were made by necessity rather than 
choice. The reality is that a number of prominent bloggers were not willing to speak with 
me – whether because of interview fatigue or because of fear of my motives. In fact it 
took months to win any credibility at all in the tight social world of the elite, and it was 
only after repeated calls, emails, and meetings that I was able to gain the trust of anyone 
at all. Furthermore, more quantitative investigations of social networks were simply not 
possible in Egypt, nor was an analysis of link structure between blogs, since Egyptian 
blogs are often structured very differently from their American counterparts. What this 
means ultimately is that this is less a quantitative study, and more of an attempt to build 
theory about the effects of digital activism in authoritarian countries.  
I chose to undertake a single case study analysis for a number of reasons. First, in 
Egypt alone, the rate of internet usage skyrocketed during the past decade (Wheeler 2006, 
5). Wheeler notes that in all likelihood there are more users than estimated because of the 
widespread availability of internet cafes (Wheeler 2006b, 34-35). And as will be 
demonstrated below, Egypt may be unique in the region in terms of how much influence 
blogs have had on events and public discourse – and this may have something to do with 
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the absence of overt filtering or censorship. In this way Egypt can be thought of as a 
critical case for the idea that the Internet has placed new tools and resources in the hands 
of the political opposition. In other words, if the tools do not have an effect in a relatively 
open authoritarian environment such as Egypt, we can be fairly certain that they will be 
of little use in stricter environments like Syria.  
Additionally, Egypt looks like a strong comparison case to other authoritarian 
regimes and their regulation of the Internet. The response of authoritarian regimes to the 
Internet appears to run the gamut from total exclusion of most individuals from the Web 
(i.e. Burma) to the liberal encouragement of e-commerce and other online activities (as in 
the U.A.E.). Perhaps the best-known case of Internet regulation is in China, whose 
architecture of online censorship is discussed in more detail below. The relevant point is 
that the Chinese regime has cracked down hard on what it perceives to be online 
organizing by its chief opposition groups – notably the Falun Gong, whose e-activities 
have been almost totally curtailed by state strength (Kalathil and Boas 2003, 28-31). And 
why have Chinse attempts been so successful (MacKinnon 2008)? In contrast, the 
Egyptian regime appears to have gone after only a handful of prominent Islamist and 
secular Web activists, and only then when these figures transgressed very clear red lines 
of Egyptian politics. Why have Chinese and Egyptian authorities constructed different 
architectures of control, and why do they appear to perceive the threat posed by Web 
activism differently?  
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1.5 Outline of the Dissertation 
The primary contention of this dissertation is that what I call Social Media 
Networks (SMNs) can trigger informational cascades through their interaction effects 
with independent media outlets and on-the-ground organizers. They do so primarily 
through the reduction of certain costs of collective action, the transmission capabilities of 
certain elite nodes in social and online networks, and through changing the diffusion 
dynamics of information across social networks. An important secondary argument is that 
while states, including Egypt, have become more adept at surveillance and filtering, 
SMNs make it impossible for authoritarian countries to control their media environments 
in the way that such regimes have typically done so in the past. However, the power of 
SMNs is not capable of challenging the entrenched repressive capacity of determined 
states, nor can SMNs be substituted for the difficult work of grassroots organizing. 
Chapter Two, Social Media Networks, Media Events, and Collective Action in 
Authoritarian Regimes, provides the theoretical core of the dissertation, and introduces its 
key terms. In Chapter Two, I explain how advances in our understandings of networks, as 
well as research into the link structure of the Internet, helps us explain how information 
can be diffused more quickly across Social Media Networks, whether through blogs, text 
messages, social networking sites, or microblogging services, and how certain key nodes 
in networks are responsible for distributing information and influencing other members 
of their social networks. The chapter also argues that these diffusion dynamics can be 
instigators of “informational cascades,” or sudden and widespread shifts in preferences, 
attitudes or behaviors. These informational cascades can do two things – first they can 
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make it difficult for regimes to maintain their control of information hegemony, and 
second, they can lead to the organization of collective action, by lower the “revolutionary 
thresholds” of individuals embedded in social networks. 
Chapter Three, Agenda-Setters: Torture, Rights and Social Media Networks in 
Egypt, evaluates four case studies of blog-driven or blog-enhanced media events in Egypt 
to test the theories about media events and information control in Chapter Two. These 
three events are: 1) the sexual harassment scandal of October 2006; the torture scandal of 
January 2007; the Sudanese refugee crisis of 2006; and the Al-Qursaya Island takeover 
attempt of 2007-8. The chapter demonstrates the critical agenda-setting or story-breaking 
power of Social Media Networks – particularly in comparison to the absence of media 
coverage of similar events in the past – and casts substantial doubt on the null hypothesis, 
that SMNs have no substantial impact on authoritarian politics. Chapter Three further 
argues that in a country like Egypt, where few are connected to the Internet, it is the 
presence of a robust independent media that ultimately is responsible for transmitting 
claims out of Social Media Networks and into the broader public sphere. It thus revises 
our understanding of the causal pathways between the Internet and social or political 
change in authoritarian countries.  
Chapter 4, New Tools, Old Rules: Social Media Networks and Collective Action in 
Egypt, evaluates case studies of social-media-driven mobilization to test competing 
hypotheses about the effects of SMNs on collective action. The two case studies are the 
April 6th, 2008 general strike, and the April 6th 2009 General Strike. The two events, with 
similar organizers, goals, and execution, are strikingly close to a natural experiment. The 
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chapter theorizes the April 6th General Strike as an informational cascade and tests this 
theory against other possible explanations of the day’s events. The chapter also tests 
theories of regime response to these activities and answers questions about their 
effectiveness. The chapter argues that while the April 6th 2008 General Strike constituted 
an informational cascade, its organizers misunderstood its relationship to the on-the-
ground organizing done by the labor movement. This misunderstanding attributed more 
causality to SMNs than was warranted, and led to the failure of the follow-up strike. Thus 
the chapter casts substantial doubt on the hypothesis that SMNs are direct causal factors 
of revolutionary moments.  
However, even though they might not have a direct revolutionary impact, it is 
possible that SMNs can have additional impact on Egyptian politics and the Egyptian 
public sphere by creating and sustaining public spheres or “counter-publics” for 
marginalized groups like women, religious minorities, and sexual minorities. Chapter 
Five, (Amplified) Voices for the Voiceless: Social Media Networks and Marginalized 
Groups in Egypt, evaluates the use of the Internet by Baha’is and Muslim Brothers. It 
explains the function of Social Media Networks for these two groups, one socially and 
the other politically subordinated. The chapter uses evidence of blog-driven media 
coverage of to evaluate competing hypotheses about the effect of social media. The 
chapter finds that while blogs and other forms of electronic media increased coverage of 
issues for both groups, this effect can largely be explained by the writing of the same 
group of elite blogger-journalists who helped drive coverage of the issues in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter Six, Cascades, Colors, and Contingencies: Social Media Networks and 
Authoritarianism in Global Perspective, evaluates the SMN model tested in chapters 3 to 
5 against outside-sample cases. It does so through a series of case studies of that evaluate 
the use of the Internet in crisis mobilizations, in Ukraine, during the Orange Revolution 
of 2004, in Moldova, during the so-called Twitter Revolution of 2009, in Kenya, during 
the 2007-2008 election crisis, and in Iran, during the Green Revolution of 2009-2010. 
The chapter seeks further to explain the role of the media environment in these cases. 
Chapter 6 confirms the findings of earlier chapters that SMNs contribute to informational 
cascades, that independent media outlets are critical transmission belts for claims made 
through SMNs, and that the outcomes of the crises in question depend not on the 
properties of SMNs, but rather on local and international features of institutional politics 
in each case.  
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Chapter 2 
Social Media Networks, Media Events, and Collective Action 
in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
In any case, there is an irremovable political obstacle to becoming sufficiently 
knowledgeable: vulnerable regimes can block the production and dissemination of 
information potentially harmful to their own survival. 
-Timur Kuran 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The study of social media is becoming a subject of increasing importance for 
political science. Scholars are beginning to take seriously the claims that social media 
might lead to more collective action outcomes, and to consider the kinds of tools that may 
contribute to those outcomes. The study of networks is a critical variable for 
understanding the potential power of social media. The discovery of new laws governing 
networks in a number of different realms has led a small number of political scientists to 
investigate the relevance of network theories for their own areas of expertise. Some 
scholars have used advances in network theory to shed light on the mobilizing capacity of 
terrorist groups (Matthew and Shambaugh 2005), while others have used networks to 
enhance our understanding of globalization processes (Freyburg-Inan 2006). Slaughter 
(2009) uses networks to test theories about America’s possible decline as a major power. 
The concept of the power law (defined below) has been used to analyze the frequency 
and severity of wars in the international system (Cederman 2003). And Elhafnawy argues 
that the existence of scale-free networks in complex societies poses important problems 
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for the pursuit of security (Elhafnawy 2004). The relevance of certain properties of social 
media has been used to look at intelligence gathering and sharing (Ackerman et. al., 
2007). Pedahzur and Perlinger (2006) use social network analysis to examine the 
resilience of Palestinian terror networks, and notably argue that “hubs” are critical for 
terror operations and that these networks indeed are scale-free and function according to 
power laws. In this chapter, I explain how these network theories, and the Social Media 
Networks that operate by their laws, must cause us to revise our understanding of 
collective action outcomes, media events, and informational cascades. 
2.1 Networks and Web 2.0 
A flurry of scientific research in recent years has pointed to the importance of new 
discoveries about networks. Most importantly, this research emphasizes the idea that not 
all nodes or actors in a network are identical, and that certain kinds of nodes assume far 
greater importance in their networks than do others. A network, according to Watts, is 
merely anything that is connected to any other thing. Or as he puts it, a network is “a 
collection of objects connected to each other in some fashion” (2003, 27). Some networks 
are random, in that most nodes have about as many links as any other node – many 
scholars point to the U.S. highway network as typical of this kind of network. No node in 
the highway network is substantially more important than any other, and even the most 
well-connected stretch of road has a limited number of links. Most U.S. cities have a few 
connections to the interstate highway system, but none have dozens, and none have zero. 
Such randomness is how most scientists looked at networks until relatively recently. 
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But some networks operate according to different principles, what are called 
“power laws” – the idea that certain nodes in these networks have virtually no limit on 
their potential size or scale.5 The discovery of what this study will call power law 
networks was made when scholars tried to “map” the Internet and found that while there 
are millions of Web pages, only a few have more than a handful of links to other pages, 
while a select few have thousands and thousands. According to Watts, what distinguishes 
such a network from most of these ordinary networks is that they operate according to a 
power law: “most nodes will be relatively poorly connected, while a select minority of 
hubs will be very highly connected” (2003, 107). (I don’t think this is a clear or complete 
enough explication of this concept which you will invoke so often) And these well-
connected hubs operate according to the principle of the rich getting richer – they tend to 
attract more connections because they are already well-connected, transforming them 
from ordinary nodes into super-connected hubs. This is called the principle of preferential 
attachment- a principle that applies so long as the network is growing. As Barabasi puts it, 
when new nodes enter a network, they are much more likely to link to the existing nodes 
with greater numbers of links (Barabasi 2003, 86). New nodes in an existing network 
have great difficulty attracting link. Investigators intrigued by the results of the Internet 
mapping quickly discovered that power laws apply to diverse phenomena ranging from 
the spread of disease to the composition of terrorist networks. 
 
 
5 The unfortunate and misleading term “scale-free” has been applied to networks that exhibit these 
characteristics. The term is misleading because such networks certainly do have a scale, just one that differs 
from other kinds of networks. 
  
Figure 2.1: Power law distribution versus a random distribution6 
 
What interests us here is not just the idea of networks themselves, but rather how 
the tools of Web 2.0 enhance those networks and are enhanced by them. To answer this 
question we must first arrive at an agreed-upon understanding of what Web 2.0 actually 
is, how it differs from Web 1.0, and the kinds of services, tools, opportunities and 
drawbacks it offers to users. The Web has evolved over the past decade in ways that are 
theoretically meaningful. A definition is hard to come by, but O’Reilly argues that some 
of the critical components of Web 2.0 are participation (as opposed to simply publishing), 
“radical trust,” in the form of Wikis like Wikipedia, “radical decentralization,” and 
“tagging, not taxonomy,” in the form of the kind of user-generated sorting and rating that 
takes place on certain Web sites (O’Reilly 2005).  The typical transformation from Web 
1.0 to Web 2.0 can illustrated by the move from “dumping” offline, print content onto the 
Internet, to the creation of online-only sites that utilize the new cooperative and 
collaborative capabilities of the technology itself. O’Reilly points to the Web 1.0 site for 
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6 Image reprinted from http://orionwell.files.wordpress.com/2007/06/random-vs-power-law-distribution-
2.jpg 
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the Encyclopedia Brittanica, to the Web 2.0 site Wikipedia, where user-editors both 
create, edit, and police the content.  
The rise of Web 2.0 has given rise to the creation of what some scholars have 
called “social media,” what Shirky refers to as “social tools” and what I will refer to as 
Social Media Networks (SMNs). Social Media Networks encompass Weblogs (i.e. blogs), 
Social Networking Sites like Facebook, Niche-networking sites like LinkedIn (for 
professional networking), crowdsourcing content like Digg7 (a site that allows users to 
rank and control media content), text-messaging services (by which mobile phone users 
can send written messages to one another), micromedia services like Twitter (a many-to-
many communications service that allows users to send messages to each other or post 
them to blogs), picture-sharing services such as Flickr (which allows users to mark or 
“tag” their photos and self-organize the content), and event-planning sites like Meet-Up. 
Much of what these services do is allow people to share information and to form groups, 
at a very low cost, with a very large number people, and to do so interactively. Power 
laws have also been applied to the study of blogs in addition to commercial Web sites 
(Shirky 2008; Karpf 2008; Drezner 2007). Unsurprisingly, most of the blog traffic in the 
world is directed to a relatively small number of sites, whereas most blogs, like most 
Web sites, get zero to a handful of hits8 per day. The reality that blogospheres are 
governed by power laws helps explain the popularity of certain blogs and bloggers 
against others, and generate hypotheses about why certain events and stories receive 
coverage and others do not. Power laws should also lead us to be cautious about 
 
7 The term “crowdsourcing content” is borrowed from Brian Solis and his graphical illustration of the 
social media world “The Conversation Prism”.  
8 “Hits” refers to the number of unique visitors to any given Web page.  
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assuming that, to paraphrase Hindman (2008), to speak in cyberspace is the same as 
being heard. The reality is that not everyone has an equal voice on the Internet, and that 
Web 2.0 technologies have the effect of amplifying those inequalities. 
In the political realm, information is of far-reaching importance, and therefore, the speed 
and means by which information travels must be of equal importance. As Castells et. al. 
note, “Control of information and communication has been a major source of power 
throughout history” (2007, 209). This is particularly true of authoritarian systems, in 
which certain kinds of information – if shared by all citizens – might be damaging to the 
long-term viability of the system. SMNs perform a number of information functions that 
make them desirable for dissidents in authoritarian systems. First, they facilitate “many-
to-many” communication and allow individuals to share information instantly with large 
numbers of people – news of an arrest, the dates and times of a demonstration, the 
impending arrival of security forces. This is increasingly true in the age of the “mobile 
web”- when accessing the always-on Internet from mobile phones becomes at least as 
prevalent as doing so from a laptop or computer terminal. Second, they make it difficult 
for regimes to cover up news stories or events that are deemed threatening to government 
control. Third, they dramatically reduce the amount of time it takes for information to 
travel – both because of the nature of the technology itself and because of social media’s 
ability to enhance standard social networks – while simultaneously increasing the 
geographic and spatial reach of that information. To explain the impact of social media, 
we must first understand how networks function and how the new networks being 
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constructed and used are altering the social and political topology in societies that are 
adopting these technologies.  
2.2 SMNs and Media Events 
SMNs cause us to revise our understanding of the relationship of press freedom to 
authoritarianism in the developing world. By empowering non-professional actors and 
placing the tools of documentation and truth-telling into the hands of ordinary citizens, 
SMNs create linked activists who can contest the narrative-crafting and information-
controlling capabilities of authoritarian regimes. In so doing they render questionable 
understandings in the literature about press freedom and its relationship to 
authoritarianism. For instance, non-partial rankings of press freedoms in the developing 
world may need to be updated to take into account the effects of SMNs and the feedback 
loop with the press that generates coverage for issues that may have been previously 
ignored in the official press 
Farrell and Drezner claim that the effectiveness of blogs as sources of news and 
information is due to their consumption by political and journalistic elites. They write (in 
the American context), “There is strong evidence that media elites – editors, publishers, 
reporters, and columnists –consumed political blogs” (Farrell and Drezner 2008, 23). 
There is no particular reason to imagine that this isn’t also true in authoritarian societies 
with relatively free presses. In such societies, the universe of prominent bloggers is quite 
small, limited both by the network structure of the internet (Shirky 2008) and by the still-
limited Internet access for many ordinary citizens in less-wealthy parts of the non-
democratic world. But this tiny elite of bloggers and journalists is able to have outsize 
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influence on public affairs, due to their interconnectedness with journalists As Ajemian 
notes, “…the value of blogs as a form of new media is that they allow for individual grass 
roots political journalism and facilitate the creation of a counter-public sphere of 
discourse that has the potential to penetrate mainstream media” (Ajemian 2008). SMNs 
governed by power laws serve to create or amplify the social connections between 
journalists and elite bloggers, making it far more likely that certain bloggers will receive 
press attention, or that their work will be picked up or “borrowed” by reporters. 
SMNs have a number of structural advantages over the traditional media that 
make them quite different in their capabilities, and in some cases, able to report on 
subjects that other media outlets in authoritarian societies won’t write or report about. 
First, SMNs have the advantage of instantaneity, in the sense that blogs can be updated 
instantly, either directly through laptops, or indirectly through SMS, Twitter, Jaiku and 
other manifestations of the Mobile Web. Maratea argues that the “speed of transmission” 
available to bloggers and Web activists is more important than the lowering of cost 
barriers for entry into the media universe (2008, 144). The fact that such individuals can 
make their claims without editors or interference from corporate entities makes it possible 
for them to reach diverse audiences instantly and to influence public discussion and 
debate. It also, of course, increases the amount of information available and thus 
concomitantly may decrease trust in its veracity (Garrett 2009). For instance, mobile 
activists can update their colleagues and readers directly via a Twitter post about an arrest 
or demonstration, well before editors and writers at even the fastest newspapers can put 
stories online.  
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A long body of literature points to the importance of a free press to democracy 
(Woodly 2008, 110) and the reverse side of that democratic coin is the importance of 
maintaining information and discursive control in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
governments. It is therefore not surprising that regime type plays an important role in the 
extent to which the Internet has penetrated a given society (Milner 2006). While semi-
authoritarian countries may have some elements of a free press, those outlets are unlikely 
to have complete freedom of movement in the information market. It is therefore widely 
hoped that “new media” – from satellite TV to the Internet -- may provide an alternative 
source of information under such conditions, that might lead to more democratic 
outcomes or allow for more political space in the MENA region (Fandy 1999; Winston 
2003; Lynch 2006; Wheeler 2006; Schliefer 2006; Sreberny 2001; Rahimi 2003; 
Hofheinz 2005 )9.  
What is less studied is that SMNs have a serious effect on the effectiveness of 
these alternative media outlets and the scope of their reach as well as the interplay 
between new media sources and professionals working in more traditional media. And by 
producing quicker informational cascades, SMNs may accelerate the transformation of 
certain kinds of discourses in the traditional media – they facilitate a process by which, as 
Somer writes, “previously taboo terms and concepts are openly expressed” (2005, 606). 
By serving as first-movers and accelerating the spread of certain memes, concepts, and 
ideas, social media pave the way for the adoption of these discourses in the traditional 
media – and this might be particularly true for journalists who adhere to regime-
 
9 I want to be clear that I am not attributing to any of these authors uncritical claims about the 
democratizing potential of new media; rather they have all wrestled with the question and argued that there 
is at least such potential.  
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sanctioned forms of discourse without having a firm conviction in favor of the 
government’s position. Such individuals are particularly susceptible to the opinions of 
others (i.e. bloggers, journalists, and contacts maintained through social media) (Somer 
2005, 609). 
2.3 SMNs, Collective Action, and Informational Cascades 
Power law networks force us to revise our understanding of collective action 
problems in social movements and revolutions. Networks interface with collective action 
problems by making communication, symbol-sharing, organization, and trust-building 
simpler and more efficient.  SMNs directly impact three of the four pillars of social 
movement theory – by making organizing cheaper and faster, they affect the calculus of 
standard theories of resource mobilization. By affecting the spread of memes and 
symbols, SMNs make it easier to arrive at shared understandings of meanings. SMNs 
generate competing hypotheses about the generation and dissemination of frames. And by 
enlarging social networks and increasing the relevance of weak ties, networks might 
force a reevaluation of the processes behind the formation of relative deprivation 
grievances.  
SMNs reduce the costs of organizing collective action. Shirky writes about how 
social media can both create new networks and strengthen existing ones – both at lower 
costs than in the past (2008). The standard model of organization involves a headquarters, 
an elite structure of salary-drawing leaders, and may include the costs of holding real-
world meetings and conventions, as well as the price of producing and disseminating 
literature in the pertinent media environment. However, SMNs allow groups to form, 
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communicate, and “meet” virtually for free, after the costs of internet access and in some 
cases, the cost of maintaining a highly-trafficked web site are factored in.  
Sunstein writes about the relevance of social media for communication practices 
in the business community, arguing that they effectively streamline a number of 
processes that once cost organizations a great deal of money. For instance, contrast the 
model of advocacy presented by Amnesty International – which maintains a paid staff in 
a certain number of cities worldwide, and has a substantial budget, with an organization 
like Global Voices, which operates for a fraction of that cost yet maintains reporters and 
staff in countries from Morocco to India. While Amnesty International is still the more 
prominent organization, the success of Global Voices – listed by the blog-ranking tool 
Technorati as one of the Top 100 blogs in the world10 – in a very short time period 
should provide evidence of the efficacy of their organizing model. If the costs o
organization and participation are much lower, then it would follow that participation is 
more likely by rational actors seeking to maximize their utility. Just as individual are 
unlikely to participate in a collective endeavor whose benefits they can draw for free, 
organizers are unlikely to opt for models of organization that can be replicated and even 
improved upon for much less money. 
Collective action theory also operates on standard assumptions about individual 
behavior. Specifically, it assumed that individuals will not take the considerable risks of 
revolutionary or oppositional behavior if the benefits do not outweigh the costs. Of 
course, costs and benefits must be conceptualized loosely, as more than simply economic 
 
10 Zuckerman, Ethan. “Success. Success? Success.” …My Heart’s in Accra. January 24th, 2008. 
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/01/24/success-success-success/ 
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benefits for individuals. Perhaps the most important difference between pure rational 
actor theory and the way real-life collective action takes place involves the role of social 
ties (Gould 1993, 182). Gould argues that in dense networks (like those in SMNs) the 
contributions of less central actors have a positive overall effect on the contributions of 
others (193). Furthermore, as a number of authors have noted, different individuals have 
different thresholds of participation in mass political action. Moreover, they appear to 
have incentives, under certain circumstances, for fully or partially falsifying their public 
preferences. (Kuran 1989). Since much of this literature concerns itself with the fall of 
communist regimes, this preference falsification involves the penalties for expressing 
one’s true feelings about a government or an opposition in contexts that involve serious 
personal risks for political action. As Kuran notes, theories of collective action are very 
good at predicting the non-occurrence of revolutions, but leave us in search of theories of 
how, why, and where they do occur (1995).  If individuals always have incentives to free-
ride on the revolutionary action of others, how then do revolutions, or even mass political 
mobilizations, take place?  
Networks facilitate the exchange of private information, which in turn makes 
political or informational cascades more likely – situations in which there is a widespread 
and sudden change in collective attitudes, beliefs, or behavior. SMNs also make it much 
less likely that hostile regimes can control the information environment to such an extent 
that this private information remains obscured or intercepted. As noted in the previous 
section, extensive SMN ties between activists and journalists assures that the stories 
documented and amplified by SMNs also make it to more mainstream press outlets. 
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Under certain circumstances, the cascades triggered by this SMN activity might lead to 
rapid and spontaneous collective action of the sort that generates large protest movements 
and in some circumstances brings down governments. Cascades can also, of course, work 
in the opposite direction, suddenly dismantling or crippling a protest or social movement 
(D’Anieri 2006, 334).  
The work on cascades originally grew out of frustration with theories of crowd 
behavior which imputed irrationality to participants in crowd behavior (Berk 1972, 355). 
The crucial stepping-off point between theories of crowd irrationality and models that 
depend on rational individual decision-making is the idea that actors make decision based 
in part on the behavior and decision-making of others (Berk 1972, 363). They do so in an 
environment of “incomplete and unreliable information,” a point that will be elaborated 
on in further detail below (369). Berk also notes that collective decision-making calls for 
extensive communication between individuals. Later work, stemming from the research 
of Schelling (1978), finds political cascade models using the idea of thresholds and focal 
points to suggest that certain social phenomena become widespread after reaching a so-
called “tipping point” that leads more and more actors to change their behavior. Tipping 
models have been used to analyze everything from the dynamics of white flight and 
changes in discourse to the spread of new fashion trends. As Somer writes, “cascades 
explain how bandwagon effects and the strength of numbers can facilitate the occurrence 
of rapid changes in individual beliefs, expressions, and behavior during collective 
actions” (Somer 2005, 593). The theory operates largely at the level of the individual, and 
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assumes that actors are sensitive to the costs and benefits of participating in protests or 
rebellions (D’Anieri 2006, 333).  
It also assumes that actors’ thresholds are affected directly by the number of other 
people that they see participating in the activity (Granovetter 1978). As Granovetter 
writes, “The cost to an individual of joining a riot declines as riot size increases, since the 
probability of being apprehended is smaller the larger the number involved” (1422). He 
posits that all people have “thresholds” according to which individuals will participate in 
a collective action, and that these thresholds are in some part dependent on the total 
number of other visible individuals participating in that action. Thresholds apply not only 
to collective action, but also to fads and trends, and are analyzed with diffusion models. 
As Barabasi notes, “Acknowledging our differences, diffusion models assign a threshold 
to each individual, quantifying the likelihood that he or she will adopt a given 
innovation” (2002, 131). Those thresholds are also context-specific, in that an individual 
does not have some value assigned to “demonstrating,” but rather adjusts his or her 
threshold according to the situation (Granovetter 1978 1436). I posit here that Social 
Media Networks, by affecting the speed and scope of diffusion, are likely to powerfully 
alter the “situations” of individuals, thereby, changing the speed and likelihood that 
thresholds will be met.  
Individuals are also dependent on pre-existing preferences that establish those 
thresholds to begin with. The more individuals join the protest, the more likely it is that 
individuals with higher thresholds for participating will in fact do so. This makes each 
individual decision contingent (Granovetter 1978, 1434). The tipping point then, is that 
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moment when the protest or activity becomes self-reinforcing, and increases without 
further direct organization or action by the leadership. This is because the action or trend 
will at this point be adopted by individuals who don’t much care one way or the other but 
who generally prefer to be on the right side of things. For instance, many people aren’t 
particularly interested in what happens on the runways of Milan and Paris, but they will 
adopt a trend, like argyle sweaters, so they don’t appear to be out of step with 
contemporary fashions. It is similar to the idea of network effects, which stipulate that a 
technology becomes more useful the more people who adopt it (Lessig 2008, 153-154). 
Ultimately this leaves only the small minority which is ideologically opposed to the 
movement.  
Work on cascades was given new life by the unexpected events that caused and 
followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is widely-acknowledged that almost no one 
saw the breakup of the USSR coming far in advance. As Kuran argues, “The evidence is 
overwhelming that virtually no one expected communism to collapse rapidly, with little 
bloodshed, and throughout Eastern Europe before the end of the 1980s” (Kuran 1995, 
1528). The sudden collapse of governments considered durable took the social science 
universe by total surprise. Similarly, few observers predicted or understood the swift 
breakup, along ethnic lines, of states like Yugoslavia. The descent of the Balkans into 
ethnic violence and genocide horrified journalists, social scientists, and policymakers 
alike, who were left to rely on theories of “primordial” or “ancient” hatreds put forth by 
popular writers (Somer 2001, 135).  
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It made seemingly very little sense for countries with thriving, multi-ethnic cities 
and traditions to suddenly implode and polarize along ethnic lines. However, using 
cascade models may help us understand the nature and causes of such a sudden and 
drastic shift. Somer argues that because of preexisting uncertainties about the extent of 
ethnic tolerance, observers may have underestimated the amount of ethnic polarization 
already present in the former Yugoslavia, and thus a small shift in the amount of 
publicly-expressed divisiveness led to a drastic shift in support for the leaders and 
strategies of polarization. Specifically, Yugoslav society may have polarized privately 
during the 1980s without a general understanding of this polarization, making the 
collapse of the state and the bloody wars of succession far more surprising than they 
should have been had private preferences been known and available, both for observers 
and for the individual agents themselves (Somer 2001, 142). The usefulness of these 
cascade models for understanding sudden, unexpected, and seemingly unpredictable 
shifts in collective behavior has obvious relevance for students and scholars of the 
Middle East, a discipline which has long been accused of making inaccurate predictions 
about collective outcomes, or of not having foreseen the changes that have taken place 
(i.e. Kramer 2001).   
Lustick and Miodownik have defined a cascade as “a radiating pattern of 
transformation in behavior across a large population involving an accelerating change in 
available information about the future condition of the population” (2006, 3). The term is 
generally credited to Bikhchandani et. al., who defined informational cascades as taking 
place when “…it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead 
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of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own 
information” (Bikhchandani et. al. 1992, 994). Their model is sequential in the sense that 
every decision maker can see the decisions of all those who precede them (Bikhchandani 
et. al. 1992, 996). Their model, however, makes the problematic assumption that the 
ordering of individuals is “exogenous and known to all” (998) – i.e that everyone is 
aware of who the first-movers are and act sequentially, basing their own decisions on 
those of the first-movers and their followers. Firms and individuals react to the prior 
decisions of others, even when their own private information might lead them to do 
otherwise.  
For Kuran, this concept of preference falsification is critical to his theory of how 
the events in Eastern Europe unfolded in the last days of communism. The reason that 
few observers and academics successfully predicted the fall of communism has a great 
deal to do with the fact that until the very latest hour, many individuals either falsified 
their preferences for revolution, or maintained their support for the status quo. As Kuran 
notes, the trouble was “imperfect observability” (Kuran 1991, 47). He defines preference 
falsification as “Insofar as his two preference differ – that is, the preference he expresses 
in public diverges from that he holds in private – the individual is engaged in preference 
falsification” (1991, 17).11 Kuran’s model gives individuals thresholds based on their 
available information about others. The size of the opposition affects an individual’s 
payoff structure for supporting anti-government forces (1991, 18). Kuran defines an 
 
11 Somer cautions that under conditions of widespread preference falsification, individuals are unlikely to 
really believe they hear in public (Somer 2005, 608). However, this leaves the problem of how these 
individuals, even if they sense the hypocrisy of publicly-expressed beliefs, are to ascertain the true level of 
support for their private positions.  
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individual’s “revolutionary threshold” as the point at which the payoffs to joining the 
opposition outweigh the psychological costs of maintaining public support for a regime 
that the individual privately opposes (1991, 19). He also emphasizes that very small 
changes in individual support for the regime can cause a cascade effect, as more and 
more individuals’ revolutionary thresholds are crossed. Exogenous shocks, such as an 
external patron declaring its intention not to use force to prop up the status quo, can effect 
these thresholds, insofar as they affect payoff matrices for supporting the opposition, or 
by reducing the potential costs of revolutionary action. But as he notes, “neither private 
preferences nor the corresponding thresholds are common knowledge” (Kuran 1991, 
20).12 He notes that this makes it possible to arrive at the very brink of revolution without 
anyone knowing that the abyss is a mere step away. 
In most of these models, too, the concept of private information is critical. 
Opposition to a particular regime or to particular policies of that regime may be 
widespread, but due to the possibility and cost of repression, that information is held and 
kept privately. Kuran argues that the costs of protest go down as the number of 
participants in widespread political action goes up. These kinds of analyses assume that 
changes in the percentage of the population supporting mass action will change the 
preferences of individual actors (Moore 1995, 446). The problem, then, for mobilization 
becomes twofold – one is how to properly gauge and interpret the private information of 
potential revolutionaries. The second is how to ensure that information, once transmitted 
“publicly” reaches its intended audiences of both the regime and fellow potential 
 
12 One could add that “revolutionary thresholds,” inasmuch as they exist in the real world, may not be 
known to the individual in question either. 
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revolutionaries. Lustick and Miowdownik (2006) argue that standard rational choice 
assumptions about private and public information falsely assume that individuals have 
perfect information about the behavior of others. The authors argue: 
They assume that individuals do not receive information about their world from 
some subset of the population with whom they interact or in whom they place 
particular trust. Instead, individuals are modeled as learning about the state of the 
population as a whole by viewing the entire population or by making inferences 
from a random sample of it (Lustick and Miowdownik 2006, 6).   
 
Instead, they argue that individuals are greatly influenced by their 
“neighborhoods” – i.e. that subset of the population with whom they associate and have 
more information than they do about the general population. Schelling referred to these 
neighborhoods as “zones of knowledge,” whereas Lustick and Miodownik refer to the 
concept as “spatiality.” Somer refers to them as “private zones of trust” in which 
individuals are comfortable expressing beliefs about the political system that they would 
not express in public (2005, 608). They point to research that suggests “tipping” is “more 
rapid and more common when the local neighborhood of each agent is larger” (Lustick 
and Miodownik 2006, 20). They note that focusing on spatiality in fact makes tipping 
substantially less likely, and that “an important determinant of their rate of occurrence is 
the size of the spatially defined neighborhood” (2006, 26). They argue that this finding 
accounts, in some part, for excessive expectations of collective action in certain contexts. 
If true, then private information stands in the way of collective action, and that things that 
serve to decrease the amount of privately-held information in tightly-controlled political 
environments would lead to a greater likelihood of a cascade. 
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For Kuran, the low likelihood of informational cascades ever happening makes 
the business of predicting (as opposed to understanding) revolutions a fruitless process. 
To him, acknowledging human inability to predict the time and place of successful 
rebellion against authoritarian governance is not to be confused with abandoning the 
social-scientific endeavor. “…accepting the limits of what we can expect from science is 
not an admission of defeat” (Kuran 1991, 47). Kuran notes particularly the difficulty of 
obtaining accurate information about private preferences in non-democratic societies – 
during the 1980s, it was virtually impossible to undertake sophisticated opinion research 
in communist regimes, and even when research was undertaken, there was no way to 
really know if the information was accurate or if respondents were falsifying their 
responses because of potential state reprisals (Kuran 1995, 1538-39). Furthermore, as 
Kuran himself notes, it is imperative for the regime itself to maintain its control over the 
flow of information – for according to his model, once it becomes common knowledge 
that the vast majority of citizens opposes the government, it is much more likely that 
individuals will be willing to take part in protest activity.  
In that sense it is not just about private information, but also about the perceived 
likelihood of revolutionary success. Individual assessments of this calculus are thus very 
dependent on individual cognitive processes. As Sunstein and Kuran note, human 
judgments about probability depend on what they call the availability heuristic – the 
human tendency to make assessments based on “the ease with which we can think of 
relevant examples” (Sunstein and Kuran 1999, 685). They argue that these perceptions 
are often not empirically useful or correct – i.e. making judgments about the kinds of 
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conditions that lead to revolution based only one case that an individual is intimately 
familiar with. The availability heuristic sometimes causes the spread of misinformation, 
leading to the adoption of suboptimal responses by public officials, as in the case of the 
panic over the contamination of Love Canal – a perceived public health threat that was 
never proven as such (Sunstein and Kuran 1999, 691-697). As the authors note, far from 
being irrational, the use of the availability heuristic may in many cases be the best option 
for individuals operating in the real world, in which there are real obstacles to becoming 
the perfectly-informed actors of pure rational choice theory (Sunstein and Kuran 1999, 
690). For our purposes, however, it should be sufficient to note the authors’ larger point: 
that the availability of information leads actors to revise their own judgments about 
things that are considered normatively accepted, and gives them clues about the 
preferences and interests of others (767). The role of social media in making information 
like this more readily available should lead us to think more about the conditions under 
which cascades take place. It also challenges the notion, advanced by Shirky, that social 
media merely helps brings together people who already share preferences, rather than 
changing preferences themselves (2008, 288). 
Sunstein writes about the information-aggregating potential of digital and social 
media. In Sunstein’s analysis, what prevents groups from properly aggregating 
information is that certain members of the group will choose not to share their privately-
held information ----- whether preferences or critical information or simply new ideas – 
for fear of ridicule or because of a willingness to go along with the group. Sunstein calls 
these wells of private information “hidden profiles” (2006, 81) and defines them as “the 
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accurate understandings that groups could attain but do not.” Groups arrive at sub-
optimal decisions for a variety of reasons, among them the “common knowledge effect,” 
by which information shared by all group members takes on a much larger significance 
than private information held by some or one member of the group (2006, 82). He also 
argues that lower-status members of groups are more likely to keep their hidden profiles 
hidden, and to be ignored even if they do speak up. According to Sunstein, and pace 
Bakhchandani et al., this actually makes cascades more likely since individuals in groups 
are liable to disregard their own private information and go along with the group.  
SMNs have the effect of aggregating this dispersed, private information and 
revealing hidden profiles, either through the SMNs themselves, or by transmission from 
SMN activists to journalists. SMNs by their nature require users to share as much of their 
private information, political leanings, and activities as possible, and require deliberate 
action to make any of this activity private. What is new about SMNs is that by default the 
actions of individual users are made public to that individual’s entire network by 
automatically updating. Blog postings are, by their very nature, public. Twitter posts, 
while not available to all in quite the same way as a blog, are also public for an 
individual’s entire network. On Facebook, for instance, any change in an individual’s 
“status” (a short, updateable, two-line note that appears under your profile) can be seen 
by the dozens, hundreds, or thousands of other people in that network. So if Facebook 
had been around in 1989 Leipzig, the message “Hans is heading to the square to 
demonstrate” would have been instantly transmitted to anyone in his network. While it is 
unlikely that Hans’ close friends would have been particularly surprised by this decision 
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– since actors tend to inform those closest to them of their political preferences – it may 
have been news to the weaker ties in his social network: distant cousins, acquaintances 
from work, old college buddies – the people commonly referred to as “friends-in-law”. 
According to Gould, if Hans is a marginal actor – i.e. a non-connector – the marginal 
value of his contribution to the collective action might be very high (Gould 1993, 194). 
These are precisely the kinds of ties that SMNs tend to “activate” in the sense that in the 
real world, such individuals are unlikely to interact or to exchange information on 
anything remotely approaching a regular basis. Of course, governments may use this 
practice as well, but because of the Friend of a Friend (FoF) nature of these sites, those 
messages are unlikely to be effective in reaching or changing the preferences of distant 
social clusters – in other words, there is a reputational component to SMNs that will be 
difficult for governments to fully overcome. 
SMNs create large, dense networks that effectively collapse the distinction 
between strong and weak ties. SMNs transmit information that was formerly “private” – 
i.e. known only to a small subset of their larger social network, and make that 
information “public” in the sense of transmitting it to the entirety of that network (or at 
least the percentage of the network engaged in social media). For social scientists, a peek 
at this kind of data might allow for more informed classifications of regime popularity 
and legitimacy under conditions of incomplete or suppressed information – certainly an 
improvement over the kinds of information that scholars once used to judge the 
popularity of authoritarian regimes. As Kuran notes, in the 1980s, observers could only 
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compare official, falsified data with the observations of travelers and dissidents (Kuran 
1995, 1538-1541).  
This discussion of public and private preferences points to a problem, first, with 
the traditional schema of “public” and “private” information. While information 
transmitted in this way may be known to an individual’s entire network, it is still not 
necessarily “public” in the way that Lohmann and Kuran would define it – i.e. available 
as random, public information to any member of the general population. So perhaps the 
critical distinction is not between public and private, but between networked and un-
networked information. What matters is not whether information is, strictly speaking, 
available to anyone, but rather whether preferences are open and well-known in 
individual neighborhoods. And there can be little doubt that SMNs increase the volume 
and accuracy of information in an individual’s network – even if it’s also true that the 
amount of information available may be cognitively overwhelming. If only a small 
amount of formerly private information is transmitted, processed, and understood, it 
could drastically alter trajectories. 
However, making more private information available to social circles does not 
necessarily mean that this information will reach beyond an individual’s narrow network. 
However, SMNs are likely to facilitate the transfer of information across social circles, 
reducing the “small worlds” problem. Most people are familiar with the idea of “six 
degrees of separation,” in which you can connect anyone in six steps or less to any other 
person.” Barabasi locates the first written instance of this phenomenon in an obscure 
Hungarian short-story writer named Frigyes Karinthy, who speculated that there were no 
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more than five degrees separating any two people in the world (Barabasi 2003, 36). But 
most academic investigations refer back to the experiments of the controversial social 
scientist Stanley Milgram, who wanted to see if randomly-selected individuals could 
forward a letter to certain “target” individuals, and to count the number of intermediaries 
needed to get the letters across the country.  
Although the study itself seems beset with difficulties in retrospect (see Watts), 
Milgram found that the median number of stops made by the letters on the way to their 
targets was 5.5. If there are so few degrees separating any two individuals, then we 
indeed live in what can be termed a “small world.”  Other discoveries include the idea 
that people tend to sort themselves into social “clusters,” with small groups of well-
connected people clustered around common interests or locales. Instead of all people 
having an equal number of social connections, in actual social networks, small clusters 
are connected by a few people with a high number of connections – what Gladwell called 
“connectors” (Gladwell 2002) and what others term “influencers”.  Furthermore, weak 
ties – i.e. acquaintances – are just as important as strong ties in bridging these clusters 
(Watts 1999, 15). This is because even a single connection bridging two distinct social 
groups has the effect of “shrinking mathematical worlds” (Freyberg-Inan 2006). It is 
worth quoting Barabasi in full here to get a full understanding of the importance of these 
links: 
The surprising finding of Watts and Strogatz is that even a few extra links are 
sufficient to drastically decrease the average separation between the nodes. 
These few links will not significantly change the clustering coefficient. Yet 
thanks to the long bridges they form, often connecting nodes on the opposite 
side of the circle, the separation between all nodes spectacularly collapses 
(Barabasi 2003, 53).  
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The implications of this “spectacular collapse” of social distance are only now 
becoming widely-understood. But if true, then social networking tools may help solve 
one of the conundrums of small-world social reality – the limited cognitive ability of 
most people to sustain more than a few hundred connections at a time. In some ways, 
Facebook turns all of its users into connectors – people with dozens of instantaneous 
social connections that span social clusters and build bridges between distinct social 
groups. Not only does Facebook collapse social distance within clusters, it collapses 
social distance between them.  
SMNs like Facebook thus might have an important role to play in amplifying weak 
ties, making them transparent and usable, and simplifying the process of activating them. 
Expanding on Gould’s conclusions about the role of social ties in collective action, SMNs 
empower peripheral actors in very dense networks, whose contributions become more 
valuable. SMNs help build what Shirky calls “bridging capital” between diverse groups 
of people who might otherwise not think to work together for a common cause. Therefore, 
again, theories that operate on assumptions of randomness might be of less use in coming 
to a true understanding of the dynamics of informational cascades. Cascades take place in 
Small Worlds and so studies that start from an assumption of social randomness are at a 
serious disadvantage. 
Assuming that individuals base their preferences not on a random subset of the 
population, but on their local neighborhoods, any change in the ratio of private-to-public 
information about those neighborhoods would have a corresponding effect on preferences 
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and revolutionary thresholds. SMNs reduce the amount of truly private information for 
individuals in any network – leaving only falsified public information (saying on your 
information page, for instance, that your political views are “very liberal” when in fact 
they are the opposite). Concomitantly, any increase in the amount of public information 
decreases what Sunstein calls “hidden profiles,” and may lead to more optimal outcomes 
in cases of group action or deliberation. Users of these media forms tend to make this 
information public without a great deal of discomfort about the potential ramifications. In 
revolutionary or potentially revolutionary situations, then, the amount of what Sunstein 
calls “dispersed” information is greatly reduced. This makes it easier to organize, all 
things being equal, and makes it more likely that collective actions can be successfully 
organized. D’Anieri (2006) notes that later protest movements in Serbia and Ukraine 
were successful, whereas earlier movements, undertaken under similar circumstances, 
were not. He allows that the later movements were “clearly stronger, more organized, and 
better funded, than their predecessors” and avoids a discussion of why this might be at 
the level of group organizing, arguing that it was pre-existing divisions at the elite level 
that explain the divergent outcomes (347-348).  
2.4 Network Effects and Authoritarian Responses 
Authoritarian states are likely to recognize the threat posed by SMNs and to 
respond accordingly. The properties of SMNs, however, are likely to mediate the 
effectiveness of authoritarian response. SMNs are not invulnerable to destruction, but 
they do present unique challenges to anyone seeking to undermine them. As Matthew and 
Shambaugh (2005) argue, such “networks are easy to access but difficult to destroy” 
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(618). For activists seeking to oppose the state, the networking capabilities of SMNs 
make it both more difficult to take out hubs, and lessen the consequences of doing so. A 
large number of nodes need to be removed from the system before the network itself will 
cease to operate properly. To put it more directly, while the state can conceivably shut 
down any one human rights organization, it cannot erase the accumulated experiences, 
knowledge, and wisdom of its members, which exists independently of their physical 
headquarters and is situated in a larger, denser (online) network. On the other hand, it is 
exceedingly easy for the state to reach out and use repression on individual members of 
the network. The way that many prominent activists in authoritarian societies are linked 
to transnational activist networks also makes it costlier for regimes to systematically 
engage in this kind of repression.  
However, a focus on the individual neglects more systemic variables that might 
affect a state’s effectiveness in combating SMNs. First, the more powerful authoritarian 
states are moving toward a strategy of stripping SMNs of their power, by partnering with 
corporations to make “non-generative” and “tethered” technologies (Zittrain 2008). 
Tethered technologies reserve to the corporation, and thus the state, the ability to 
remotely track, alter, or destroy the devices upon which all SMN activity so critically 
defends. Powerful authoritarian states can also force SMN companies, like Google, 
Facebook, or Youtube, to capitulate to authoritarian demands – whether that is filtration, 
blocking individual users, or altering software to suit local repressive needs.  
Authoritarian states that nevertheless possess functioning parliaments, quasi-
independent press outlets, active parties, and at least mildly competitive elections are 
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most vulnerable to pressure from IT-based dissidence at moments of extreme tension and 
crisis. This conclusion is drawn from the lessons of the various “color revolutions” of the 
past six years. In Serbia, Lebanon, Georgia, and Ukraine crucial regime turning points 
revolved around elections and electoral competition in longstanding, authoritarian 
regimes. Mass mobilization in these situations was aided significantly by widespread IT 
usage, particularly mobile. SMN technologies like Twitter and SMS are tools that make 
these kinds of meetings and networks possible, in part because of their own unique 
technological characteristics and in part because states have been unable to entirely clamp 
down on users’ activities. We should expect authoritarian regimes to engage in 
increasingly sophisticated attempts to control the use of SMNs, and for those responses to 
vary by regime. Strict authoritarian regimes are more likely to engage in strict control of 
the Internet’s architecture – filtering, censoring, and surveillance, whereas semi-
authoritarian regimes are likely to allow for greater debate but then respond to actual 
provocations with traditional repression. 
2.5 Hypotheses  
If the expectations and theories outlined in this chapter are correct, they lead to a 
series of hypotheses about the relationship between Social Media Networks and media 
events and political mobilization. The first and most obvious is that, ceteris paribus, an 
increase in the density of usership of SMNs should lead to an increase in group formation 
and political mobilization in any given society. Specifically, we should expect that under 
similar structural conditions, mobilization should be expected and observed whereas in 
the absence of social media, mobilization did not occur. We should expect to see, at the 
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least, attempts to mobilize what Olson called “the forgotten groups” – groups that in the 
past may have remained unformed. These are groups that may share common interests 
but that previously lacked the capacity to organize themselves into politically relevant 
entities. Of course this causes something of a methodological conundrum, since there is 
no way to establish cause-and-effect for absent social phenomena. Absence of evidence is 
not evidence of absence.  
Some scholarly work contradicts this hypothesis. While Calfano and Sahliyeh 
(2008) found that increased access to the Internet has not led to increased political 
freedoms in the Middle East, a simple tally of internet connections does not lend insight 
into the full spectrum of applications and services offered by Web 2.0, many of which are 
specifically geared toward organization and mobilization. Since the MENA region has 
been late to adopt the Internet generally, it should also be expected that the region will 
lag behind other parts of the world in the pace of its adoption of social media. Therefore a 
more comprehensive approach would take into account not only internet connections, but 
also cell phone users, members of SNS’s and so forth. Comparative, global statistical 
analysis is badly needed for political scientists to properly understand the role of social 
media in political change – and more importantly we need to leave behind the monolithic 
conception of “the Internet” as an explanatory variable, and come to more nuanced 
understandings of what takes place online, who is doing it, for what purposes, and to 
what effect.  
Secondly, if SMNs facilitate the movement of information, it follows that we 
should expect semi-authoritarian regimes (which operate under some constraints) to have 
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an increasingly difficult time managing the information environment (as opposed to strict 
authoritarian regimes, as noted above). SMNs turn individuals into reporters, 
photojournalists, and documentary filmmakers, requiring nothing more than a standard 
cellular telephone. The topology of such networks suggests that the work of individuals is 
likely to be found, cited, or borrowed by traditional media sources, and thereby will be 
disseminated to the mass of un-networked individuals in societies with relatively free 
press environments. Therefore, the more SMNs, the more likely it is that government will 
be unable to quash stories that it finds threatening. On the other hand, in societies with 
little to no press freedom, SMNs are unlikely to be nearly as effective. This can be 
directly measured by the appearance of stories in the independent press as compared to 
the traditional press, in paired comparisons with previous instances of similar events and 
coverage. As manifestations of this prediction, we should expect to see similar news 
events receive disproportionately greater coverage in networked societies as opposed to 
un-networked societies. For the purposes of this project, the coverage and outcomes of 
labor demonstrations (increased ancillary activity in addition to on-the-ground labor 
mobilization), sexual harassment movements (increased NGO and street mobilization), 
and torture incidents (increased NGO activity, mobilization, and at least cosmetic 
changes in regime torture policy) should be considerably different between the pre-social 
media and post-social media age. Inasmuch as collective action is driven by events and 
grievances, this element alone should lead to greater organization around certain key 
issues, as will be seen most clearly with respect to the prior three issues in Egyptian 
politics.   
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These phenomena of SMN-driven coverage in the press and SMN-driven 
collective action are mutually reinforcing. SMNs may generate press coverage, the 
existence of which enriches the information environment, and in tandem with SMNs lead 
to informational cascades. Therefore our final hypothesis is that increased usership and 
density of SMNs should more easily trigger information cascades in authoritarian 
regimes. 
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Chapter 3 
Agenda-Setters: 
Torture, Rights and Social Media Networks in Egypt 
“The internet means geography isn’t so important, so if you an find the 1,000 or 5,000 or 
50,000 people out there who want to make a certain kind of change and can connect them 
and show them a path, they want to follow you.” 
-Seth Godin 
 
“Beyond their momentous effects, protest waves are intrinsically fascinating. The 
phenomena of ordinary people struggling to preserve their honour and dignity, 
organising to make forceful demands on those who control their fates and livelihoods, 
activating their citizenship, this is an awesome thing to behold.” 
-Baheyya 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Until very recently, conversations about the impact of the Internet in Egypt (and 
most parts of the Middle East) proceeded from a caveat: the limited access of most 
Egyptians to the Internet stands in the way of any real impact. Not only that, but even 
cursory observation makes it clear that most Egyptians still get their news and 
information from print media and satellite television. The primacy of more traditional 
media forms is true not just in Egypt, but comparatively as well (Woodly 2007, 109). 
With these largely-uncontested caveats, the study of new media in the Middle East has 
been considered marginal in comparison with longstanding institutional, economic, and 
social realities. While there may be widespread admiration for the work and courage of 
SMN activists, enthusiasm about their impact has been largely limited to popular 
accounts (see The Nation 2007; Shapiro 2009) rather than academic inquiry. Even those 
studies that postulate a link between New Media and outcomes typically fail to identify 
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causal mechanisms. However, outright dismissal of New Media fails to explain the way 
that Social Media Networks have generated coverage of previously taboo subjects, from 
sexual harassment to the Baha’i faith. Skeptics are right to insist on the primacy of 
traditional forms of media, but miss the SMN-enhanced social connections between 
journalists and activists.  
As argued in chapter 2, one of the ways that SMNs generate traditional press 
coverage is through electronically-enhanced social networks. SMNs have the effect of 
extending an individual’s social “neighborhood” by transforming weak into strong ties, 
and non-existent ties into weak ones. Journalists in general tend to be better-connected 
than the average individual, and in Egypt, prominent SMN activists are either former 
journalists (Wael Abbas, Nora Younis) or double as either print or electronic activists 
(Hossam El-Hamalawy). The ties between this small set of individuals and the large 
number of traditional journalists in Egypt means that the work of SMN activists has a 
significant chance of getting picked up by the press and written about or broadcasted. 
This does not necessarily mean that SMN activists will be credited for their work, as 
much as their work may convince traditional journalists that a particular issue or event 
should be covered. In the American context, Drezner demonstrated that journalists 
regularly read a small number of blogs, giving those bloggers an immense amount of 
influence and credibility. Egyptian journalists also routinely mention the same small 
number of bloggers as influential, particularly in the issue-areas of most interest to this 
project (human rights activism).  
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Skeptics also point to the limited utility and results of SMN activism in the 
Middle East as evidence of their essential irrelevance. Region-wide, no regime has been 
replaced by activism or organizing from the Internet, nor do any observers believe that 
the entrenched political and military power of authoritarian states in the region has been 
seriously threatened by SMN activists, with the exception being the events since June 
2009 in Iran. The failure of SMN activism to effect these kinds of attention-grabbing 
changes seems particularly acute in comparison to the widely-acknowledged role that 
such technologies have played in regime changes in the Philippines, Ukraine, and 
Georgia.  
However, the efficacy of those technologies in other contexts was demonstrated 
during times of serious regime-level crises, in two cases over fraudulent elections, and 
the other over corruption. SMNs are unlikely to provoke this kind of crisis as much as 
they are likely to be well-positioned to contribute to them.  Furthermore, expecting 
SMNs to cause macro-level change in stable authoritarian regimes may be asking more 
than the technologies by themselves can deliver; a focus on the state level also misses the 
most important effects of SMN activism. Theorizing from the failure of SMN-led 
organizing or protest leads to conclusions of inefficacy, under circumstances in which 
few political or social forces have successfully mobilized for macro-change across the 
region. Success under such conditions needs to be defined much more narrowly. This 
chapter argues that SMNs have had a very clear, if politically limited, impact on several 
issue-areas in Egyptian politics, under conditions in which the opposition is fragmented.  
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As Mosahel argues, “Mubarak’s opposition hums with disparate voices….” Often 
the failure of opposition forces to come together provides ample evidence for theorists 
who argue for the efficacy of Mubarak’s divide-and-rule strategy. Unsurprisingly, these 
successes all fall under the umbrella of issues on which the opposition forces in Egyptian 
politics have found broad agreement. Rutherford (2008) argues that a “convergence of 
political alternatives” has taken place, in which Islamist and secular opponents of the 
regime agree on a small set of substantive human rights and rule-of-law reforms. It is 
SMN activism that focuses on this narrow area of convergence that is likely to be 
successful, and has been successful in the past.  
This chapter will trace the emergence of the relationship between blogs and other 
forms of electronic media, on one hand, and the traditional Egyptian print media, on the 
other. In particular, it will be argued here that SMNs, by breaking some major stories, 
and reporting in unique ways on others, have contributed to an overall climate in which 
the Egyptian regime is unable to control public discourse and enforce its dictates without 
opposition. The paper will outline the structural differences between SMNs and the 
Egyptian press environment, and argue that while SMNs add essential elements to public 
discourse, they are still very dependent on the existence of the independent press to 
publicize their findings and to create an environment in which the general public has 
access to the discourse of the blogosphere and the issues raised by Web activists. The 
methodology will compare these cases of SMN-driven coverage against past coverage or 
non-coverage of similar events in the Egyptian political system, to determine the impact 
of both SMNs and the emergence of independent press outlets in 2003-2005. 
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3.1 The Birth and Maturation of Egyptian Blogging 
Boas and Kalathil note that Egypt, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, has no formal 
mechanism to control or filter Internet content (Boas and Kalathil 122). The Egyptian 
government, as of the publication of this research, appeared to view the commercial and 
administrative potential of the Internet as greater than the potential for political unrest 
and opposition coordination, although a branch of the police now known as the “Internet 
Police” was formed in 2004 (Eid 2004).13 With the inauguration of the National Project 
for Technology Renaissance in 1999, the regime set itself on a course of using 
information technology and the Internet as a way to streamline and improve government 
efficiency, as well as to attract international capital (Wheeler 2003, 631). Thus the regime, 
having committed itself to the positive externalities of e-commerce and e-government, set 
itself on a course in which it would be very difficult to substantially filter the Internet.  
It was in that free-flowing context that one of the first “blogs” in Egypt was formed, 
Cairo Live. It began operating in 1995. At the time, Internet subscribership was miniscule 
in Egypt, and most Web content was in English. Cairo Live’s owner was Tarek Atia, who 
says that he was “blogging before blogging was invented.”14 Cairo Live began as a news 
aggregation service, which summarized articles, and featured an interface similar to The 
Drudge Report. Atia, presaging much of the rationale for later bloggers, argued that  
The key function is to reengineer or reestablish news priorities. It’s basically 
a window for readers to see that the news priorities that traditional news 
authorities present to them is not the paradigm that they have to function on. 
 
13 Informally, accessing the Internet has become more difficult and more expensive between the summer of 
2008 and the summer of 2009. Internet cafes that formerly offered free Internet access had locked down 
their service through Mobinil, and required registration through a cell phone. This practice was clearly 
intended to introduce an element of surveillance to what had been relatively open access practices in Egypt. 
14 Interview with Tarek Atia, Cairo, Egypt. February 6th, 2008. 
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It’s an attempt to explain to people that politics should never only be limited 
to this concept of foreign policy or domestic policy. Politics is much wider 
than that, it’s the stuff of everyday life. Our newspapers and our traditional 
media have limited what people think is newsworthy. 
 
Thus Egyptian blogs provide an alternative to official discourses. Many bloggers 
consider themselves guardians of a kind of objectivity that they do not find in any of the 
newspapers or other media outlets in Egypt. However, with the exception of Cairo Live, 
this activity had to wait for the emergence of more sophisticated publishing platforms – 
as well as the right political moment. In the meantime, chat rooms, Yahoo groups, and 
email listservs played important roles in the development of the Egyptian public sphere, 
particularly with respect to Egyptian reactions to the second Palestinian Intifada. These 
now-outdated forms of discourse emerged in Egypt around the turn of the century. As 
Hossam El-Hamalawy notes, “I was being spammed left and right by people who have 
the boycott lists, updates about the Intifada, pictures of the dead, pictures of the atrocities 
– these were being emailed, and yahoo groups15 were like the hip thing back then.” In the 
early part of the decade, Blogger – one of the world’s foremost blogging platforms – 
began offering service in Arabic, and the Egyptian blogging scene grew more vibrant. 
There was also a deep and intimate connection between the emerging blogosphere and 
the nascent protest movement that emerged in Egypt after the beginning of the Iraq War. 
The movement was known as Kefaya (literally: Enough!) and was conceptualized as a 
broad-based protest and political movement opposing corruption and the continuation of 
the authoritarian regime of Hosni Mubarak.  
 
15 Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy, Cairo Egypt, May 27th, 2009. 
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As Radsch writes, “A natural symbiosis between Egypt’s early core bloggers and 
the emerging protest movement helped popularize the Egyptian blogosphere as a site of 
protest as Kefaya grew in popularity during 2005” (Radsch 2008). Radsch terms this 
period “the experimentation phase.” As more and more politically-interested individuals 
formed their own blogs over this period, they made the platform of blogging itself 
increasingly relevant to Egyptian internet users, since according to Metcalfe’s law, the 
value of a communications network increases the more people use it. The most prominent 
Egyptian bloggers of this period still blogged in English – sites like The Arabist, as well 
as the still-anonymous Baheyya, the Sandmonkey, Big Pharaoh, and others. Some of 
these bloggers were notable for their pro-Western positions, which together with their 
choice of language, placed them well outside of the political mainstream in Egypt and led 
some to dismiss blogging as the niche tool of an Americanized elite. This early period 
was also when the relationship between bloggers and journalists – before the maturation 
of the independent press – was most toxic. As Wael Abbas says, “The relationship 
between the blogs and the newspapers was not really good from the beginning. As I told 
you we had like exclusive material and exclusive footage, in the beginning they used to 
steal it without even crediting us…but it gradually grew into a cooperation between 
newspapers and blogs.” 
As noted in Chapter 2, strong evidence from other contexts indicates that journalists 
read and borrow stories from bloggers (Farrell and Drezner 2008). Every journalist I 
interviewed in Cairo mentioned at least a handful of blogs that they read on a regular 
basis – typically this includes Wael Abbas’s influential blog, as well as people like Malek 
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Mustafa, Hossam El-Hamalawy (who writes about labor issues and human rights) and 
Nora Younis. In fact the universe of prominent bloggers is quite small, limited both by 
the network structure of the internet (Faris 2008; Shirky 2008) and by the still-limited 
Internet access for most Egyptians. But this tiny elite of bloggers and journalists is able to 
have outsize influence on public affairs, due to their interconnectedness with journalists – 
in fact many prominent Egyptian bloggers are or were journalists to begin with. As 
Ajemian notes, “…the value of blogs as a form of new media is that they allow for 
individual grass roots political journalism and facilitate the creation of a counter-public 
sphere of discourse that has the potential to penetrate mainstream media” (Ajemian 2008). 
Digital media serve to amplify the social connections between journalists and elite 
bloggers, making it far more likely that certain bloggers will receive press attention, or 
that their work will be picked up or “borrowed” by reporters. 
Observers are split about the relationship between bloggers and the press. “My own 
theory is that bloggers want to replace old media,” says Atia. “Any new media wants to 
become old media.”16 As even the activists themselves acknowledge, there is an element 
of competition and jealousy between members of the traditional media and the 
“blogosphere,” with each side asserting its primacy and in many cases questioning the 
authenticity and legitimacy of the other. However, this competition does not negate the 
idea that the electronic media – spearheaded by SMN Activists who have their feet both 
in citizen journalism and activism – have taken their place in the Egyptian media and 
discursive environments and have irrevocably altered both. In some cases Egyptian SMN 
Activists see themselves as the only unrestrained and reliable sources of political 
 
16 Interview with Tarek Atia, Cairo, Egypt. February 6th, 2008. 
  
 
66
information, while the journalists view the bloggers as sensationalist and unprofessional. 
These repeated accusations are leveled, but at the same time most participants in this 
discourse understand that they are situated in a particular media environment and that 
they are each playing distinctive and important roles.  
What SMNs accomplish in Egyptian politics is to expand the public sphere to 
accommodate new “claims-makers.” As Maratea (2008) argues, the traditional press 
serves a “gatekeeping function” which serves to restrict access to the media and to 
control the content of what reaches the mass public (140). Citizens have traditionally had 
very little control over or input into the content of mass media, serving largely as 
recipients of information and consumers of entertainment and news (Maratea 2008, 141). 
However, the rise of digital media has created an environment in which individuals have 
the opportunity to interrogate the social and political worlds, and to influence the content 
of news coverage (Delli Carpini 2004). There is also, undeniably, an aspect of the 
Internet that has consolidated the interests of commerce (Pajnik 2005), but the reality of 
commercial domination of the Internet does not exclude the potential for the promotion 
of alternative discourses. As Maratea writes, “…the Web makes it feasible for average 
citizens to disseminate their own commentaries on mainstream media coverage, political 
events, or any other issue of relevance” (2008, 142).  
3.2 SMNs and the Egyptian Press Environment  
In Egypt, while there are certainly strains and invective between these two groups, 
the relationship is actually much more complicated and cooperative than one might be led 
to believe. Egypt’s press environment can best be described as somewhat free. Rugh 
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recently classified Egypt’s press environment as “transitional,” by which he means “these 
systems were quite complex, containing strong elements of government control and 
influence, alongside elements of freedom and diversity” (Rugh 2007, 9). Rugh argues 
that while journalists have much more freedom than in the past in such countries (he 
includes Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria in the category) the government still retains certain 
privileges, and that there are “red lines” that journalists dare not cross. In a practical 
sense, this means what appears to be a lively press environment, with copious criticisms 
of regime practices and policies – even in the government-owned papers – but with a 
great deal of self-censorship occurring still. In Egypt, the process of obtaining a license to 
publish a newspaper is a daunting obstacle to any entity or individual who wishes to 
pursue one. Black (2008, 11) details the ordeal that awaiting the would-be publishers of 
El-Badeel in 2007, who were forced to wait months upon months for their license.  
There are, generally, five kinds of newspapers in Egypt: the government owned 
dailies, the opposition dailies, the party newspapers, the regional papers, and newspapers 
published from abroad (Salih 2007, 13-15). The most-read and most important 
government papers are the dailies Al-Akhbar, Al-Ahram, and Al-Gumhuriya, while other 
government-aligned newspapers of note include Rose Al-Yusef. These papers, while not 
averse to carrying criticism of the government at times, generally toe the editorial line of 
the ruling National Democratic Party, and are known for ignoring stories that are 
unfavorable to the regime, or at least initiating coverage much later than other media. It is 
generally agreed that the Egyptian press environment was energized with the founding of 
the daily opposition paper Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2004, as well as the re-issuing of Al-
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Dustur, first as a weekly, and then in 2007 as a daily.  Their publication followed changes 
in the press laws that ended the government’s monopoly on news information inside 
Egypt.  
Today these two newspapers are by far the most important and influential 
opposition newspapers in Egypt, trailed in importance and circulation by the liberal 
opposition daily El-Badeel17 and a handful of others. These opposition papers are willing 
to carry frank and often direct criticism of the Mubarak regime, and have tended to cover 
stories that the government papers won’t touch. The existence of this independent press 
calls into question the routine lumping of Arab media systems together under the 
umbrella of unfree, and ignores the values that Arab journalists may share (Iskander 
2007). As such they tend to carry a certain legitimacy not possessed by the government 
dailies, even while they seem to have a reputation for sensationalism that was only 
further reinforced in the summer of 2007 when Al-Dustur in particular headlined 
concerns about the health of President Mubarak and relayed rumors of his death. Al-
Dustur Editor-in-Chief Ibrahim Eissa paid a steep price for these decisions, after being 
sentenced to six months in prison with hard labor.18 In this environment it cannot be 
argued that blogs and new media are the only available forms of dissent available to 
Egyptians – one need only turn to the op-ed page of any major or minor opposition or 
party paper to see direct criticism of the state  – although of course there are red lines, 
such as calling for regime change or insulting the president or his family, which are not 
always observed online.  
 
17 El-Badeel has ceased its daily edition as of May 2009. 
18 “Egypt editor sentenced to six months, free on bond.” Reuters, March 26th, 
2008. http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnBAN635621.html. Accessed April 8th, 2008. 
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Instantaneous communication, as noted in Chapter 2, is very important in Egypt. 
Such was the case this past year, when an imprisoned American journalist used Twitter to 
get himself out of jail after covering a labor demonstration (Simon 2008). One major 
newspaper editor admitted that on the day of the events in question, he turned not to Al-
Ahram or even his own paper, but rather to the blogs, for information about what was 
happening and where.  He argues,  
I’ve been working on Sunday until the late evening for the first edition or the 
second edition, so this was my day off, so I’ve taken Monday a vacation. When I 
wake up in the morning I didn’t turn on my TV or wandering around the papers, 
I’ve just opened the blogs and Haraka Masria site, and opened my email there is a 
very famous mailing group called al-Mahroosa, and I found many, many news 
entries for my knowledge. I want to know what’s happening all night, and this is 
the first source I visited to know what’s happening at night.19 
 
This was due both to the reliability of the bloggers in question – earned the hard way over 
a period of years – and to the structural advantages enjoyed by blogs and mobile media.  
As noted in Chapter 2, (some) SMN platforms offer the possibility of remaining 
pseudonymous to their writers and activists, particularly in a state whose security services 
do not appear to be terribly sophisticated technologically. The roster of pseudonymous 
Egyptian bloggers is long, from the caustic right-wing Sandmonkey to the reflective 
Baheyya, and the critical Zeinobia, but the fact remains that the medium gives these 
writers the option to remain anonymous to the security services.20 The Egyptian 
government has recently deployed new identity-tracking software in Internet cafes, but 
with constantly-evolving and freely-available masking software it is unlikely that the 
state will be able to clamp down on the kind of activity it would like to see stopped. And 
 
19 Interview with Ehab El-Zalaky, Cairo Egypt. April 8th, 2008.  
20 At least in the case of the Sandmonkey, the author eventually came to feel that the security forces did 
indeed know who he was.  
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as Shapiro notes, activists are increasingly migrating to sites that are dual-purpose, like 
Facebook – commercial in purpose, but used cleverly by regime opponents to advance 
their claims (Shapiro 2008). The regime, in turn, has grown increasingly successful 
infiltrating those sites and forcing activists to move to still other applications, as we will 
see in Chapter 4. 
SMN activists are willing to violate the red lines of the Egyptian media 
environment and to take quite unusual risks of punishment, arrest, imprisonment, or 
worse, therefore allowing them to report on issues and events that might go unreported in 
the state-aligned, opposition, or party presses. It is not that bloggers have never been 
arrested – on the contrary nearly every activist can tell stories of harassment, intimidation, 
arrest, and in some cases even torture – but rather that few have been sentenced, and even 
fewer have stopped writing and organizing due to these efforts, and thus many bloggers 
express a willingness to risk arrest for the sake of truth-telling and dissent. The fact that 
these individuals do not have to report to editors or institutions who might be wary of 
having their entire operations shut down by the state only makes it more likely that SMN 
activists will cross these boundaries and not ordinary journalists. This absence of 
institutional oversight and control – something that has been criticized by observers21 
actually means that the element of caution present in established relations between the 
regime and the opposition press is completely absent in the blogosphere. Bloggers report 
to no one but themselves and their readers, and they express their commitment to taking 
this responsibility quite seriously. As Mina Zakry of the Arab Network For Human 
 
21 See for example the comments of Abdullah Schleiffer at the December, 17th, 2007 BBC Free To Speak 
debate held in Cairo, Egypt.  
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Rights Information (and the blog Egypt Watchman) told me, “Through my blog I was 
defending freedom of expression, freedom of religion, practicing political and social 
criticism.”22 Another activist for the Muslim Brotherhood, who infiltrated the show-trials 
of the organization’s senior leadership, remarked that “Of course I am afraid, but I don’t 
care, because it’s my life in this country. I have been arrested two times.”23 This lack of 
reticence about the repercussions of activism is widespread in the small blogging and 
human rights community. 
The content provided by SMNs increasingly resembles traditional reporting in 
terms of its emphasis on communicating hard news, often about arrests, reports of torture, 
violations of human rights, and other reports of abuses by the regime. In fact these citizen 
journalists function effectively as their own news agencies, and have developed a 
following that makes them more – or at least just as – respected and trusted than the 
traditional “blogger” who is not out on the street. The influence of bloggers on the public 
sphere takes place through social network connections between bloggers and journalists – 
connections that are strengthened (or created) by the capability of SMNs to bridge social 
clusters. Even when claims advanced in the blogosphere are not immediately picked up 
by journalists who may have other stories to cover, they provide what Maratea calls “a 
database of available claims” that can be drawn upon during lulls in news coverage 
(Maratea 2008, 156).  
In many ways, the development of citizen journalism has led to a bifurcation of 
Egyptian blogging, one path leading to Wael Abbas and his style of first-hand reporting, 
 
22 Interview with Mina Zakry, Cairo, Egypt, March 27th, 2008. 
23 Interview with Ahmed Abdel Fattah, Cairo, Egypt, December 10th, 2007.  
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photography, video-taking, Twittering, and commentary, and the other to what most 
people imagine when they think of a blog – an often acerbic, individualistic take on the 
news and other people’s writing – the style pioneered in Egypt by the Sandmonkey. And 
as Hossam El-Hamalawy caustically notes of that blog, “He represents himself and like 
ten other people in the whole republic.”24 And while both have their utility and their role 
in the Egyptian media environment, it is becoming increasingly clear that the individuals 
who have the most influence are those who practice the former – those who perform all 
of the functions of traditional journalist but who are willing to cross lines and violate 
taboos that professional Egyptian journalists are (typically) unwilling to do.  
Generally, the impact of blogs on the media in Egypt can be broken down into 
four categories. The first is breaking stories, when SMN activists either report original 
information not carried anywhere else in the news universe, or when an activist is 
actually present to provide the first-hand reporting. The second is documenting stories, 
when a SMN activist is present to provide unique textual, photographic, or video 
evidence of stories that were already present or would have been reported on in any case. 
The third is transmission, when SMN activists post or share videos, stories, or photos of 
something that has already happened, via a third party.  Finally, there is red-lining, the 
practice of SMN activists crossing traditional media boundaries in a case or cases in 
which traditional media practitioners are unwilling or unable to say or print certain things. 
The remainder of this chapter will detail one instance of each of these phenomena, which 
challenge the null hypothesis in different ways.  
 
24 Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy, Cairo, Egypt, May 27th, 2009. 
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3.3 Breaking Stories: Sexual Harassment in Downtown Cairo 
In the spring of 2005, Egyptian blogs began to attract international attention, as they 
served as a platform for coordinated protests against a proposed Constitutional 
amendment (Radsch 2008). However, perhaps the defining moment of Egyptian blogging 
took place in October of 2006, during the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. Downtown 
Cairo witnessed a string of mob-like sexual assaults on women – assaults that initially 
went unreported in the Egyptian press. By coincidence, two of Egypt’s more well-known 
SMN activists, Wael Abbas and Malek Mustafa, happened to be on the scene at the time. 
A clearly horrified Malek (who blogs as Malcolm-X), detailed the assaults in all their 
grotesque gratuity on his blog. Amira al-Husseini of Global Voices provided this 
translation of Malek’s initial report: 
We saw a large number of men whistling and running in the direction of Adly 
Street. We went with them to see what was happening. I was surprised to see a 
girl in her early 20s falling on the ground and a mob of men gathering around 
her, feeling up her body and tearing her clothes off her. I didn't understand or 
rather I couldn't comprehend what was happening. The girl got up and ran into 
a restaurant and hid inside. Some boys surrounded the restaurant and wouldn't 
leave until one of them shouted that there was another one coming. All of them 
ran towards Talaat Street again and there I saw a girl who was completely 
surrounded by a mob of hundreds of men trying to touch her body and take off 
her clothes. This girl was rescued by a taxi driver, who pulled her into his taxi. 
But the boys would not allow the taxi through and formed a circle around the 
car,” he said.25 
 
Despite the presence of bloggers and the pictures and videos circulating on the 
Internet, the press remained completely silent for days. However, the first penetration 
of the official silence came via a report on Dream TV on October 28th, with talk show 
host Mona El Shazly and other reporters confirming the allegations with other 
 
25 Ibid. 
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witnesses and shopkeepers (Al-Malky 2007). Then with a series of press articles, the 
official silence began to crack. The first paper to run a report was Al-Fagr, by the 
journalist Wael Abdel Fattah. Other outlets of the independent press soon followed 
suit, including Al-Masry Al-Youm and the still-weekly Al-Dustur. The November 1st 
issue of Al-Dustur, “borrowing” pictures straight from Abbas’s blog, ran no less than 
8 articles directly or indirectly addressing the incident.26 Articles and criticism 
followed in all the major independent and party newspapers, eventually trickling into 
the official press. The regime denied that anything untoward happened downtown, 
while the official press was largely silent. Typically when that silence was broken, it 
initially took the form of attacking Abbas himself, a pattern that would become sadly 
familiar in the years to come.27 However, the protests, coordinated by bloggers such as 
The Sandmonkey, forced a debate that eventually reached even the government press. 
Activists called for the resignation of Interior Minister Habib El-Adly, which of course 
did not happen. However, the more details leaked out about the case, the more it 
appeared that sexual harassment on Eid enjoyed the official or unofficial support of 
elements of the regime, particularly security forces who either participated in the 
assaults or tolerated them.28 
With both video and photos, taken on cell phones, the event was difficult, if not 
impossible, to credibly deny. What made the story even more poignant were the first-
hand accounts from women that day, some of whom were apparently inspired to begin 
 
26 See for instance “al-Dakhiliya ankarat ‘adat al-taharrush fi-l-Qahira wa qalat inna kullu shay’ tamam ya 
fandim!” (The Interior Ministry denied the return of harassment in Cairo and said “Everything is fine, 
Effendim!”) Mohamed Khayr. Al-Dustur Weekly, November 1st, 2006. 
27 El-Hamalawy, Hossam. “Rosa Al-Youssef hits new rock bottom”.  3arabawy. October 31st, 2006. 
28 This aspect of the case remains, unfortunately, very murky. 
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blogging by what happened that day. The short-lived blog Wounded Female From Cairo 
provided the following account: 
We, girls, had our butts, breasts, and every inch of our bodies grabbed. I 
end up slipping into a car that was parking on the road side when I tried 
to catch one of the [profanity omitted] who insisted and never gave up 
on grabbing my butt. So, I end up with a deep cut in my right hand 
palm and another one on my thumb of the same hand as I slipped into 
the car's headlight that broke and cut my hand. 6 stitches on my hand 
palm cut and 3 on my thumb--still my anger is pretty fresh in the deep 
inside of me that makes want me to put all Egyptian men on fire right 
now for what they have caused...Don't you have sisters who can also 
face the same thing as we did?29 
 
The story was another instance of SMN’s providing undeniable evidence of a 
social or political trend that many people may have preferred to ignore. Blog entries like 
Wounded Girl From Cairo also provided indispensible platforms for the coordinated 
protests that followed (including protests on November 9th and November 14th, 2006), a 
subject that will be returned to in Chapter 4. While of course many Egyptians were aware 
of the prevalence of sexual harassment, most were untouched by it or had never 
witnessed it first-hand. The videos and pictures that made it out of the Eid harassment 
story forced individuals to confront the reality of sexual harassment, much like the torture 
scandal in 2007 – also propelled into the press from the blogosphere – forced Egyptians 
to confront another unpleasant aspect of their government.  While the two incidents may 
not have led to a regime change or substantial legal revisions, they did change the context 
of the relationship between the regime and its people.  
 
tml
29 Girl4Cairo. “LOOK AT ME.” Wounded Girl From Cairo. Thursday, November 9th, 
2006. http://woundedgirlfromcairo.blogspot.com/2006/11/look-at-me.h    
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Several factors propelled the sexual harassment story out of the blogosphere and 
into the mainstream discourse. First, the assaults exposed the prominence of sexual 
harassment in Egypt, and deeply embarrassed the regime. Second the assaults appeared to 
dovetail with two major social problems in Egypt – the continuing delay in the age of 
marriage and the mounting sexual frustration of the country’s young men (and women, 
although of course discourse focused on the former). Third, elements of the emerging 
SMN sphere contributed to the viral effectiveness of the story, such as the existence of 
digital videos which could be passed around through email and hyperlinks, and the 
ubiquity of pictures and first-hand accounts that the regime was unable to quash despite a 
total press blackout for the first week following the events. In short, blogs, mobile videos 
and the Internet made possible a staying power for this story that, while not impossible in 
the past, would have been phenomenally unlikely. Finally, the story was almost instantly 
picked up by international observers and organizations like Global Voices, which 
provided further extensive coverage and amplification of the events, and drove the 
shaming of the Egyptian government for its total inaction, particularly when it appeared 
that sexual harassment might interfere with the booming Egyptian tourism industry. This 
was a story that the activists refused to allow to die.  
Crucially, however, the online writing and dissent moved into the real-world, with 
protests that were organized in part by the Sandmonkey.30 And when the independent 
press started covering the story, they did so with vigor, forcing the government finally to 
acknowledge that something was at stake. That press attention culminated in a series of 
protests and a still-ongoing campaign against sexual harassment, spread across the 
 
30 Interview with the Sandmonkey, Cairo, Egypt, March 23rd, 2008.  
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blogosphere and a number of human rights organizations. Blogs had officially become a 
force to be reckoned with. Wael Abbas, who witnessed the events and wrote about them 
on his blog, argues,  
Now with flocks of young people harassing and molesting girls, in groups, in a 
religious feast, in downtown cairo, or in the absence of the police or the police were 
there but didn’t interfere, it brought to light the issue of sexual harassment in 
general in workplaces and families, and it made it to be discussed in TV talk shows, 
even in the official newspapers they couldn’t ignore it. The only thing that pissed 
them off was that we exposed that the police were negligent for what was going 
on.31 
 
The jump to international outlets was an acute embarrassment for the Egyptian 
government and society, which relies so heavily on tourist receipts – not from the United 
States, but from elsewhere in the West and the Middle East. For Egypt to develop a 
reputation as a place that is unsafe for women to travel would be devastating for the 
tourism industry. Still the state-run press dismissed the story, smeared the people 
propagating it, and denied any official culpability. As Ehab El-Zalaky, Deputy Editor of 
Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2008, says: 
it was a big shock for the whole society for that matter. You know that it 
happens Eid al-Fitr after the holy month of Ramadan ...so it was an explosive 
story for the blogs for two or three days, the first things came after that period of 
silence, it was being circulated as a story, and many were talking about what was 
happening, people in all of Egypt were talking about it, and there was pure 
silence from the mainstream media, and there was a statement from the interior 
ministry that no such thing happened at all. The first thing was published in Al-
Ahram and denied what happened, and talking about things on their sites from 
their imaginations, some of the independent newspapers started to write about 
the issue, at the same time – blogs were trying to back each other, so some of the 
blogs published some blurry pictures taken with mobile phones, so it wasn’t 
very clear what was happening, after about a week, one of the Egyptians who 
was living in the States sent Wael Abbas a video shot taken a year before that, 
 
31 Interview with Wael Abbas. Cairo, Egypt, April 14th, 2008.  
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which detailed another mass sexual harassment in Cairo streets, he take the shots 
and took it back to the States and never thought about publishing it.32 
 
El-Zalaky’s last point makes it clear that this sexual harassment during Eid was 
not something new in 2006, but rather something that had happened in the past but that 
remained an undocumented rumor.33 The tools of SMN’s made it possible for distant 
contacts to pass videos through enhanced social networks, and the credibility of the 
bloggers in the streets allowed them to establish the veracity of the events in question. 
The way that the story went from rumor to full-blown media event in a matter of days 
calls to mind the kind of informational cascades discussed in Chapter 2. And the way it 
called attention to previously subordinated events recalls both El-Zalaky’s claim that 
blogs provide “a voice for the voiceless” and serves as evidence for the efficacy of 
SMN’s breaking news. 
The linkages between SMN activists and independent journalists continued to 
give the story increasingly wide play. Al-Dustur ran a series of hard-hitting articles that 
December, not just about that particular incident, but about sexual harassment in general. 
The number of articles about sexual harassment in the Egyptian press– hardly a new issue 
in Egyptian politics – jumped from 33 stories in 2004 to 173 in 2006 and 171 in 2007. 
Other Arab print outlets picked up on the story, as did regional papers and outlets like Al-
Jazeera. The Egyptian Center For Women’s Rights launched a campaign against 
harassment in Egypt that continues to this day, in coordination with grassroots 
organizations like The Street Is Ours. The point is not that harassment has been 
 
32 Interview with Ehab El-Zalaky, Cairo, Egypt, April 8th, 2008 
33 Research through the Middle East Monitor (formerly Zad) confirms the absence of any coverage of these 
events. 
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eliminated, for such a deeply-rooted phenomenon is difficult to change in such a short 
period of time, and after all women are harassed not just in Egypt but all over the West 
and elsewhere in the Global North. The point is that a cross-political coalition was forged, 
with the work of SMN activists, to contest the issue of sexual harassment in Egypt. In 
fact, Eid harassment has continued. In the Fall of 2008, there was a very similar incident 
that took place downtown – however in contrast to the 2006 incident, when security 
services did finally arrive, the harassers were arrested. As the Egyptian Center For 
Women’s Rights argues, while it is unfortunate that such incidents still take place, a 
climate in which the perpetrators are punished does at least represent progress.34 As 
Gamal Eid notes, “There are some official coalitions between some groups, but when 
these cases are finished, every group will be on its own.”35 El-Zalaky believes that this 
was the moment that bloggers gained domestic credibility: “This is one of the major hits 
and major turns of the blogs to be known by ordinary people and I think after this 
incident blogs gained a huge amount of credibility.”36 
3.4 Documenting: Sudanese Refugees and the State 
Even before the widely-reported genocide in Darfur, Cairo has played host to 
thousands upon thousands of Sudanese refugees fleeing the country’s endemic violence, 
particularly the civil war between the north and the south. The refugees themselves are in 
a particularly precarious position in Egyptian society, since many do not speak Arabic, 
cannot work, are very poor to begin with, and must contend with endemic racism. Overall 
 
34 “The Collective Harassment During the Eid El Fitr Holiday and the Absence of a Law.” Egyptian Center 
For Human Rights. Press Release, October 8th, 2008.  
35 Interview with Gamal Eid, Director of the Arab Network for Human Rights Information. Cairo Egypt, 
February 26th, 2008. 
36 Interview with Ehab Zalaky, Cairo, Egypt, April 8th, 2008. 
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there are upwards of 1 million refugees in Cairo. The Egyptian and Sudanese 
governments signed an agreement in 2004, guaranteeing Sudanese refugees the right to 
live, work, own property, move about freely, but critics argued that the agreement was 
never implemented and that life for the refugees was very difficult in Cairo.37 Most 
refugees sought resettlement in a third country, not wanting to stay in Egypt where their 
plight was grim, but not wanting to return to the endemic violence of their homeland. The 
UNHCR had offered voluntary repatriation for the refugees on a case-by-case basis, but 
the threat of mass deportation loomed and in any case Sudan itself remained manifestly 
unsafe in many places. The Egyptian government, already strapped trying to provide for 
its swelling population, had been very reluctant to grant asylum to the refugees, believing 
it might lead to more refugees, more asylum applications, and more responsibility that the 
government did not seek or want.  
On September 29th, 2005, hundreds of asylum-seeking Sudanese refugees began a 
months-long sit-in at Midan Mustapha Mahmoud, near the Cairo offices of the UNHCR38. 
Both the Egyptian government and the UNHCR maintained that the refugees were 
economic migrants that would not have been in any immediate danger if they were to 
return to Sudan.  Whatever the merits of this claim, the refugees, all in danger of 
deportation, staged the sit-in to draw attention to their plight. The only attention they 
drew, however, was from residents and merchants who considered their day-and-night 
presence to be a nuisance. As the months dragged on, it became increasingly clear that 
the regime was likely to break up the sit-in by force.  
 
37 Nkrumah, Gamal. “Insecure but incisive.” Al-Ahram Weekly. 24-30 November, 2005. 
38 “UN ‘Shocked” By Violence in Cairo”. BBC News. December 30th, 2005.  
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On New Year’s Eve, the journalist and blogger Noura Younis was near 
Mohandisin, an upscale neighborhood near downtown Cairo. Younis had been on her 
way home when a friend told her that “the police presence in Mohandisin is incredible.” 
She quickly made her way to the square, and when she arrived, public buses were being 
prepared to take the refugees to an undisclosed location. Younis had her camera with her, 
but her battery was low, so she began to document what was going on with her cell 
camera and SMS messages. Younis was apopolectic. “I realize that I’m there to 
document, nobody can stop this at the moment what we can do is not let them get away 
with it. I was so angry. I was freaking out and I was crying.”39  
Younis snuck into an adjacent building and camped out on the 10th floor, where 
she had an unimpeded view of the goings-on. What she saw was appalling: police had 
turned water cannons on the astonished and terrified refugees, herding them toward the 
buses. The security forces deployed force against the refugees, beating many of them, and 
it was clear even to Younis from her 10th-story vantage point that a number of people 
were going to lose their lives. December 2005 was pre-Twitter, but Younis sent texts 
from her cell phone, took pictures with the phone’s camera, and her heretofore largely-
unknown site later became a clearinghouse for information about the incident. Younis 
was unquestionably the first journalist on the scene, and the government press barely 
mentioned the incident at all. Her account of the evening’s events – which turned into a 
massacre – was widely linked, reported, and cited by media organizations as a definitive 
version of the evening’s events came together. Below is an abridged version of her 
account, as much an indictment of the racism of the Egyptian observers as it is of the 
 
39 Interview with Nora Younis, Cairo Egypt, April 23rd, 2008. 
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police themselves. She called her account “Ashamed to be an Egyptian,” and it detailed 
the confrontation between the police and the refugees in painstaking detail; Younis even 
followed the refugees after they were taken away in buses to a detention facility in 
Dahshur.  
Younis’ presence at the atrocity allowed for coverage by blogs, independent 
media, and non-Egyptian international press outlets. In fact, the account was cited as 
evidence for where the refugees were taken. As Ehab Zelaky argues, “No one wrote and 
took pictures of what happened like Nora Younis.”40 As Younis herself notes,  
My coverage of the Sudanese refugees, it got covered by the independent media 
and the blogs. People translated it into I don’t know how many languages, it was 
weird, people were picking it up translating it, and I was getting comments from 
different places, but the mainstream media did not cover my coverage. The 
mainstream media commented on the human rights report, there was no report 
that was issued that did not make reference.41 
 
The regime and its press allies predictably tried to pin the blame on the refugees 
themselves. Notably, the refugees (who were Christian) were said to have been drinking, 
attacking the police, having sex in public.42 There was little to no evidence that any of 
this was actually true, but the rumors were calculated to diminish any potential public 
sympathy for the refugees themselves. The tourism ministry claimed, absurdly, that the 
refugees were tourists.43  
Word leaked out that the surviving refugees were to be deported, which generated 
a firestorm of criticism in the Egyptian press, and attracted the attention of legal forces 
 
40 Interview with Ehab Zelaky, Cairo, Egypt, Aِpril 8th, 2008. 
41 Interview with Nora Younis, Cairo Egypt, April 23rd, 2008.  
42 Ta‘dhib fi Masr. January 2nd, 2006.  
43 Al-A’oumi, Yusef. “Wazarat al-siyaha: laji’u al-Sudan fi Misr siyah.” Al-Masry Al-Youm, January 5th, 
2006. 
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who sought to prevent the deportation. Younis’s story ignited a debate in the press about 
the refugees themselves, their treatment, and the issue of racism in Egyptian society. It is 
important, of course, that Younis was on the scene that evening. Without the 
documentation from her cell phone, press outlets would have had no credible source, 
aside from eyewitness reports (of which there were many) for the stories that later ran 
about the massacre.  
Coverage of refugee issues did not change much after the massacre, going from 
15 articles between 1998 and December 29th 200544 to 21 between December 29th 2005 
and January 1st 2007. So the immediate upshot appears to be that the Egyptian 
government relented on its plans to deport 654 refugees from Mustapha Mahmoud. In the 
aftermath of the incident, the regime had announced plans to deport the refugees. 
However, in the wake of a series of protests, as well as intense international press 
attention (which appeared to be more effective than anything that appeared in the 
Egyptian press)45 the government relented and agreed to review the status of the refugees. 
While of course no direct cause and effect can be ascertained here, it would something of 
a coincidence that the regime agreed to review longstanding plans for the refugees – 
plans that had been hatched before the massacre in the Midan – just as activists mobilized 
protests, rights organizations organized on behalf of the refugees, and the regime was 
receiving negative press attention, both at home and internationally. The regime also saw 
 
44 Research conducted through the Middle East Monitor (formerly Zad). Comprehensive searches not 
available prior to 1998. 
45 Slackman, Michael. “Egypt Says It Won’t Deport Any of the Jailed Sudanese”.  New York Times, 
January 18th, 2006. See also Wright, “Activists Demand Probe in Cairo Killings” Reuters, January 1st, 
2006;  Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. “Egypt’s Democratic Charade.” Globe & Mail. January 17th, 2006; “UN 
‘Shocked’ By Violence in Cairo”. BBC. December 30th, 2005.   
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nascent cooperation between liberal and Islamist opposition forces, as the action was 
widely condemned, and the refugees were supported by the Brotherhood bloc in 
parliament. This perhaps was what frightened the regime most of all. It was perhaps a 
minor concern for the regime, but a concern nonetheless.  
3.5 Transmission: Torture and the Fate of Emad El-Kebir 
In January of 2006, a 21-year-old microbus driver named Emad El-Kabir was 
arrested for attempting to break up a police assault on his cousin. The allegations against 
El-Kabir, even if true, were relatively minor. However, during his detention, he was 
subjected to torture by the interrogating police officers, who beat and raped him. El-Kabir 
himself was nearly powerless to do anything about his brutal treatment by the police; 
while he could file a complaint, torture is widespread in Egypt, something that most 
individuals realize is taking place, but that until 2007 received little press attention. 
However, by 2006 the Mobile Web had arrived in Egypt, and one of the officers engaged 
in the practice of taping El-Kabir’s torture with his cell phone, and then passing the video 
around to others.  
The video, taken in January 2006, apparently passed around Cairo social networks 
for nearly a year before it arrived in the hands of bloggers like Demagh MAK and Wael 
Abbas. The video itself is graphic and devastating, as El-Kabir pleads with his captors, 
whimpering “Ma‘lish ya basha! (Forget about it, Pasha!)”. The naked El-Kabir is 
savagely sodomized with a nightstick – the video was so graphic that Youtube, where it 
was eventually posted as well, briefly suspended the account of Wael Abbas, who had 
posted it. Social Media Networks have the ability to accelerate the transmission of 
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information – including messages, videos, and frames – out of target networks, and this 
appears to be what eventually happened in this case as well. The officers who were 
supposed to share the video instead forwarded it along to someone – it is not clear who – 
who then passed the video on to the blogger Wael Abbas. Abbas posted the torture video 
to his blog in December 2006, and generated interest on the part of traditional media 
practitioners – while torture is widely-acknowledged, it is rarely discussed, and even 
more rarely documented so graphically. 
El-Kabir himself apparently played no role in the dissemination of the video; in 
fact, when Abbas published the video on his blog, no one even knew who the victim 
actually was. As Abbas says, “I didn’t know who he was and where, and what were the 
circumstances and when, and so an independent investigative journalist was able to find 
the microbus driver and interview him.”46 The journalist, Wael Abdel Fattah was from 
the independent newspaper El-Fagr47, further underscoring the importance of 
cooperation between SMN activists and traditional media practitioners48. Other media 
outlets quickly piled on the case, with Al-Masry Al-Youm claiming to publish the first 
photo of an officer responsible for the torture of El-Kabir.49 Al-Masry Al-Youm credited 
El-Fagr for breaking the story in its first piece on El-Kabir.50 The publication of 
in different independent press outlets (none of which had anywhere near the cir
 
.stm
46 Interview with Wael Abbas. Cairo, Egypt, April 14th, 2008. 
47 Saleh, Heba. “Fears for Egypt torture victim.” BBC News, January 16th, 
2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6264193  
48 Abdel Fattah, Wael. “Officer from Qism al-Haram torture video arrested.” El-Fagr, November 27th, 
2006. 
49 Al-Sayyid, Emad. "Al-Masry Al-Youm: Alone in publishing the first picture of the officer in Bulaaq 
accused of torturing Emad Al-Kabir." Al-Masry Al-Youm, December 29th, 2006. 
50 Al-Sayyid, Emad. "El-Fagr batal fadihat al-ta‘dhib fi bulaq: al-mabahith sawamatni wa-’arghamatni ‘ala 
takdhib" (El-Fagr is the hero of the torture scandal in Bulaq: the secret police coerced and forced me into 
lying) 
  
 
86
s 
                                                
of government dailies at the time) contributed to a kind of critical mass. Columnist
denounced the torture and wrote about the venality of the practice, while newspapers 
covered the case in-depth as it made its way through the court system. El-Kabir’s torture 
and the subsequent focus on torture as a practice constituted a kind of informational 
cascade. El-Kabir himself put himself at great risk when he decided to step forward and 
push for the prosecution of the officers themselves.  
Perhaps more offensive to public sensibilities than the initial, undeniable torture 
was the fact that El-Kabir was subsequently sentenced to three months in prison for 
“resisting the authorities.”51 The re-arrest of El-Kabir signaled to observers that the 
authorities were unrepentant and bent on maintaining total hegemony. However, because 
the case had broken in the media, the regime was no longer able to keep the story hidden, 
and unable to convince anyone that El-Kabir had resisted the authorities, not with such 
graphic evidence on display for everyone to see. The idea that torture is widespread in 
Egypt became unremarkable, and press outlets became increasingly outspoken critics of 
Egyptian torture practices – with some even denouncing Mubarak himself in addition to 
El-Adly. Addressing Mubarak directly, Magdi Al-Gallad wrote in Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
“There is something terribly wrong, your Excellency, in the philosophy and ideology of 
the law enforcement agencies in Egypt” (Al-Galad 2007). Mohamed Baghdadi wrote that 
the videos were not evidence of the reality of corruption, since “everything is corrupt.”52 
Al-Masry Al-Youm, in particular, provided ongoing coverage of torture in Egypt, 
 
51 El-Hamalawy, Hossam. “El-Adly Videogate: Torture Victim Receives 3 Months in Prison for “resisting 
authorities”! Arabawy. January 9th, 2007. 
52 Baghdadi, Mohamed. “Fan ta‘dhib al-muwatin.” (The art of torturing the citizen). Al-Masry Al-Youm,  
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documenting torture complaints53, publishing op-eds, and following the El-Kabir case as 
it progressed. The paper also went into unusual, and gory, detail about conditions inside 
the stations.54 The independent press also provided close coverage of other torture and 
abuse scandals, such as the slapping of a man named Ahmed Gad and the abuse of a 
female murder suspect who was interrogated while suspended from a stick, like a spitfire 
grill. 
The El-Kabir case wound its way through the Egyptian court system, finally resulting in 
sentences for the officers on November 6th, 200755. While the sentences were light 
considering the overwhelming evidence in the case, it was a small victory for human 
rights activists. The years since 2007 have seen the solidification of a de facto alliance 
against torture56 Ultimately the significance of the El-Kabir case goes far beyond the 
prosecution of three individual police officers, though that in and of itself was an 
accomplishment for the opposition. Abbas and his fellow bloggers succeeded in making 
torture a serious issue in the Egyptian public sphere, and the controversy appears to have 
ignited a kind of coalition against torture – a coalition that reaches beyond traditional 
political left-right boundaries and encompasses everyone that is interested in seeing more 
serious implementation of the rule of law. Actors appear to recognize their mutual 
interest in seeing practices of torture abolished or abated, and are acting rationally in that 
self-interest. The Egyptian Human Rights Organization, for instance, is supported by the 
 
53 Shalaby, Ahmed. “16 cases of torture inside police stations in July alone.” Al-Masry Al-Youm, August 
4th, 2007. 
54 Al-Dassouki, Farouk. “Adawat al-ru‘b fi aqsam al-shurta.” (Instruments of horror in police stations). Al-
Masry Al-Youm, August 18th, 2007. 
55 McDonough, Challis. “Prison Term for Egyptian Police in Widely-Published Torture Case.” VOA News, 
November 6th, 2007. 
56 Chapter 4 will explore how this de facto alliance uses SMN’s to facilitate on-the-ground organizing, 
particularly Twitter. 
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Muslim Brotherhood faction in parliament, and together they publicly oppose the 
practices of the Mubarak regime with regards to torture – uniting under the guise of 
international legal conventions (Abdel Halim 2009). This not only suggests an emerging 
coalition, but also points to the power of international rights activism. Rights activist 
organizations who had long written about and documented torture in Egypt also noted the 
importance of the El-Kabir case.57 
3.6 Red-lining: The Case of Al-Qursaya 
In late 2007, one of the biggest political controversies in Egypt involved a tiny 
island on the Nile in Cairo called Al-Qursaya. Home to some 5,000, largely impoverished 
Cairenes58, the island was suddenly inundated with the regime’s armed forces in the 
Spring of 2007. The exact purpose of the takeover was the subject of intense speculation, 
but the effort was eerily similar to another attempted regime takeover of Al-Qursaya and 
another Nile Island, that of Gold Island (Jazirat Al-Dhahab) in 2001. The most common, 
and plausible, explanation was that developers wanted to get their hands on the island, 
and that the Egyptian army was financially implicated in the takeover. Even with the 
independent press involved in the fight, however, it seemed like a David vs. Goliath 
situation. The army is a red line in Egyptian politics and journalism, and any public 
discussion of the armed forces is forbidden. No matter the outcry, in all likelihood the 
army would be able to do as it pleased to the island, regardless of the wishes of its 
marginalized residents. However, within a year the regime’s plans for Al-Qursaya would 
 
ture
57 “Egypt: Hold Police Accountable For Torture.” Human Rights Watch.org. December 12th, 
2006. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/12/22/egypt-hold-police-accountable-tor   
t.shtml
58 “An island occupied in Egypt.” BBC radio World 
Service. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/outlook/2008/01/080121_qursaya_egyp  
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be in tatters, defeated in two courts – the Egyptian legal system and in the court of public 
opinion.  
The Al-Qursaya Island case presents a different kind of challenge to entrenched 
power. Unlike the sexual harassment and torture cases, the Al-Qursaya Island incident 
does not appear to have begun on the Internet or in the blogosphere, instead breaking 
initially in the independent press. The general outlines of the  Al-Qursaya case remain 
somewhat murky despite considerable press attention to the subject. This murkiness is 
rooted in the involvement of the Egyptian army in the proceedings, meaning that ordinary 
press outlets writing in Arabic have been incapable of telling the true story of what went 
on between September of 2007 and the Spring of 2008. It is also true that officials 
involved in the takeover of Qursaya adamantly deny the idea that residents were to be 
evicted so that the Qursaya could be turned into some sort of neoliberal tourist paradise. 
However, because the government made a similar attempt on another Nile island earlier 
in the decade, the regime’s credibility on this issue was low to begin with. The murkiness 
surrounding the takeover of Qursaya is given emphatic life in the signs posted all over the 
island after the army’s arrival, announcing that Qursaya “….belongs to the army. No 
photography.”59  
The island of Al-Qursaya itself is a small outgrowth in the middle of the Nile, 
home to a population of fisherman and other hardscrabble Egyptians, and a place that has 
so far resisted the Westernized development that now characterizes other parts of Cairo. 
There had been rumors about the impending takeover in the Egyptian press as far back as 
the previous spring, but nothing concrete emerged until the army arrived, treating the 
 
59 “Cairo farmers fight army for land.” AFP. November 11, 2007.  
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island and its citizens like occupied territory. However, many of the residents have 
ownership deeds on their houses that in some cases go back 150 years, giving the lie to 
regime propaganda that the residents are squatters impeding the development of the 
Egyptian economy and tourism.  
Almost immediately the independent press pounced on the story and began 
muckraking, turning Al-Qursaya into a virtual cause célèbre for the country’s opposition. 
In June 2007, stories began to appear in independent press outlets like Al-Dustur warning 
that a vast crime was about to be committed against the indigent inhabitants of the island. 
At the time the story fed into a general press atmosphere of contempt for the Mubarak 
regime’s lawless venality, and the press used its more sensational style to play up the 
story for its hungry audiences. Coming immediately on the heels of months worth of 
rumors about Mubarak’s death, the trial of prominent editors, and a burgeoning economic 
crisis, the Al-Qursaya Island takeover represented to many the total venality of the 
Mubarak regime and its contempt for ordinary citizens. 
One blogger who wrote about Al-Qursaya was former physician Mina Zakry. As 
he tells the story, “The government with some businessmen wanted to take over. Armed 
forces from the army went down to the island and intimidated the people, pushing them 
to sell the land, or even to just evacuate it.”60 Zakry acknowledges that newspapers were 
covering the story, but insists that they were unable to tell the entire tale. In the carefully-
honed tradition of self-censorship, the news stories would write clear around the issue of 
an army takeover. As Zakry argues, “They [print reporters] would even say something 
like “a dominant body” or a “high entity” – the law prevents anything.” This impression 
 
60 Interview with Mina Zakry, Cairo, Egypt, March 24th, 2008.  
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is widespread, as is the idea that outside of Al-Dustur and Al-Masry Al-Youm, no one 
wanted to touch this story. On November 13th, 2007, weeks prior to Zakry’s story, The 
Sandmonkey asked himself why the media wasn’t reporting on the island takeover. His 
answer was “Because critisizing [sic] the army in any way can land you for at least year 
in jail. Plus, whatchu gonna do? Call them thieves? Can't really steal what you already 
own, and they own all of our asses.”61 The AFP story that Sandmonkey links to makes 
this same point – “Emergency laws in place for decades mean that any Egyptian will 
think twice about reporting on military activity, and the few media references to what is 
happening on the island studiously avoid mentioning the army.”62 
Research confirms the allegation that even the independent press was unwilling to 
print the truth about the island’s takeover. Typical of this reticence is Fahmy Howeidi’s 
December 27th Al-Dustur op-ed “Ghazwat Al-Qursaya.” In his acerbic piece, in which he 
criticizes the island’s takeover and lauds the efforts of the islanders, he refers to the 
perpetrators as “armed soldiers.” While this may seem like a hair-splitting difference, it is 
in fact a deliberate semantic choice to avoid fingering the Army. This is in spite of the 
well-known fact that reporters were well aware of exactly who it was that was sending 
forces into the island and causing trouble between the regime and its residents. Howeidi 
even went to the trouble of writing a follow-up column for Al-Dustur, “Hidden Realities 
of Al-Qursaya” in which he writes about “armed forces” being behind the takeover, but 
refuses pointedly to direct attention to the Army. Some realities in Egypt must remain 
 
61 Sandmonkey. “Al-Qursaya Island.” Rantings of a Sandmonkey. Tuesday, November 13th, 2007.  
62 “Cairo farmers fight army for land.” AFP. November 11th, 2007.  
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hidden. This was a pattern followed by nearly all other reporters and columnists at the 
time.  
According to Zakry, an Al-Masry Al-Youm reporter dropped the Al-Qursaya 
Island file into his lap one day, claiming that the newspaper couldn’t print the truth about 
what was really going on. Zakry, understanding the risks involved in telling the truth, 
decided to proceed anyway.63 On December 3rd, 2007, Zakry published a story on his 
blog about the army takeover of Al-Qursaya. The entry was entitled “Video: The army 
conquers Al-Qursaya Island.”64  The entry contains an embedded video that depicts the 
unmistakable signs of the Egyptian armed forces (al-quwat al-musaliha). Soldiers on a 
boat are captured on video by an intrepid cameraman, and those soldiers, as the 
commentary indicates, are clearly not from other organs of the Egyptian security 
apparatus.65  
In the entry, Zakry claims that other than one story in El-Badeel (at the time a 
new paper with an extraordinarily limited circulation) he was the only person willing to 
go on record with the Army allegations. To his surprise he was not arrested – suggesting 
that perhaps the crossing of so-called “red lines” is possible in Egypt’s new press 
environment, through a process of challenge-and-response. It is also possible that he got 
away with it because no one connected to the regime actually noticed. But perhaps once a 
new red line has been violated, other journalists and bloggers look to the transgressor to 
see whether he or she is punished. SMN activists are taking the lead in this process. 
Zakry’s story was one small piece of a very large campaign on behalf of Al-Qursaya’s 
 
63 This version of events was confirmed to me by anonymous sources inside the newspaper. 
64 In Arabic: bi-l-fidyu: iqtiham al-jaysh jazirat al-qursaya.  
65 Egyptian security forces are divided into a dizzying array of different services. 
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residents, which unfolded over the course of the year. In November of 2008, the regime 
was finally defeated in court, and the army takeover was halted (Abdel Hamid and el-
Karnashawi, 2008). While it is still possible that the army will resume its plans for the 
island once the furor has passed, activists can legitimately claim this as a substantial 
victory for the residents.  
In addition to Zakry’s reporting, digital media gave activists and citizens other 
tools for pooling their resources. The reporting on Al-Qursaya falls under the umbrella of 
awareness-raising. As Fenton writes,  
The internet has become home to mediated activity that seeks to raise 
people’s awareness, to give a voice to those who do not have one, to 
offer social empowerment, to allow disparate people and causes to form 
alliances, and ultimately to be used as a tool for social change (Fenton 
2008, 233).   
 
Dozens of other bloggers took up the cause. The blogger Ahmed Al-Hiwari wrote a post, 
typical of the blogging response to the crisis, on December 3rd, 2007 entitled “Al-Qursaya: 
Island of Fear.”66  The article, which clearly editorialized against the takeover, featured 
original reporting and gave first-hand insight into the lives of the islanders. This period of 
early December was one of great import for electronic resistance to the takeover; the 
prominent left-wing blogger Hossam El-Hamalawy, co-founder of the influential 
English-language blog The Arabist, made a number of posts on the issue. On December 
4th, for instance, he posted three videos of the island, one depicting islanders resisting the 
armed forced, and another a documentary by the filmmaker Mohamed Abla.67 
Hamalawy’s story (and another story that same day on the main Arabist page by Issandr 
 
66 http://masr.20at.com/newArticle.php?sid=12711. Accessed January 20th, 2008.  
67 El-Hamalawy, Hossam. “Resisting Mubarak’s Army.” 3araاbawy. December 4th, 2007. 
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El-Amrani) was the catalyst for a Global Voices story on December 5th, which placed the 
island takeover in the context of increasing regime incursions into civil society. 
The photo-sharing site Flickr, for instance, was used to coordinate the upload of 
photographs of the island and its people. Bloggers reported the times and dates of 
demonstrations, and contributed to an environment in which the Al-Qursaya takeover was 
becoming a PR nightmare for the Mubarak regime. Facebook also became a site of 
dissent and resistance, presaging the site’s role in the April 6th, 2008 general strike that 
brought widespread notoriety to the social networking site. Shortly after the publication 
of Zakry’s story – which was widely linked in the small Egyptian blogging community –  
a group was formed called “Anqidhu ahali jazirat al-Qursaya” (Save the People of Al-
Qursaya Island). It quickly boasted hundreds of members, and its wall featured links to 
outside stories and the times and dates of demonstrations.68 In November 2007, over 600 
people gathered for a press conference to promote a documentary about the residents 
(Singer 2007). Prominent human rights lawyers – including Amir Salim, who represented 
jailed opposition leader Ayman Nour – filed a case on behalf of the residents69, drawing 
on a 2001 Prime Ministerial decrees which allowed the residents of nearby Gold Island to 
stay in their homes. Egyptian celebrities got into the act, staging a protest on New Year’s 
Day to draw attention to the plight of the islanders. The pace of press coverage picked up, 
 
68 Facebook. (Save the People of 
Qursaya). http://www.facebook.com/wall.php?id=19903372840&page=1&hash=8177ac749eb7a592f4d53d
a247f9c038 
69 “Egyptian army weighs in on disputed Nile island.” Reuters. December 12th, 2007. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/inDepthNews/idUSL0664802420071212?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandCha
nnel=0 
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and the government press was forced to provide some grudging coverage. Protests were 
arranged, including one at the journalists’ syndicate downtown (Carr 2008).  
Ultimately, the government – which had been stonewalling the press for months – 
was forced to admit that it had drafted plans for the island. On January 4th, Al-Dustur 
columnist Ibrahim Monsour reported that the government had admitted that it had 
planned to turn the island into a tourist resort (Monsour 2008). Simply getting the 
government to admit to this can be considered a minor triumph, considering the murky 
relationship between the executive and the Army. The fact that residents ultimately 
triumphed is remarkable. Zakry’s account also coincided with an increase in the density 
of coverage of the Al-Qursaya case. Between May 2007 and December 3rd, 2007, 85 
stories appeared in the Egyptian print media on the crisis – mostly in the independent 
newspapers Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Dustur, and El-Badeel.70 Except for a handful of 
stories, the state-controlled press largely ignored the story or printed accounts of 
ministerial defenses of government conduct.71 Between December 3rd, 2007, and 
December 1st, 2008, however, that number jumped to 194 stories. While the majority of 
these stories appeared in the independent press, the official press was forced to confront 
the issue as well, with substantive articles describing the conflict appearing in Rose Al-
Yusef, Al-Ahram, Al-Gumhuriya, and others. 
The relevant comparison for the Al-Qursaya takeover is not difficult to discern – 
the regime has in fact made multiple attempt to seize the island, as well as others on the 
Nile. A similar attempt failed in 2001, when the government was once again opposed in 
 
 
70 Research was conducted through keyword searches via the Middle East Monitor (formerly Zad). 
71 See for example, the November 7th, 2007 story in Al-Gumhuriya.  
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court (Fayza 2001). However, the specifics of that case are difficult to come by – since 
not a single article was published in the Egyptian or Arabic press about the case.72 Since 
the government did not successfully take over the island in 2001, we can assume that 
press attention and digital media are not the only causal variable at work here – clearly 
the government does not control the judicial system to the extent that some observers 
imagine (Rutherford 2008). However, the outcry caused by the 2007 edition of the case 
was far and away more extensive than anything that occurred in 2001; however further 
research is needed to ascertain the relevant details and players of the earlier case, since 
there is no extant press record. The evidence of a similar attempt in 1998 puts Al-Qursaya 
in the same category as Qurna, a settlement in Luxor that the government tried for 50 
years to clear of residents – finally succeeding in 1997. In other words, the Nile islands 
around Cairo are clearly coveted by the regime or elements in the regime, and activists 
and residents should expect repeated and continual attempts to push them out in the name 
of progress or tourism.  
3.7 Conclusions 
In evaluating the evidence presented in the above cases, several hypotheses from 
Chapter 2 are supported. The first is that Social Media Networks transmit information 
through critical nodes. When looking at the Sudanese refugee case, it is striking that Nora 
Younis is herself a journalist and has extensive contacts in the Egyptian press community, 
making her not just a credible source, but a node in the broader SMN in which she is 
situated. Her contacts allowed both for her presence that day, which was anything but 
 
72 Research was conducted through the Middle East Monitor (formerly Zad) at the American University of 
Cairo. Searches pulled in 111 articles between 2007 and 2009, and only one prior; it was published in 1998 
in Al-Ahrar, a government daily. 
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serendipitous – it was rather orchestrated via a text-messaging network in which activists 
who knew her and knew of her interest in such matters were able to “activate” her and get 
her quickly to the scene, and for the seemingly instantaneous way in which the 
information she gathered made its way to the press outlets. While any ordinary Egyptian 
with a cell phone could have taken pictures and posted them to a blog, it was Younis – a 
highly-connected, and highly-read journalist-blogger – who was able to turn that 
hypermedia footage into more than an interesting entry on a little-known web outlet.   
The same connection can be made with the sexual harassment and torture cases – 
in both cases information was first provided by a former journalist whose blogging and 
SMN activism was trusted and credible. Younis is trained as a journalist, and her 
presence on the scene mitigated the concerns expressed by a number of professional 
journalists that bloggers don’t know what they’re doing, are willing to report rumor as 
fact, or who can’t or won’t actually get out in the street, do interviews, and perform the 
difficult work of a paid journalist. As Al-Ahram journalist Amira Howeidy noted about 
another blogger, Hossam El-Hamalawy, “First of all, I know Hossam personally, I think 
that’s an important factor, I know he is an honest person, and he’s connected in his field, 
and he’s into labor activism and he’s a socialist and so on and he’s very devoted to his 
cause, when there are events related to these issues, I find him credible.”73 It is this 
sentiment that drives the credibility of certain bloggers for journalists in the field. This is 
the difference between a dead end in cyberspace and a SMN with capabilities – with 
power. It is not the power to put an end to refugee crises, racism, or the lawlessness of 
authoritarian regimes, but the power to set the agenda of public debate.  
 
73 Interview with Amira Howeidy, Cairo, Egypt. April 19th, 2008. 
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Corroborative evidence is also found for the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes 
will have increasing difficulty controlling the media environment. The El-Kabir case 
points clearly to a shift in public discourse, and the willingness of Egyptian journalists to 
write about torture in the wake of the case. No one has argued that torture became more 
widespread between 2007 and 2009  - if anything police might have become somewhat 
more reluctant to torture given the consequences for the officers caught torturing El-
Kabir. This does not mean, by any stretch of the imagination, that torture has been 
eradicated or that it is no longer a problem. It does, however, mean that it no longer takes 
place under a shroud of secrecy. The success of the El-Kabir story the and widespread 
use of cell phone cameras to document police abuse outside of police stations means that 
the watchers are being watched by the citizenry, and that individuals are increasingly 
emboldened to document cases of police abuse.  This is particularly surprising given that 
a general scholarly consensus has emerged, arguing that Mubarak’s regime has become 
emboldened to commit renewed human rights violations with the retreat of the Bush 
Administration’s mid-decade democracy promotion initiatives. 
A close reading of the Al-Qursaya case offers further understanding of how 
SMNs function in Egypt. First, not all cases of blogging’s relevance involve breaking 
stories that would otherwise have gone unreported. This can be seen especially in the 
case of the recent Israeli invasion of Gaza. Blogs, of course, did not “break” this story, 
but along with other forms of digital media, they greatly amplified the activist response. 
Second, it is clear that the Mubarak regime cares about and is sensitive to its press 
reputation and the international repercussions of its actions. The regime appears to be 
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most vulnerable on populist issues – salaries, working conditions, the plight of the poor – 
and on human rights issues that are capable of drawing the broad-based support of 
Islamists, leftists, and liberals – issues like sexual harassment, torture, and due process. 
This is not to say that activists have the upper hand, but rather that everyone involved 
would benefit from knowing which issues they are likely to be able to successfully 
promote within the system. Aside from a handful of developers and whoever was going 
to benefit directly from the conversion of Al-Qursaya into some kind of magical tourist 
paradise, few would publicly argue for the dispossession of some of Cairo’s poorest 
citizens.  
This discussion of the cases should not lead us to believe that digital media 
necessarily have a democratizing effect in authoritarian countries. The quantitative 
evidence linking the Internet with democratization is spotty at best (Wheeler 2006; 
Calfano and Sahliyeh 2008; Hofheinz 2005). Rather, under certain circumstances, digital 
media can serve as tools in the repertoire of dissidents. They also create alternative public 
spheres -- what some have theorized as counter-publics (Asen and Brouwer, 2001). These 
alternative public spheres function through the empowerment of individuals whose ability 
to express themselves and participate in politics is severely limited in other ways. As Al-
Saggaf writes, “The Internet not only allows people to discuss and debate issues of 
utmost importance to them, it also makes them authors of media content rather than a 
passive audience” (2006, 312). Regardless of whether such places qualify as 
Habermasian public spheres in the strict sense, they certainly operate as focal points of 
dissent and allow individuals – particularly those from repressed minorities like Baha’is, 
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Coptic Christians, or others – to articulate their needs, desires, and dreams. In the 
uncoordinated chaos of the Internet, these focal points allow for the production of 
commentary and agreed-upon narrative frames and calls to action. 
Wael Abbas, the internationally-recognized Egyptian blogger and citizen 
journalist, told me that “We are recording history so that in the future no one will dare to 
lie about it.” Abbas says that Egyptian media (and Arab media generally) have a long 
tradition of deceiving citizens about the true nature of news events and social and 
political developments. He cites the Egyptian media’s cover-up of the country’s 
devastating loss to Israel in the 1967 War – the way that press organs cooperated with the 
Nasser regime to downplay the Air Force and Army’s terrible losses. While it cannot be 
said that regimes have lost all control over information-control, one of the lessons of the 
cases presented above is that SMNs greatly complicate the efforts of authoritarian 
regimes to craft and control narratives about politics. The four cases presented above, 
while not indicative of large-scale social or political change in Egypt, are illustrative of 
the new media environment in which authoritarian regimes must operate. They highlight 
the effects of cooperation between embattled reporters at independent media outlets and 
their digital media critics. Finally, it suggests that tactical victories are within reach of 
determined and digitally-mediated activists, under the right circumstances. 
However, these battles are not simply one-off struggles, in which SMN activists 
sometimes win, and sometimes lose, nor is it simply another tale of regimes allowing for 
“safety valves” for the harmless release of pressure. The growth of SMN activism is an 
expression of dissatisfaction with the structural alignment of political forces in Egypt, 
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and the way that big decisions – economic, social, political – have been made without the 
input of actors outside of the NDP or the military. As Castells argues,  
sociopolitical forms and processes are built upon cultural materials and… these 
materials are either unilaterally produced by political institutions as an 
expression of domination or, alternatively, are coproduced within the public 
sphere by individuals, interest groups, civic associations of various kinds (the 
civil society), and the state (2008). 
 
SMN activism contributes to a public sphere in which politics is co-produced by other 
actors with the state, particularly independent journalists and human rights organizations. 
While the state may still be the dominant actor in Egyptian politics, SMNs make it 
possible for other actors to contest that domination and occasionally to subvert it. The 
role of the public sphere in these developments– in theoretical terms – will be addressed 
in Chapter 5.  
The importance of the independent press holds not just for the advancing of 
claims, breaking of stories, or introduction of marginalized actors into the public sphere, 
but also for the mobilization of collective action. The question of whether or not SMNs 
facilitate the organization and execution of collective action in authoritarian contexts is 
the subject that this dissertation now turns to in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 
New Tools, Old Rules: 
Social Media Networks and Collective Action in Egypt 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Since their development in the early part of this century, activists all over the 
world have seized on the tools of Social Media Networks as they organize opposition to 
authoritarian regimes and practices. From the text-messaging armada that descended on 
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in the Philippines in 2001 to text-messaging protestors 
and electronic journalists in the Orange Revolution, and now today to Iranian protestors 
Twittering the news of mass protests, arrests, and intimidation, activists have proven that 
under the right circumstances, SMN activism can be powerful and effective. However, 
scholars have yet to identify the kinds of circumstances under which SMNs can be 
effective, and why. This chapter, through the evaluation of case studies in Egypt, seeks to 
explain the circumstances under which SMN activism can successfully mobilize 
collective action in authoritarian contexts, and the circumstances under which such 
mobilization is likely to lead to political change. One does not necessarily lead to the 
other. In so doing, the chapter contributes a critical piece of theory-building as scholars 
seek to understand the impact of technological proliferation in the developing world. The 
chapter evaluates competing hypotheses about the mobilization and collective action 
potential of SMNs under conditions of authoritarianism. The null hypothesis is that, 
especially in low-connectivity societies like Egypt, SMNs have little to no role to play in 
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mobilizing dissent, because so few individuals have Internet access and because Social 
Movements are built and sustained by persistent frames, concrete demands, and 
organizational ties within communities. This hypothesis would expect that thriving social 
movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian labor movement will have a 
much greater role to play in the Egyptian collective action environment.  The alternative 
hypothesis advanced here is that SMNs reduce the costs of collective action, and thus 
should lead to more protests, demonstrations, and strikes, the standard manifestations of 
dissent in authoritarian societies. Consistent with Lust-Okar’s expectations that included 
groups are less likely to involve themselves in protest and dissent activities, it also seems 
a reasonable expectation that excluded groups like the Muslim Brotherhood will invest 
more heavily in the tactical tools of SMNs.  
Mona El-Ghobashy (2008) poses a critical question for scholars of Egypt: if 
authoritarianism has in fact deepened and stabilized in Egypt through the institutional 
choices of the regime, or become “durable” in the popular language, as many scholars 
argue (Brownlee 2007, 4; Albrecht 2005, 378; Kassem 2006, 188) why has there been a 
massive increase in the number of civil society organizations, and an organized effort on 
the part of the judiciary to exert its power vis-à-vis the regime? Her answer involves the 
internationalization of Egyptian politics, in the form of routine connections between 
international NGOs and governments and domestic Egyptian actors, as well as the 
“mobilization of the constitution,” by which opposition forces, including the judiciary 
and ordinary citizens, seek the enforcement of the actual laws on the books in the country 
as opposed to more arbitrary forms of state power. Ghobashy, however, whose argument 
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will be explored in more depth below, fails to conceptualize or seek to explain precisely 
what has enabled those international connections or the increased ability and willingness 
of civil society forces to agitate on behalf of constitutional issues in Egypt. In this chapter, 
in addition to testing hypotheses about the causes and consequences of new information 
technologies and their relationship to collective action, I will seek to fill the gap in El-
Ghobashy’s argument by arguing for the critical role of Social Media Networks in 
internationalization and mobilization in Egypt – even while remaining sanguine about the 
potential of these technologies for truly large-scale mobilization. As we will see with the 
Judges Club ferment, the April 6th movement and the reaction to the Israeli invasion of 
Gaza, SMNs are the missing variable in recent accounts of Egyptian civil society, and 
understanding how they operate, as well as their possibilities and limitations, is critical to 
a proper understanding of contemporary politics in Egypt. In so doing, I hope to explain 
the salience of SMNs in Egypt, and to situate the changes that have taken place in 
Egyptian politics within a larger narrative of authoritarian persistence.  
This chapter will proceed by first looking at the collective action environment in 
Egypt and the ways that SMNs have changed the incentives and possibilities for 
organizers. It then proceeds to explain the contribution of SMNs to four discrete events: 
the struggle over judicial independence in 2005-2007, the April 6th 2008 General Strike, 
the 2009 General Strike, and the protests against Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008-2009.  
4.1: Mobilizing Protest in Egypt 
In Khaled Al Khamissi’s non-fiction pop sensation Taxi, the author relates a 
conversation with a cab driver ridiculing the size a demonstration on the streets of Cairo 
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by the opposition group Kefaya . “In the old days,” says the driver, “we used to go out on 
the streets with 50,000 people, with 100,000. But now there’s nothing that matters” (Al 
Khamissi 2008, 24-25). The driver located what he called “the beginning of the end” with 
the bread riots that rattled the Sadat regime in January 1977. The regime quashed that 
proto-revolution, “And since then the government has planted in us a fear of hunger…. 
They planted hunger in the belly of every Egyptian, a terror that made everyone look out 
for himself or say ‘Why should I make it my problem?’” Al Khamissi, clearly rattled by 
the driver, who was able to recall the exact dates of the demonstrations in 1977, wonders 
what “the end” actually is. 
Perhaps the end was the decades-long interregnum in street protests in Egypt, a 
pause that seemingly came to a close with the Second Intifada and the demonstration 
wave that has swept Egypt since 2003. But it is certainly true that no one has mustered  
the kind of street demonstrations that might truly threaten the regime of Hosni Mubarak 
and the system of emergency law that still governs Egypt – and that most demonstrations 
in Cairo and its environs consist of more riot police and plainclothes police (the dreaded 
bultagiyya) than actual demonstrators. El Khamissi’s driver puts his finger on precisely 
the collective action problem that plagues any attempt to spur change from below in 
Egypt – the question of why anyone should make anything their problem. 
Figure 1 indicate that protests in Egypt have increased in number since the 1990s, with a 
peak in 2005.  
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Figure 4.1: Protests in Egypt, 1994 - 200774 
_________________________________________________ 
Egy    1994    1 
Egy    1995    1 
Egy    1996    2 
Egy    1997    2 
Egy    1998    2 
Egy    1999    0 
Egy    2000    4 
Egy    2001    4 
Egy    2002    1 
Egy    2003    4 
Egy    2004    0 
Egy    2005    9 
Egy    2006    0 
Egy    2007    4 
__________________________________________________ 
 
The growth of opposition activities had a number of discrete causes, from the 
widening gap between rich and poor and neoliberal economic policies that were seen to 
disadvantage industrial laborers in Egypt. Declining wages for industrial wages were one 
of the primary consequences of the neoliberal economic program undertaken by the 
Mubarak regime (Mitchell 2002, 286).  The Egyptian government was also under 
pressure, since the attacks of 9/11 to open up its political system, as the Bush 
Administration adopted the position, at least publically, that terrorism was intricately tied 
to the absence of social and political freedoms in the Middle East. In the midst of this 
pressure, the Mubarak government allowed the flourishing of new and independent press 
outlets (see Chapter 3), and held multi-candidate (if far from free) Presidential elections 
 
74 Data courtesy of Patrick Meier, Tufts University. This is, to my knowledge, the only existing data for 
this time period. I can also say with great certainty that this data is wrong, since it is compiled out of 
English-language reports from places like Reuters, the AFP, and the AP. One of the biggest problems with 
existing protest databases is their lack of engagement with local sources, in this case the Egyptian 
opposition press, which documents strikes and protests in great detail.  
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in 2006. The announcement of those elections came in 2005, which coincides with the 
largest recorded number of yearly protests. The role of SMNs in mobilizing 
demonstrations during this time period is well-known and has been written about at 
length (Al-Malky 2007), but it is worth exploring how exactly it worked and why it 
represented such a change.  
Organizing a demonstration in the 1990s, prior to SMNs, was a painstaking affair 
fraught with very real peril for both organizers and participants. Permits had to be 
obtained, leaflets printed, and a location agreed-upon far in advance. Such high-profile 
and easily-detectable efforts made demonstrations easy for the regime to see coming in 
advance. Hossam El-Hamalawy elaborates: 
in order to organize a demonstration in the 1990s there was so much secrecy, you 
can’t talk over the phone, you would meet people you would chat, and how would 
you publish for a demonstration, you had to print out something.75  
 
During this time period, as well, the regime held what amounted to a news monopoly on 
information and events in Egypt. As El-Hamalawy argues, if someone showed up at a 
demonstration in the 1990s with a camera, demonstrators would turn away and hide their 
faces, since they could be fairly certain that the journalist was from one of the 3 major 
government dailies, Al-Akhbar, Al-Gumhuriya, and Al-Ahram. Reporters from those 
newspapers were believed to feed information and pictures directly to the security 
services, making it very dangerous to have your picture taken at any kind of 
demonstration. Beatings, arrests, and other forms of rights abuse all took place with little 
scrutiny from the press or international observers. The costs of organizing this kind of 
collective action, then, were exceptionally high, and the odds of those protests, even if the 
 
75 Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy, Cairo Egypt, May 27th, 2009. 
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organizers pulled them off, being reported inside or outside of Egypt were low. A 
confluence of circumstances – largely related to relative calm in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and strong domestic economic growth rates – combined to make protest a 
relatively rare thing in the 1990s. Protest waves clearly depend as much on external and 
internal circumstances as they do on the means that demonstrators might deploy to 
execute their plans. However, the advent of satellite television in the 1990s introduced a 
competing news source into the Egyptian news environment (Lynch 2006; Sakr 2002), 
even if that source was typically focused more on international relations and Arab-Israeli 
conflict stories than it was on local Egyptian stories. Hossam El-Hamalawy explains: 
The outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada [in 2000] this marked the beginning of 
internet activism, that took the form of email lists, yahoo chat groups.  I was being 
spammed left and right by those who have the boycott lists of updates about the 
Intifada, pictures of the dead, pictures of the atrocities. These were being emailed, 
and yahoo groups were like the hip thing back then.  
 
The primary function of SMNs during this time period was coordination and 
information-transmission. Bloggers posted, texted, and emailed the times and dates of 
demonstrations or other actions, and SMN technologies like SMS messages were used to 
find agreed-upon places for demonstrations, to adjust those locales on the spot, and to 
communicate information about the results and any arrests. As Hossam El-Hamalawy 
says 
With the crackdown on the judges movement, I was mailing continuous updates, 
at the same time I had 50 plus numbers on my mobile that I had in a group, that I 
used to text updates, we would be running around in downtown, and seeing 
people kidnapped, and sending SMS and then running home, uploading emails 
and photos, and Issandr would post the pictures.76 
 
 
76 Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy, Cairo, Egypt, May 27th 2009. 
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SMNs like blogs, especially during this time period, also played a role in transmitting 
information to outsiders, and challenging the boundaries of public discourse. SMNs were 
important sources of information transmission and dissent during the class over judicial 
rights in 2005-2007. The struggle over judicial reform and the role played by SMNs 
helped set the political context in which the April 6th Movement – which forms the core 
of this chapter – developed. Understanding how that first struggle played out is critical to 
understanding where and how the April 6th Movement succeeded and failed. 
4.2 The Judges Club and the Protest Wave of 2005 
The Egyptian judiciary has been engaged in a struggle with the regime at least 
since the Second World War (Wolff 2009). The struggle has primarily centered around 
the function of the judiciary as a check on the power of the executive. Since Nasser, the 
executive has tried repeatedly to undermine the capacity of the judiciary for independent 
action. Thus do the members of the judiciary become “a favoured class in Egyptian 
society” (Wolff 2009, 103). Sadat’s initial draft of the Supreme Constitutional Court law 
in 1977 would have left the organization toothless and subordinate to the regime 
(Rutherford 2008, 45). Opposition from prominent judges led the Sadat regime to agree 
to a far more invasive and powerful SCC than it had originally been conceptualized And 
because of that power, the SCC has again and again challenged the arbitrary power of the 
state, such as in 1985, when it ruled against Sadat and his attempts to use the emergency 
law to amend the Law on Personal Status (Rutherford 2008, 54). Rutherford concludes, 
“The SCC and the administrative courts have accumulated a large body of rulings that 
seek to limit state power and render it more accountable to the law” (2008, 52).  
  
 
110
                                                
Especially since Hosni Mubarak took over after Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the 
judiciary has struggled repeatedly to carve out victories vis-à-vis the state – for the right 
to form democratic syndicates and political parties, property rights, and freedoms of 
speech, in particular. The longstanding involvement of the courts in questions of multi-
party politics in Egypt stretched across a number of national elections. And when, 
seemingly under pressure from the United States to democratize, the regime announced it 
would hold not just parliamentary elections, but a multi-candidate election for the 
presidency, the stage was set for different political forces to The 2005 presidential and 
parliamentary elections were thus set up as the perfect opportunity for a very public 
struggle between the regime, which wanted to rig the elections for the NDP, and the 
judiciary, which was constitutionally tasked with overseeing the fairness and legality of 
the elections themselves. The looming battle pitched the rhetoric of democracy and 
pluralism against the continued reality of the Mubarak regime using the threat of 
“terrorism” and the Muslim Brotherhood to continue the state of emergency that has been 
in place since 1981.77 But compared to the decades-long struggle between the regime and 
judiciary, rather than just against the exigencies of the moment in 2005, it was clear that 
both sides saw the elections as a pivotal battle. Truly free and fair elections could 
potentially threaten the core of Egyptian authoritarianism.  
The elections themselves split the Judges Club, between those who believed they 
should take no part in what would likely be fraudulent elections, and those who argued 
that they should exercise their power, even taking into consideration the institutional 
 
77 Wolff notes that the regime renewed the State of Emergency on April 30th, 2006, on the dubious pretext 
that the question would be revisited at another, more amenable time.  
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limits placed on judicial freedom.  After the elections, Mahmoud Mekki and Hisham 
Bastawisi, vice presidents of the Court of Cassation, very publicly declared the 
parliamentary elections rigged and presented evidence of their claims, igniting what 
Wolff calls “a huge civil society movement” (2009, 105). The judges themselves were 
arrested, along with hundreds of activists and leaders from the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Kefaya. The streets of Cairo became sites of contestation between these opposition forces, 
who sought transparent and fair elections, and forces of the regime, which hoped to quash 
them. The outcome of these struggles was and is unclear. Most observers agree that there 
has been a retrenchment in political rights since the heyday of the Kefaya movement in 
the mid-2000s. And it is certainly true that the regime won an important victory when the 
judiciary was essentially stripped of its election-overseeing component in 2007, as article 
88 of the constitution was amended to create an electoral commission to oversee future 
elections. (Wolff 2009, 105). The regime’s victory highlights the important difference 
between successful mobilization and successful political change. 
On May 25th, 2006, The Arabist, at the time one of the leading English-language 
blogs in the Middle East, published what it called a “recap” of the demonstrations 
planned for that day. The author (Issandr El-Amrani) wrote that he was just “passing 
along the info”. The post contained the times, places, and messages of the day’s various 
protests, which were not just in solidarity with the Judges’ Club, but also included an 
anniversary demonstration for Black Friday, May 25th, 2005, in which female journalists 
were assaulted by the security services.78 The Arabist itself had long served as a depot for 
 
78 “Black Referendum Day – demo recap.” The Arabist. May 25th, 2006. 
 http://arabist.net/archives/2006/05/23/black-referendum-day-demo-recap/ 
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information, pictures and analysis about the demonstrations that were taking place in 
Cairo against the usurpation of the judiciary’s power. These posts often included links to 
Flickr accounts, where amateur photographers gathered documentary evidence of the 
day’s events, building shared meaning through exchanging and linking to pictures. This 
lent the blogs themselves both a pre-and-post demonstration utility – before the 
demonstrations, they served to provide information to the select minority of Egyptians 
who got information like this online, and after the demonstrations, they constructed and 
deconstructed the demonstrations themselves, calling for more action, criticizing the 
treatment of the demonstrators, and attempting to bolster the movement. Many posts, 
such as the one that appeared on The Arabist on May 18th, 2006, depicted police brutality, 
particularly by the so-called bultagiyya, the plainclothes police often hired by the regime 
to break up demonstrations.79 Demonstrations themselves took place over a long period 
of many months, leading up to the passage of the constitutional amendments in 2007. 
The struggles of the Judge’s Club are arguably representative of the kind of 
democratization that is taking place in Egypt, in spite of the fact that in many respects, 
authoritarianism has worsened in recent years. El Ghobashy calls this “mobilizing the 
constitution” – i.e. framing and organizing contention around the actual written document 
of the 1971 constitution, and challenging the state on the basis of its legal precepts (El-
Ghobashy 2008, 9). It would not be the first time that “flawed constitutions” were used to 
bring about democratic reform – as El-Ghobashy notes, the same strategy was used in 
Poland. Many constitutions, even in authoritarian countries, promise rights that are not 
 
 
 
79 “Pro-judges demo pics.” The Arabist. May 18th, 2006. 
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delivered upon in real life. In Egypt, it was the ferment created by the announcement of 
multi-candidate presidential elections in 2005 that made this strategy the default mode of 
the Judges Club and the various NGOs organizing in support of them.  
Once again, though, independent media and its relationship to SMNs played an 
important role in the mobilization process. With only the state press on the scene, it’s 
unlikely that the kind of debate about the elections that occurred would ever have taken 
place. And the blogs would have had no one to link to. As Issandr El-Amrani put it, 
The 24-hour cycle in Egypt in terms of breaking news, didn’t really exist [in 
2005]. The official press is often vague about what’s happening, it didn’t have a 
lot of serious competition. That changed in 2004 with the new independent dailies 
that came out…it really created a wonky discussion about what was taking place 
in the political arena. It’s not that it didn’t exist before, it didn’t get updated at a 
daily pace. It forced the issue of election fraud on the agenda, election fraud is 
nothing new, it’s just that there are these outlets available and the right political 
atmosphere.80 
 
As the protest movement continued its actions in 2005-2007, blogs became sites of 
discussion and documentation – of the demonstrations themselves, and also of arrests. 
Leading Arabic-language blogger Amr Gharbeia, on October 26th, 2006, wrote about 
central security forces surrounding the Judges Club, and about the arrests of fellow 
bloggers – in real time. “Central security forces are surrounding the Judges Club,” he 
wrote, while also posting the names of arrested activists and bloggers.81 Wael Abbas, on 
his blog Misr Digital, posted a detailed description of the protest events planned for May 
 
80 Interview with Issandr El-Amrani, Cairo Egypt, February 16th, 2008.  
81 “500 Central Security soldiers around the Judges’ Club.” Gharbeia.net. October 26th, 2006. Author’s 
translation. 
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25th, 2006, both in Egypt, and abroad.82 The posting of times and dates of protests was 
common during this period, particularly since the movement to oppose the constitutional 
amendments was led by Kefaya, which had and still has a strong Web presence. 
Sympathetic activists in the blogging community helped spread the word about these 
protests. One such blog was “Manal and Alaa’s bit bucket,” one of the oldest and more 
well-known Egyptian political blogs, which was published sometimes in English and 
sometimes in Arabic. A typical post would list the time, date, and place of an upcoming 
demonstration, along with the organizers. They also included short descriptions of the 
events’ raison d’etre, such as the demonstration in Midan Tahrir on March 15th, 2007, 
which saw the constitutional amendments as designed to “continue dictatorial rule and 
eliminate judicial supervision of elections.”83 
The protests continued through March of 2007, including demonstrations 
generally neglected by the international press on university campuses across Egypt. One 
such demonstration on March 25th, 2007 drew thousands of protestors across Egypt, not 
just in Cairo but in universities across the country, including in secondary cities like 
Tanta.84 Still, constitutional amendments were passed over the objections of this 
movement. The Judges Club and their political allies lacked the grassroots organizing 
capabilities that might have put more people in the streets, while international pressure on 
 
82 “Today’s Activities in Egypt.” Misr Digital. May 25th, 2006. Author’s 
translation. http://misrdigital.blogspirit.com/archive/2006/05/index.html. (Abbas’s posts do not gene
have permalin
rally 
ks). 
83 “Muzhahara bi-midan al-tahrir 3-15 li-l-ta‘bir ‘an rafd al-ta‘dilat al-dusturiyya.” (Demonstration in 
Tahrir Square to express rejection of the constitutional amendments.” Manal and Alaa’s bit bucket. March 
10th, 2007. http://www.manalaa.net/node/87226. Author’s translation. 
84 “Al-Muzhahirat al-rafida li-l-ta‘dilat al-dusturiyya tashmal mu‘zham jami‘at Misr.” Demonstrations to 
reject constitutional amendments include most Egyptian universities.” Ikhwanonline. March 25th, 
2007. http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=27259&SecID=304 
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the regime proved incapable of changing its course. And while SMNs contributed to 
coordination and globalization, they were not the fundamental driving course of the 
events of 2005 -2007. However, the political context created by the struggles of 2005 – 
2007 helps us understand the environment in which later organizing took place. To assess 
the impact of SMNs on collective action in Egypt, we must look at the April 6th Youth 
Movement, and the strikes organized on April 6th, 2008, May 4th, 2008, and April 6th, 
2009 – strikes that were organized in large part online and whose success or failure can 
tell us much about the conditions under which SMN-driven collective action might 
succeed or fail. In terms of theory testing, these strikes were conducted by the same 
group of activists, under virtually identical political conditions, with widely divergent 
results. More than the Judges Club organizing, the April 6th Movement is a kind of 
natural experiment, so rarely possible in comparative politics – an experiment which will 
assess the possibilities and limitations of mobilization conducted through Social Media 
Networks.  
4.3 Informational Cascades and the April 6th Movement 
On the morning of April 6th, 2008, a small group of Egyptian bloggers and 
activists made their way from one internet café to another, updating web sites and Twitter 
feeds dedicated to the day’s tumultuous events in Cairo and other cities. They generously 
allowed me to spend the day with them, to see what they were up to and how they were 
using the tools of Web 2.0 to facilitate political protest and social action in Egypt. The 
afternoon took me from the overpriced coffee joints of Mohandisin and Zamalek to the 
Judges’ Syndicate, where a protest was the focus of several blocks full of plainclothes 
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police, riot police, participants, and gawkers both Egyptian and foreign. The young men 
and women spent their time in the cafes aggregating reports from other activists about 
arrests and protests, and while they of course were doing everything they could to avoid 
being arrested, the general attitude seemed to be one of acceptance of that risk. They 
were, of course, doing all of these things at the same time, often talking on the phone, 
updating a Web site, and speaking with one another, engaging in what has been dubbed 
“continuous partial attention.” As one of the organizers and writers told me, “With the 
Internet you can get online anytime, wherever, so like now we are publishing all the same 
news the same minute. If someone got caught now, arrested now, we can write about it 
now, rather than the old style.”85  By the old style, of course, this young blogger meant 
the traditional media, which has a built-in time-lag between an event and the delivery of 
news about that event, a delay that has been eclipsed by Social Media Networks.  
Some of this activity appeared to be facilitated by the Internet. SMNs have little 
to nothing to do with broadcast news media, the traditional focus of academics studying 
Arab media, almost to the exclusion of all else (Armbrust 2007, 531). The day’s events 
also had little to do with the kind of blogging we have come to associate with the form – 
the airing of opinion and analysis by non-professionals, or angry people in their pajamas 
railing against the media or political forces. These were blogger-activists, or “citizen 
journalists” in the new lingo of the field. The reason that April 6th, 2009 received so 
much domestic and international attention was because of the actions taken by a Ghad 
party functionary named Esraa Abdel Fattah, who formed a “group” on the popular 
Social Networking Site Facebook. She and her fellow activists turned April 6th from a 
 
85 Interview with blogger, name redacted for security purposes, Cairo, Egypt April 6th, 2008. 
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localized labor protest into an international event. The Facebook activists, as they came 
to be called, triggered an informational cascade, as outlined in Chapter 2.  
Abdel Fattah started the Facebook group in mid-March of 2008. The group was 
devoted to striking with the textile workers of Mahalla al-Kubra, in the Delta. The 
workers of Mahalla had chosen April 6th as the day to go on strike to protest declining 
wages and rising prices, and together with other creeping developments in the Egyptian 
economy and political system, the strike had the potential to develop into something 
much larger than an isolated labor protest. For months prices of basic commodities had 
been rising in Egypt at the same time that official figures on the economy continued to 
look rosy, and the regime didn’t seem terribly interested in helping ordinary people out of 
trouble. Inflation was rampant, and yet the state still seemed determined to forge ahead 
with its program of neoliberal privatization (Beinin 2008). In addition, the government’s 
heavy-handed campaign against top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood was reaching a 
crescendo in advance of the state’s attempts to rig local elections on April 9th 
(McDonough 2008), and the state was still feeling the fallout of its failed attempts to take 
over the Nile island of Qursaya (see Chapter 3). Finally, dissatisfaction with the state’s 
position vis-à-vis the besieged residents of the Gaza Strip was serving to further 
delegitimize the state. The original impetus for the strike lay with the besieged Mahalla 
textile workers, but it was only with the bridging and amplifying capabilities of SMNs 
that a textile strike turned into a national event… 
Within two weeks of forming the group, Esraa’s Facebook organization had 
70,000 members, quite astounding given that only approximately 790,140 Egyptians are 
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even members of Facebook to begin with.86  The idea was for the 70,000 plus group 
members to stay home on the day of the strike, April 6th, and it soon took on a life of its 
own.  In the heavily policed state of Egypt, organizing demonstrations is technically 
illegal, and calling for a general strike particularly so. This does not, of course, prevent 
them from happening regularly, but demonstrations are generally small affairs, thought of 
by many as the domain of liberal and left-wing activists surrounded by blocks full of 
black-clad riot police and plainclothes police. Certainly no one could have expected a 27-
year-old human resources coordinator to serve as the catalyst for an event that would grip 
the national consciousness for the better part of a week (Mukkaled 2008). It perhaps 
seemed even less likely that Facebook – an online social networking scheme hatched by 
Harvard undergraduates just a few years ago, associated largely with American college 
students, would be the chosen platform for this massive action. But when examined 
against developments in the scale-free Egyptian blogosphere and the innovations in 
network theory explored in Chapter 2, the events make much more sense.  
The state itself certainly recognized the power of these social tools and the threat 
that they represent to the state’s control of information. Shortly after the strike, the 
regime undertook a campaign of delegitimization against Facebook and other Internet 
sites deemed a threat to regime authority (Darabni 2008). Esraa, who was arrested the day 
after the strike and imprisoned for more than two weeks, became a kind of celebrity 
within the country, and a cause célèbre for international NGOs. And on a personal level 
the state’s intimidation worked, since she emerged from prison telling reporters she 
 
86 Facebook data from http://www.facebook.com/ads/create/ as of July 20th, 2008.  There were probably 
considerably fewer members in March 2008.  
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would not be getting involved in any more online organizing (El-Ghitany 2008). But the 
state’s demonization of the strike’s organizers did not seem to succeed in convincing the 
political class or prominent media voices that Facebook is illegitimate, that the day’s 
events were a failure, or that everything is fine in Egypt. No less a heavyweight than al-
Dustur and Al-Ahram columnist Fahmy Howaidy declared the Facebook organizers 
“hope for the future in Egypt.”  
Why wasn’t the action on April 6th coordinated through blogs, long the darling of 
Egyptian opposition politics? First, a kind of a fatigue with Egyptian blogging has set in, 
which is driving the organizing and activity in opposition politics to other places. If you 
ask many observers – journalists, bloggers themselves, ordinary people, what they think 
of Egyptian blogs, they will tell you that their time has passed. As the anonymous 
blogger Sandmonkey told me about blogs having a real-world impact, “It’s rare. We’re 
talking three stories in three years.” He was referring to a handful of major stories that 
were brought to the mainstream press by the bloggers, who he referred to as “pushers.”87 
And even if they are still sold on the relative importance of Egyptian blogging, they tend 
to cite the same handful of bloggers – Hossam El-Hamlawy, Wael Abbas, and Nora 
Younis, among a very small handful of others. El-Hamalawy himself calls them “power 
bloggers.” Other bloggers link to these blogs, as do newspapers, online media, 
international groups, and others. These hubs operate by “providing routing, coordinating, 
and information functions that increase the ease and efficiency of navigating the 
network” (Matthew and Shambaugh 2005).While these individuals do terrific work, their 
importance has made it more difficult for new voices to be heard in the blogosphere. In 
 
87 Interview with Sandmonkey. Cairo, Egypt, March 23rd, 2008.  
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the U.S., the network architecture of the Internet creates a small group of power bloggers 
and excludes most other writers from the public sphere (Hindman 2008). There is no 
reason to believe that architecture works any differently in Egypt. 
This might explain why organizing has migrated from the Egyptian blogosphere, 
governed by power laws, to the realms of Facebook and Twitter – the next generation, 
while of course free to start and maintain blogs, might find the door to internet fame and 
success closed to them in a way that it had never been previously. For an analogous 
example in the U.S., consider the success of the left-wing site Daily Kos, which is so 
popular that its traffic dwarfs that of even relatively well-read sites in that community, 
like MyDD and Firedoglake (Karpf 2008). In other words, the reason we haven’t seen 
another Araba3y or Misr Digital is that the previous two sites might be so much more 
popular than their competitors that the properties of the network make it exceedingly 
unlikely that anyone else will gain such popularity. And while those communities may 
have great numbers of readers, there are several reasons why Esraa probably chose 
Facebook over either starting her own blog or going through existing ones to organize the 
general strike. First, the most popular Egyptian blogs are not participatory (if not 
democratic) communities like Daily Kos. This is not to suggest that they don’t have 
communities of active participants and commenters, but rather that most have no “diary” 
function that allows individuals to generate unique content to contribute to the site. As 
Karpf notes, “Community blogs are designed to enable collective action” (2008).  So 
unless the owner of the blog were to get enthusiastically behind the strike action, it would 
be difficult to coordinate the action in that way. Second, while blogs do facilitate the 
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formation of ad-hoc alliances around certain issues, they do not make social connections 
transparent and easier to use, and they do not lend themselves easily to the formation of 
groups. Finally, blogs start off with the tiny number of readers who are initially told 
about the blog, whereas the audience on Facebook begins with the number (often in the 
hundreds) of social connections you’ve already made on the site, and then multiplies 
rapidly through network connections. For all of these reasons and more, while observers 
have long been looking at blogs as the predominant medium of online action and protest 
in Egypt, there are alternatives that might work better. 
Facebook played an important role in transmitting the frames and calls to action 
of the April 6th General Strike. It also demonstrated, not for the first time, the power of 
SMS and Twitter in coordinating action and contesting the regime’s crackdown on the 
activists. In fact, subsequent events in both Egypt and in other authoritarian contexts have 
demonstrated that Twitter in particular and micro-blogging in general may play a more 
important role in information dissemination and mobilization. Twitter is particularly 
useful for short-term organizing and on-the-fly coordination and adjustment. As El-
Hamalawy argues,  
Let’s say we had a demo scheduled in the square, the initial scouts show up, they 
see they are detaining people already, they say, let’s move the demo to the press 
syndicate, then we receive the updates, then we communicate it. 
 
Not all activists and bloggers agree that all of the action is now on Twitter, though. The 
blogger Mohamed Khalid (who blogs as “Demagh MAK” (the brain of MAK), argues  
I’ve moved to Facebook because Facebook is easier to write and more popular. 
Everybody’s on Facebook all the time. I started 6 months ago, I posted on my 
blog and the same time I posted to FB, the comments and the feedback on the 
Facebook more than the blog, but I still love my blog, it’s my main thing I do first 
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every month. You can write a note in the Facebook, then you tag 30 people and 
it’s like a message and this 30 people and open their Facebook in the morning.88 
 
The Egyptian press gave extensive coverage to both Facebook and the April 6th 
movement after the day’s events. International press outlets also lavished attention on 
what everyone seemed to regard as a successful strike. However, not everyone agreed 
with the assessment that the 2008 strike was a success. Hossam El-Hamalawy, for 
instance, who played a critical transmission role from his temporary perch in faraway 
Berkeley, California, argues that in fact far from helping the main strike efforts in 
Mahalla, the April 6th organizers in fact provided a distraction for the regime, and had the 
effect of loading expectations and demands into the moment that were neither productive 
nor called for. El-Hamalawy and others warned not to read too much into the strike, and 
argued for the continued importance of grassroots organizing.  
4.4 April 6th Redux and the Limits of Online Organizing 
On the one-year anniversary of the April 6th 2008 general strike, the leaders of the 
April 6th Movement, together with the most important factions of the opposition – the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Kefaya, and many political parties, staged a follow-up 
demonstration. The regime was not, however, caught off guard this time, waging a 
weeks-long campaign in the press against the movement and the strike. When April 6th 
2009 arrived, Egypt appeared to function normally, handing the April 6th Movement a 
serious defeat from which it is unclear whether it can recover. Whereas there was 
divergence in the coverage of the 2008 strike, with Al-Dustur calling it a success, Al-
Masry Al-Youm declaring it a qualified success, and the government dailies trumpeting its 
 
88 Interview with Demagh MAK. Cairo, Egypt, June 18th, 2009. 
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failure, there was no such disagreement in 2009. All the major news outlets and blogs, 
even those who are generally sympathetic to the movement’s goals and practices, wrote 
of the day’s events as a failure. However, the failure of the follow-up strike leaves us 
with a puzzle: if the same tools were used to publicize and organize the strikes in 2008 
and 2009, what are the variables that explain the divergent outcomes? 
Observers sought explanations for the failure of the day’s events, and some 
agreement can be found. As Mohamed Adel argued, the first strike was tied to concrete 
wage demands of striking workers in Mahalla, and to the increase in prices for basic 
goods in Egypt that had taken place during the months preceding the April 6th, 2009, 
general strike. The absence of any such raison d’etre in 2009 is certainly one 
unmistakable explanation for the failure of the strike organizers to galvanize public 
opinion and mobilize participation in the strike. As Amr Shubaki put it, 
If we remember last year’s General Strike, we will find that some of us forget that 
it was called by textile workers in Mahalla, not political activists or party 
members, to demand improved working conditions and to raise wages.89  
 
Shubaki argues that the organizers did not learn the lesson of their first follow-up strike 
on May 4th, 2008, and in fact repeated all of that day’s mistakes. He argues that in 
meeting the demands of workers for raises in wages, the government was able to defuse 
the nascent political movement that had piggybacked onto those social demands. 
Shubaki’s comments are consistent with the findings of collective action literature which 
suggest that it is the presence of cogent demands that drive protest movements, rather 
than new technologies themselves, with their capabilities. The technologies themselves, 
 
89 Shubaki, Amr. “Limadha fashala al-idrab al-‘am?” (Why did the general strike fail?). Al-Masry Al-Youm, 
April 9th, 2009. 
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and the youthful, elite organizers of the April 6th Movement, cannot manufacture the 
conditions which might lead to widespread protest in Egypt.  
Sensing that Egypt’s diverse political oppositions had won at least a symbolic 
victory on April 6th, 2008, the regime set about making sure that such a convergence of 
technology, demands, and capabilities would be much more difficult to attain if 
organizers attempted a similar action. Ironically, it may have been the very success of the 
movement in drawing press attention to itself that provoked the state to crack down so 
hard. As Hossam El-Hamalawy argues, “They scared the regime about what was going to 
happen that day. The 6th of April guys came into the picture –  around that time that had 
70,000 plus members – and the newspapers dealt with it very sensationally.”90  
Hamalawy believes that it was this press attention that distracted activists from the actual 
demands of the Mahalla workers and allowed the state to co-opt substantial portions of 
the strike leadership. The test run for the regime’s strategy for the follow-up strike was 
successfully executed on May 4th, 2008, when the April 6th movement tried to stage 
another general strike on Mubarak’s birthday. The message, however, did not resonate, 
and came on the heels of the repression of well-known members of the movement itself. 
Between May 4th, 2008, and April 6th, 2009, the Mubarak regime employed three 
distinct strategies to derail the April 6th movement – economic, repressive, and 
technological.  
The repressive end was most familiar, and easiest to execute. The leadership of 
the group itself was hounded practically into submission, and many bloggers and activists 
 
90 Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy, Cairo, Egypt, May 27th, 2009. 
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affiliated with the group were arrested.91 First there was the forced exit of Esraa Abd El 
Fatah, one of the founders of the original Facebook group for the sixth of April, from 
political life. Kidnapped from her home and held for two weeks, Abdel Fattah appeared 
to apologize for her role in the strike when she was released. Her abrupt about-face from 
online organizer to quiescent subject set the tone for what the regime hoped to 
accomplish with Egyptian youth at large. The regime appeared so threatened by this 
movement, and by the online organizers who formed its core, that they needed to crush it 
completely. Leaders of the group, including Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel, also saw 
prison time. The fear that the regime has so successfully instilled in most activists means 
that many keep ready-made SMS messages in their phones, to send off to human rights 
lawyers, friends and families when they are inevitably kidnapped and snatched off the 
streets. And many more young people never bother to join such movements in the first 
place, preferring to pursue instead the creature comforts of post-Infitah Egypt. The 
strike’s failure was a shock to participants and observers enamored with the 
transformational potential of social media. However, a closer look at the strike’s 
dynamics, and the actual capabilities of the tools themselves tells us why this effort was 
probably doomed to failure, and how activists might more successfully contest the state’s 
hegemony in the future.  
The regime also dealt capably with demands from labor organizations and civil 
society organizations for better wages. The Mahalla workers, though were also brutally 
repressed. As the blogger Sandmonkey argues, “As for the real heroes of April 6th, the 
 
91Arab Network For Human Rights Information. “Istihdaf al-mudawinin al-masriyin: ‘ard mustamir.”  
http://www.katib.org/node/7888 
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poor underpaid and courageous workers who took a stand that day? Well, they were 
never interviewed by the media, or the satellite news networks, never were invited to a 
conference, or were the focus of a news piece. What they were the focus on, was the 
government's vengeance.”92 The scuffle in Mahalla is part of a long-running and 
intensifying battle between the Egyptian state and the labor sector – with 650 workers’ 
protests between 2006 and 2007.93Egyptian labor is organized under the umbrella of the 
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), an organization that scholars consider to be 
co-opted by the state and largely part of the official power structure. Some scholars argue 
that even under such conditions, labor has been able to wring concessions from the 
government, but overall the labor movement is repressed and suffers from a lack of 
autonomy (Pripstein-Posusney 1997). At least some elements of the labor movement are 
now seeking to construct trade federations outside the structure of the ETUF, most 
recently the successful campaign of the tax collectors. However, while the movement has 
seen its fair share of victories, the state has conceded just enough to forestall the kind of 
national movement that the Mahalla strike seemingly threatened. Before the May 4th 2008 
strike planned by the April 6th movement, the government announced a 30-percent wage 
increase, and salary increases were due to kick in this July.94  Targeted salary increases 
have also been used with certain professions (like doctors) to defuse potentially serious 
 
shtml
92 “6th of April…again!” Rantings of a Sandmonkey. April 4th, 2009. 
http://www.sandmonkey.org/2009/04/04/6th-of-aprilagain/ 
93 El-Hamalawy, Hossam. “Revolt in Mahalla.” International Socialist Review 59 (May-June 
2008). http://www.isreview.org/issues/59/rep-mahalla.  
94 Abdelhamid, Doha. “Mind the Gap.” Al-Ahram Weekly. 14-20 May 2009.  
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labor disagreements.95 So the regime capably executed control strategies on the economic 
and repression fronts. But it also lucked into some limits of the Facebook platform itself.  
4.5 The Limits of Facebook Activism 
What social media technologies help to solve, or at least alleviate, are problems of 
collective action and information dissemination (Shirky 2008). Facebook and other forms 
of social media, including Twitter, blogs, and photo-sharing sites, lower the costs of 
group-formation, group-joining, and information-sharing. In the build-up to the April 6th, 
2008 strike, Facebook accelerated the transmission of the strike meme, because the site 
connects people with similar interests. As Shirky argues, “Because information in the 
system is passed along by friends and friends of friends (or at least contacts of contacts), 
people tend to get information that is also of interest to their friends” (Shirky 2008, 221). 
They furthermore have the effect of reducing the distance between networks of friends 
and acquaintances, and in so doing they can also build shared meaning. What Facebook 
did for the original strike group was first to construct, very easily, a symbolic call to 
action that allowed a maximum number of people to join with the least amount of effort. 
In so doing, the Egyptian state was confronted – almost overnight, since the group grew 
from nothing to 70,000 members in a matter of weeks – with what it regarded as a serious 
threat to its legitimacy. Whether Egyptians stayed home because they supported the strike 
or because they feared going into the streets is an open question unlikely to be resolved 
either way.  
 
95Carr, Sarah. “Doctors’ Group Skeptical of Wage Increase Promised By Government.” Daily News Egypt. 
July 16th, 2008. 
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But the reality is that at least some sectors of the regime, and many international 
observers, regarded the strike as a success and gave a good share of the credit to the April 
6th organizers and to the Facebook tools that made their efforts possible.  
However, the problems of the April 6th movement in organizing follow-up actions 
appeared to be unrelated to both the costs of collective action and the exigencies of 
getting the word out. It appeared, simply, that the message of the movement simply did 
not resonate with enough Egyptians to make a difference in the larger scheme of things, 
and that not enough groundwork had been laid by actual, on-the-ground organizers. The 
call to strike on the anniversary of…a strike ... did not seem to strike most potential 
participants in collective action as worthy of the risks involved with either taking the 
streets or staying home. Those risks are substantial, even if one is predisposed to suffer 
for a cause. The action was also poorly-conceptualized. Anniversary actions probably 
only might work if the anniversary is of something of much larger significance – which is 
not to minimize what took place in 2008, but rather to emphasize the fact that the greatest 
resistance took place in Mahalla and that ultimately the whole thing ended with the 
regime more or less victorious. In other words, it wasn’t exactly clear what was being 
commemorated. With the Mubarak regime having proven that the potential costs of 
repression remain very high in Egypt, most young people in the country took the rational 
approach and decided that they would let other people make a political statement for 
them. And in classic prisoner’s dilemma form, that statement was never made because 
the vast majority of people made precisely the same calculation. While SMNs enable 
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actors with diffuse interests to come together around a common cause (Hindman 2008), 
they cannot necessarily create the cause itself.  
To understand the failure of the April 6th, 2009 message, we must first understand 
what exactly it was about the message of the previous year that resonated with so many 
people to begin with. At the time, Egypt was undergoing price increases for basic staples, 
just as the global economy was beginning to take a turn for the worse. So even those 
individuals who did not know anyone in Mahalla or particularly care about the fate of 
striking textile workers had an access point to the movement’s message, about economic 
justice. The increase in the price of bread, in particular, recalled the reason for Egypt’s 
last large-scale street action, in 1977. Most importantly, the general strike call was yoked 
to a concrete, on-the-ground action – the strike of Mahalla textile workers and their 
demands for better wages and working conditions. Without the very real ferment in the 
streets of that city, it is unlikely that anyone in Cairo or Alexandria would have known 
what they were getting themselves into, or even cared enough to join a Facebook group to 
begin with.  
It was the absence of such a clear message that led to confusion about the purpose 
of the follow-up strike. Individuals were asked to stay home and not to buy anything – 
but if they had to leave the house, to wear black. All of this was allegedly to protest the 
injustices perpetrated during and after the April 6th, 2008 strike, giving the whole 
movement somewhat self-referential. Given that the message of the April 6th Movement 
had not reached important sections of the Egyptian population to begin with, basing the 
follow-up strike on the events following the 2008 strike was probably not a wise tactic. 
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According to the movement itself, the April 6th, 2009 strike had four primary demands: 
the institution of a national minimum wage, indexing prices to inflation, the election of a 
constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, and the suspension of gas exports to 
Israel.96 The third demand in particular was unrealistic at best, and probably only served 
to underline the regime's fears about the movement's true goals. The demand for a 
national minimum wage was almost certainly undermined by the regime's success in 
buying off sectors of the labor movement with wage increases, making the demand for a 
national minimum wage less compelling than it might otherwise have been. While this 
was less the fault of the movement than a success for the regime, it still points to the 
difficulties of crafting an effective message. Finally, the involvement of demands about 
Israel-Palestine probably only served to muddy the waters, even if anger about Israeli 
policies is widespread. 
There are also important limitations to the capabilities of Facebook organizing 
itself. To begin with, Facebook groups seem to engender extraordinarily low levels of 
commitment on the part of their members.  This should have been understood after the 
movement’s initial follow-up action, the May 4th strike, failed very publicly.  The 
technical capabilities of Facebook – such as the public nature of “status updates” and the 
ability of users to change their profile picture to adopt a widespread frame – lend 
themselves to the production and dissemination of ideas, but perhaps not as much to the 
mobilization of individual actors. The April 6th movement itself understood this, and 
boasted a Web presence to complement its Facebook profile, but even these three 
 
96“6 April 2009, General Strike in Egypt.” 6 April Movement. Saturday, April 4th, 2009. 
http://6aprilmove.blogspot.com/2009/04/6-april-2009-general-strike-in-egypt.html 
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technologies in tandem can't mobilize people without concomitant movement on the 
ground. So while the April 6th Facebook page still has [70,000] members, very few of 
them are active, either on the group’s message board, or in real-life. While Facebook 
offers a work-around for the problem of a small number of famous and important 
bloggers controlling the discourse in the Egyptian blogosphere, it is not clear how much 
real-world mobilizational potential the site really offers in the long run. A focus on 
Facebook appears also to have missed the widespread shift of online dissent from blogs 
to Twitter. As Hossam El-Hamalawy puts it, “the migration is not happening to Facebook, 
it’s happening to the microblogs.”97 He adds, “Facebook is one of the outlets I have, but 
the heavyweights are not using Facebook.” The heavyweight bloggers that El-Hamalawy 
refers to were skeptical of the April 6th movement and its possibilities. As the blogger 
Demagh MAK puts it, “The thing is that its just easier to use Twitter than a blog. You are 
in the middle of a demonstration and someone is killed or arrested, you can’t leave the 
demonstration and write a blog. One is killed two arrested, you can just send it by Twitter 
and everybody now knows.”98 What happens to the information after that depends on the 
work organizers have done on the ground, and whether or not local or global elites write 
about it. 
It is not just commitment levels, but some features of the interface itself that make 
it of limited utility under certain circumstance. Particularly at the height of any given 
crisis, the “wall” of a group and the main Facebook status update page can be inundated 
with messages. “In that flood of data, it’s possible to lose key messages,” wrote Ethan 
 
97Interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy. Cairo, Egypt, May 27th, 2009. 
 
98 Interview with Demagh MAK. Cairo, Egypt, June 18th, 2009.  
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Zuckerman before the first April 6th strike in Egypt.99 Zuckerman also points to the 
problem of “serial activists,” who jump from cause to cause – Gaza, April 6th, freeing 
Ayman Nour – without ever making any real investment of time or energy in any of them. 
However, the day’s failure was due to more than mistakes and oversights by the 
organizers – the regime’s newfound savvy disrupting the functioning of SMNs must also 
be credited.  
4.6 Regime interference with mobile activism 
The Mubarak regime has grown much savvier over the past year with respect to 
interfering with the efforts of mobile activists, making it much more difficult for 
individuals to conduct activism via the traditional tools of mobile phones. For starters, a 
sophisticated registration-and-tracing system is in place, making it easy for the 
government to track users, interfere with their signals, and to shut down large-scale 
attempts to text-message. Another part of the problem is simple financial logistics – 
Egyptian telecoms offer no unlimited texting services like those available in other 
countries, including the United States. In the U.S. for instance, one can purchase, for only 
a few dollars a month, a plan by which users are not financially penalized for the number 
of text-messages they can send. This makes it substantially easier to send large numbers 
of text-messages, to coordinate far-flung and wide-ranging action, and to adjust plans on 
the go. In both the 2008 and 2009 strikes, the Egyptian government successfully blocked 
the routes of Egyptian text-messagers. As Mohamed Adel, one of the primary organizers 
and leaders of the April 6th movement, says, “In 2008, we used SMS, we used mobile 
 
99Zuckerman, Ethan. “Pros and Cons of Facebook Activism.” ...My Heart's in Accra. February 8th, 2008. 
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2008/02/08/pros-and-cons-of-facebook-activism/ 
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technology to contact all the people.”100 In 2009, though, the government was able to 
block SMS messaging on April 6th. 
The blocking of the text-messaging service vastly complicated the efforts of the 
organizers, who were already cash-strapped. According to Adel, the movement even tried 
to buy text-messages in bulk from India, which cost only $.01 per message, but the 
regime successfully blocked these messages as well. Unfortunately, this meant that the 
only coordinating mechanism on the ground that day was the micro-blogging service 
Twitter, which had previously shut down its text-messaging component anyway. Those 
activists who can afford the cost of the mobile web, either through USB internet 
connections, or through their cell phones, were still able to communicate and send many-
to-many communications through Twitter, but unfortunately, many fewer individuals 
have or can afford to do this. Because the regime so successfully anticipated the day’s 
events, which had been telegraphed and publicized by opposition forces months in 
advance, this left the activists essentially with no capability to execute or alter their plans 
after it became clear that the state was ready for them.  
Technological problems were not the only thing hampering the efforts of the April 
6th organizers. There are only roughly 2,000 full-time members of the movement, 
according to one of its founders, Ahmed Maher.101 The movement also was riven, 
according both to its founders and other observers, with a factional split, between Maher 
and Adel and between Hizb al-Amal and other forces who sought to take control of the 
movement. Part of this disagreement can be traced to decisions made about funding the 
 
100 Interview with Mohamed Adel, Cairo, Egypt, June 10th, 2009.  
101 Conversation with Ahmed Maher, Cairo, Egypt, June 10th, 2009. 
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movement- Maher himself is alleged to have sought $20,000 in cash from Freedom 
House, an organization believed in Egypt to have ties to the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency. Rumors of CIA involvement in the April 6th Movement crippled the activists’ 
credibility at a critical juncture. One activist told me that while opposition forces are 
happy to accept technical assistance from democracy-promoters, particularly with regard 
to new technologies, the acceptance of cash from organizations with known agendas can 
be deadly for the public credibility of organizers.102 
In tandem with the clampdown on cafes, Egyptian telecoms now offer mobile 
Internet access through your laptop via a USB modem.103 This is in many ways a unique 
and useful service, enabling individuals to bypass the unwieldy process of having an 
Internet connection turned on in their homes, an expensive and time-consuming endeavor. 
Activists tell me that this connection is quite good, works most anywhere, and is very fast. 
However, the process of obtaining one of these devices also falls under state surveillance, 
as applicants are required to submit identity papers, as well as addresses and phone 
numbers. This of course makes it possible for users to be tracked by the service providers, 
and hence by state authorities. Like all attempts at interfering with Internet access, on-
the-ground realities offer any number of workarounds, as sympathetic merchants are 
sometimes willing to sell them using fake or falsified information. However, as with 
many attempts to step between the user and the Web, this step is not necessarily about 
perfecting enforcement or stopping the truly dedicated and savvy user from accessing 
                                                 
102 Interviews with Ahmed Abdel Fattah, Cairo, Egypt, June 14th, 2009, and Mohamed El-Gohary, Cairo, 
Egypt, June 13th, 2009. 
103 Several mobile phone service centers in Zamalek refused to sell me this device in May and June of 2009 
without proof of residency in Egypt and requested my passport and address.  
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content, but rather about placing roadblocks between ordinary users and the information 
and communication capabilities of the Internet, the same way that slowing down the load 
time of a Web page will deter many users from loading that site at all. The cumulative 
effect of a series of small roadblocks or deterrent devices can add up to frustrated users 
who might simply accept that there are things they can’t or shouldn’t be doing online. In 
other words, the regime may be successfully raising the entry barriers and hence the costs 
of digital activism. Removing these individual nodes from a large network can slow 
down the information transmission capability of SMNs and render them much less useful, 
pace Metcalfe’s law about the usefulness of communications networks growing as the 
number of users rises. The Egyptian regime, again, intends not to shut down networks 
(though that of course remains a possibility, particularly during short-term crises) but 
rather about creating uncertainty and difficulties for individuals who are also persecuted 
in much more straightforward and old-fashioned ways.104 The number of activists willing 
to put up both with state harassment and technical interference is surely not as high as the 
number of activists willing to engage in this activity absent such efforts. 
The regime has also instituted changes in the structure of internet cafes, vital sites 
of access to the Internet for ordinary people, which had been critical in both the building 
of online public spheres in general, and in the execution of the April 6th Movement in 
particular. For years, individuals were able to enter cafes and get online with minimal 
interference or surveillance either from café owners or the state. However, café owners 
are now required to collect vital information about the individuals using their computers 
(whether they actually do so is another question altogether). There can be little doubt 
 
104The April 6th organizers Mohamed Adel, for instance was detained for several months in 2008.  
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about the intent of these regulations, and while their effect might be limited in practice, 
symbolically the attempt to regulate access so closely could only have a chilling effect on 
the kind of writing, dissent, and activism individuals are willing to engage in.While of 
course sympathetic café owners still provide access to activists without collecting this 
information, it does present an additional hurdle to spreading information freely in an 
environment free of the threat of coercion, surveillance, and arrest. The reduction in the 
number of sites where free and unfettered Internet access is available at low cost can only 
reduce the network transmission capabilities of SMNs and interfere with the ability of 
organizers to communicate and execute plans. 
Activists also have to contend with the reality of de facto non-generative 
technologies. Zittrain defines generativity as “a system’s capacity to produce 
unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied 
audiences.”105 In other words, while many internet technologies were designed to be 
“open boxes,” amenable to alteration by their owners, non-generative technologies are 
more like closed boxes, tied to their manufacturers, and vulnerable to alteration, tracking, 
and destruction remotely. Non-generative devices include the Ipod and TiVo. Zittrain 
argues that you can think of this as the difference between “contributors or participants 
rather than mere consumers.” In the U.S., non-generativity is related to issues of profits 
and corporate interest, but in Egypt these questions are more closely related to 
surveillance and control than they are to money. Non-generativity is clearly the model 
being pursued by Egyptian telecoms and the regime. Organizers from the April 6th 
 
105Zittrain, Jonathan. The Future of the Internet – And How To Stop It.  New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008. 
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Movement described what this change means for them in practice – while it is easy to 
change your mobile phone’s “simcard”, and hence your mobile number, the phones 
themselves contain a chip that can’t be removed or altered, making it possible for your 
initial service provider to track that phone indefinitely. In practice, this means that the 
capabilities of the mobile phone itself are bifurcated – as we saw with the events of June 
2009 in Iran, individuals are still able to access the Internet, either directly or by sharing 
proxy servers. However, the shutdown that occurred at a critical moment during the 
Iranian events destroyed the capability of individuals and organizers to use their mobile 
phones as coordinating and frame-building devices. Individuals with mobile Internet 
access can of course still access the Web directly, updating blogs, Twitter feeds, and 
other forms of social media communication. However, when coupled with the 
surveillance practices instituted by cybercafés and mobile service providers, such 
shutdowns add up to a crippling of the Internet’s capacity to serve as an accelerant during 
moments of crisis – precisely the moment when they would otherwise be most useful.  
4.7 Mobilizing and Coordinating during the Gaza Campaign 
On December 27th, 2008, Israel launched an invasion and bombardment of the 
Gaza Strip. The Israelis had removed its civilian settler force in 2005, as well as its 
military forces. However, tensions remained high, particularly after the victory of the 
Islamist movement Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary elections. As a result of the 
organization’s position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and because of accelerate 
rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel, a blockade of the Strip was enforced by the 
Israelis and the Egyptians since June 2007. This blockade was controversial from the 
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outset, and engendered widespread resentment in Egypt as well. It was in this 
environment that the incursion took place, 11 days after the expiration of a 6-month 
cease-fire between Hamas and Israel that had been brokered by Egypt.106 The war 
generated substantial criticism in the Egyptian and global press, and led to the 
mobilization of protests against the Israeli incursion and the perceived complicity of the 
Mubarak regime. Such mobilization to reflects the same kind of widespread anger that 
led to mobilizations against the Lebanon War in 2006, or against the Israeli-Egyptian 
blockade of Gaza in 2008. But the battle between protestors and the state also in many 
cases reflects the success of the state in shutting down protest against the regimes policies, 
which had been causing resentment ever since the government agreed to help the Israeli 
government conduct a blockade of the Gaza Strip.  
SMNs also became important tools in the building of shared meaning. One of the 
most prominent activities on Facebook was the changing of both profile names and 
pictures to a first name of “Gaza.” Doing so was a simple and powerful gesture of 
solidarity, that in many cases reached out into a social network of friends with mixed or 
hostile feelings about the cause of the Palestinians. Blogs and video-sharing websites also 
remained important sites of documentation and functioned as work-arounds for a press 
reluctant to write about the protests. Youtube, for instance,  provides powerful 
documentation of protests in Alexandria on December 28th, 2008, in which engineering 
students organized against the Israeli incursion. Thousands of protestors can be seen.107 
 
106Zahur, Sherifa. “The Lost Calm of Operation Cast Lead.” Middle East Policy 16/1: (40-52).  
107           http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M5bXQvr8AhI&feature=related. Accessed August 20th, 2009. 
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The government, however, was loathe to admit to this unpopular policy. The 
Egyptian official press cleverly disguised the prohibition against street demonstrations 
against Operation Cast Lead. Al-Ahram, on December 31st, 2008, printed a story with the 
headline “Angry responses sweep the streets of Arab capitals.”108 The story detailed the 
protests taking place across the Arab world in response to the Israeli incursion. It’s Egypt 
section came first, but instead of details about street protests and mobilizations, the story 
talked about an announcement from the Lawyer’s Syndicate, hardly evidence of an angry 
response sweeping the streets of Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood was able to mobilize 
some protests across Egypt, including Mounifiya, Dimyat , and Fayoum109, but overall 
the security prohibition against protests was effective in Cairo. Even when protestors did 
manage to take to the streets, such as after Friday prayers on January 2nd, 2009110, their 
success was short-lived in the face of sustained repression from the regime. Outside of 
Cairo, though, protestors saw more success. In Alexandria, a demonstration on January 
9th included as many as 50,000 people.111 Reports indicated that security forces backed 
off the demonstrators because of the numbers involved. As a direct result of this protest, 
the regime arrested 21 members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Alexandria and charged 
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108 “Rudud al-fi‘l tajtahu shawari‘ al-‘awasim al-arabiyya.” Al-Ahram, December 31st 2008. 
109 "Waqafat ihtijajiya tajtahu muhafazhat Misr li-l-tandid bi-majzarat Ghazza" http://lazeeez.com/qalam/i-
343-2725.html 
110 Jessica Desvarieux. “Hundreds Protest Closed Egypt-Gaza Border.” VOA News. January 3rd, 
2009. http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-01/2009-0
voa3.cfm?CFID=265053033&CFTOKEN=57849127&jsessionid=8430d305506867ed7e7a1d4e6e7719322
97d 
111 Stern, Johannes. “Widespread anger in Egypt at Mubarak regime.” World Socialist Web Site. January 
24th, 2009. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jan2009/egyp-j24.shtml. See also  
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them with organizing the protests.112 Dozens of Brotherhood members were arrested 
across Egypt during Operation Cast Lead, as the regime sent an unmistakable signal that 
the protests had crossed the line. 
Even these limited protests mobilized against the Israeli incursion into Gaza 
cannot be said to have taken place because of SMNs. It is impossible, in fact, to evaluate 
the actual contribution of these media to the mobilization itself, except by comparison to 
similar mobilizations that took place in the past. While SMNs have been used to mobilize 
protest against Israeli policies on many occasions in the past, including the invasion of 
the West Bank in 2002, the war in Lebanon in 2006, and the ongoing blockade of the 
Gaza Strip, it remains unclear whether those who attended the protests did so because of 
SMNs or for some other reason. Large protests against Israeli policies have also been 
organized by, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that has been quite 
prominent in its opposition to the Mubarak regimes perceived complicity with Israeli 
policies. Most media reports of Gaza protests during Operation Cast Lead credit the 
Brotherhood with their organization, and the group was also behind the January 2008 
protests against the Gaza Blockade. While SMNs certainly contribute to these protests – 
Brotherhood members are active bloggers, Twitterers, and emailers – the group remains a 
grassroots organization whose strength is derived from on-the-ground organizing and 
face-to-face contact.  Another large protest was organized in Mahalla Al-Kubra, the site 
of the labor unrest that led to the April 6th, 2008 general strike.  
 
html
112 “Shurtat Misr tulqi al-qabd ‘ala 21 ikhwaniyan bi-sabab muzhaharat Ghazza.” (Egyptian police arrest 21 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood for Gaza protests.” Masrawy. January 11th, 
2009. http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jan2009/egyp-j24.s  
 
  
 
141
The evidence from the Gaza episode tells us two important things about the 
mobilizational potential of SMNs in authoritarian regimes: first, while SMNs lower 
certain collective action costs, it is not at all clear that they lower the most important 
costs in Egypt and in places like Egypt. While communication, frame-building, and 
coordination carry substantial costs for any organizer, they are much smaller 
impediments to large-scale organizing than heavy repression. The precise conditions 
under which oppositions might be most successful is a subject which will receive greater 
scrutiny in Chapter 6. This leads directly to the second point, which is that the state 
makes a determination that there will no public protests about something, they appear to 
be willing and able to execute this strategy with a great deal of ruthlessness. While 
sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians is de rigeur in most Egyptian circles, the 
Egyptian government’s success in keeping protests quiet in Cairo succeeded in hiding 
protests elsewhere from most international journalists. And since the government is 
sensitive to international opinion and pressure, this can only be seen as a victory for the 
state’s control strategy. Elsewhere in Egypt, the large protests successfully executed by 
opposition activists provide an answer to the question of whether even a determined state 
can entirely prevent motivated citizens from expressing themselves. Even a determined 
state, however, cannot stop activists from transmitting information, frames, and calls for 
solidarity to international audiences, where they may create pressure on the Egyptian 
regime. 
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4.8 Internationalizing but not Mobilizing 
This mobilization and activation of international networks of human rights activists 
can pressure the governments of authoritarian regimes like Egypt and to lend solidarity to 
strikers, protestors, and prisoners of conscience. Many of Egypt’s top bloggers travel 
frequently to Europe, have contacts in IFEX and the global human rights community, and 
either work for or are otherwise active in local Egyptian rights organizations like The 
Arab Network For Human Rights Information (ANHRI), the Egyptian Center For 
Women’s Rights (ECWR), the Egyptian Organization For Human Rights (EOHR), and 
the Hisham Mubarak Center. The networked contacts developed by this relatively small 
cadre of SMN activists reaches far beyond Egypt and into the West, in ways that are 
sometimes productive and sometimes unproductive (as we will see later with the April 6th 
Youth Movement). The blogger and rights activist Mohamed Khaled, who was the first 
major blogger to post and disseminate the Emad El-Kabir video to a wider audience, is 
also the program coordinator for AHNRI. He claims: 
We have connections with all the NGOs about specially freedom of expression, 
we are a member of IFEX this is the biggest network in the world concerning 
freedom of expression, we have a lot of contacts with other NGOs inside of Egypt 
and outside of Egypt, we can make a statement and send to the NGOs friends and 
sign it and campaign with us, we campaign with them, it makes a big media 
pressure on the government that the government doesn’t listen to us anymore, so 
you get some international pressure on the government that would be more 
useful.113 
 
The Internet thus becomes a crucial piece of local and international NGO activism, since 
the regime either does not have the capacity or the will to engage in sustained filtering or 
blocking of NGO Web sites themselves. This means that the sites themselves have 
 
113  Interview with Mohamed Khaled, Cairo, Egypt, June 25th, 2009. 
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become accumulated stores of knowledge and communication between activists and the 
international community, available to Egyptians with an Internet connection and to 
anyone in the world interested in what’s happening in Egypt. As Mohamed Khaled 
argued, “it’s opened the door for us, like if you wanted to speak or talk to the people 
through the newspaper, this can be cut from the newspaper from the government, but 
there is no censorship on the Internet, we can write about whatever we want.” These 
organizations now, as standard practice, compile yearly reports and documentation of 
rights abuses, some only in Arabic (the Hisham Mubarak Center for instance) and some 
of which are produced and translated into English as well (ANHRI provides some of its 
reports in both English and Arabic, like it’s yearly report on Freedom of Expression in 
Egypt114. 
Scholars have noticed this increased internationalization of Egyptian public life. 
Ghobashy defines it as: 
…the bargaining and interaction between Egyptian political actors and two 
specific sets of international actors: foreign governments and transnational 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and advocacy networks encompassing 
the international press and media (2008, 10).  
 
Activists on the ground echo this scholarly appraisal. Nora Younis argues: 
I realized there was a gap between the activism and the media. Most of the 
activists don’t speak English in a way or another there is a communication link 
that’s broken somehow, so I started, I had already some of the numbers of the 
reporters, and I was SMSing news of who was being released and suddenly it was 
this list of 800 reporters and human rights activists, cameraman, lawyers and other 
activists and I was sending mass SMS’s. The cell phone and the charger became 
the most important thing. 
 
114Reports available at http://www.anhri.net/en/ 
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 This is true whether the goal is labor reform or freedom of expression. SMNs 
facilitated the transmission of information to global labor networks during the campaign 
for an independent union of tax collectors, for instance. Ties between networked activists 
like Hossam El-Hamalawy and the global labor movement produced statements of 
solidarity and individual letters115, like the one sent by a branch of the Northern Ireland 
Fire Brigades Union: “We totally support the efforts of the Higher Committee for Strike 
( RETA) in trying to establish a free, independent and democratic trade union structure, 
to properly represent the rights and interests of ordinary workers and will do all we can to 
help make your voice heard.” While the tangible benefit of such displays might be 
limited, anything that globalizes the campaign of internationally marginal workers in 
Egypt has the potential to raise the profile of the labor movement, which appears to be 
happening: Time magazine’s August 2009 story on Egyptian labor unrest details the 
struggle for an independent labor federation and features an interview with El-Hamalawy 
himself.116 Support from abroad may also galvanize workers and organizers struggling to 
maintain the morale of campaigns. 
4.9 Conclusions 
In evaluating the evidence from all of these cases, one thing becomes very clear: 
There is a substantial methodological difficulty in attempting to explain the impact of 
SMNs on protest and collective action in a single-case study of Egypt. There is simply no 
 
115  See for instance “Solidarity from Britain,” which details a message from the UK Public and 
Commercial Services Union. http://arabist.net/arabawy/2009/08/11/solidarity-from-britain/ 
 
116  Hausloner, Abigail. “As Egypt’s Mubarak Comes To Washington, Labor Unrest Surges at 
Home.” Time. August 18th, 2009. 
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way to isolate the influence of blog and Twitter posts or Facebook groups, on any 
individual protest that took place in Egypt between 2005 and 2009. These difficulties are 
why the comparison between April 6th 2008 and April 6th 2009 is so important. It is, 
methodologically, as close to a natural experiment as you might find in qualitative social 
science. In each case, the demonstrations, in addition to being publicized, written about, 
documented, and coordinated online, were also organized by existing political forces on 
the ground in Egypt, most notably Kefaya and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is clear that 
the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently put together much larger demonstrations with 
little help from the toolbox of Web 2.0. Organizations with deeper social ties to local 
communities and an interest in the issue at hand will continue to have a mobilizational 
and organizational advantage over SMNs organized principally around “issue ad-
hocracies” in the sense that the elite, blog-driven protest movement centered around the 
issues in question co-existed with a much more organic and well-organized protest drive 
by either the Brotherhood or by the labor movement, which possess organizing capacity 
far beyond the capabilities of even the most well-connected bloggers or SMN activists. 
This is because, during the period in question, the demands of Egyptian SMN core were 
quite diffuse and dependent on day-to-day developments in Egyptian politics and society, 
whereas MB organizing does not depend principally on daily developments, but rather 
around its core of enthusiastic and risk-taking supporters, which it developed through 
painstaking organizing over the course of decades.  
The data presented in this chapter support the contention that SMNs can mobilize 
short-term protest activity and build linkages between groups and individuals seeking to 
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contest extant issues in Egyptian politics.  Data and interview work also support the 
hypothesis that certain SMN technologies – particularly Twitter posts and SMS messages 
– have great tactical utility for activists seeking to plan and execute demonstrations, as 
well as to contest and avoid arrests. This is true even in collective actions organized 
primarily without SMNs. SMNs reduce certain costs of collective action, including 
communication and tactical coordination. In rare instances, they may spread information 
and frames rapidly enough to instigate an informational cascade, but this possibility 
remains to be demonstrated on a scale which would indicate the clear support of ordinary 
citizens beyond the educated, urban, Internet-savvy elite. SMNs also facilitate linkages to 
international groups and organizations who can lend their voices to public discourse and 
agitate for governments and NGOs to contest arrests, human rights violations, and 
structural economic and political policies.  
However, the potential of SMNs to ignite large-scale opposition activity in Egypt 
(and in places like Egypt) appears to be quite low. There are a number of primary reasons 
for this difficulty. First, the Egyptian state, while avoiding the high-profile censorship of 
the Internet that brings condemnation from outside groups and might lead to interference 
with the state’s economic goals, it has successfully made it difficult even to do the kind 
of on-the-spot organizing with mobile phones that has received so much press attention. 
The difficulties described by organizers in the April 6th movement are indicative of 
greater savvy on the part of the regime than many previously believed.  In fact, the tools 
available to authoritarian regimes give governments great leverage to interfere with 
mobile-web-based activity such as Twitter and SMS. The formative cases of SMS-
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organized people power movements took place in states which either lacked the capacity 
or the will to engage in widespread interference with telecommunications networks. In 
Egypt this is not the case – the major telecoms are all subject to state interference and 
clearly cooperate with the regime to a certain extent. Making text messages 
extraordinarily expensive, for instance, or blocking mobile accounts, can make it very 
difficult to use these tools to organize, especially since any individual in Egypt must 
connect to the network through one of the major providers, all of which are subject to 
state licensure and pressure.  
The final conclusion drawn from the data presented in this chapter is that SMN-
mediated protest and opposition movements must be based on grassroots organizing that 
takes place offline. The contrast between the two April 6th strikes suggests that the former 
had substantial support and sympathy, because of popular identification with the causes 
of the Mahalla strike in 2008, and because of the lack of any such defining characteristic 
in 2009. Successful micro-level mobilizations, such as those that took place around the 
constitutional amendments (2005), the Lebanon War (2006) the sexual harassment 
problem (2006) and the Gaza war (2007) demonstrate that is possible to mobilize elite 
support and contention around issue ad-hocracies, and that the tools of SMNs are critical 
in raising both domestic and international awareness for these causes, as well as for the 
coordination of the demonstrations and dissent themselves. However, there is no avoiding 
the conclusion that such movements tend to be ephemeral and are eclipsed by the 
structural exigencies of Egyptian politics. Despite the openings in the media environment 
detailed in chapter 2, and notwithstanding the very real challenge presented to regime 
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autonomy by the judiciary, other openings in the Egyptian political system have been 
quite limited. This is partly because the best-organized and most credible opposition 
force, the Muslim Brotherhood, is both systematically persecuted by the regime and 
prevented from forming a political party domestically, and isolated internationally 
because of its stances on women’s rights, minority rights, and most importantly, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
These structural limitations of Egyptian politics are real and substantially 
circumscribe what can be accomplished with digital activism. The material presented in 
this chapter supports the theory that both the mobilizing and political potential of SMNs 
are context-dependent. However, it is possible that SMNs can have additional impact on 
Egyptian politics and the Egyptian public sphere by creating and sustaining public 
spheres or “counter-publics” for marginalized groups like women, religious minorities, 
and sexual minorities. This chapter argues that the context for the April 6th Movement 
was generated by political struggles which took place earlier in the decade. Chapter 5 will 
argue that by creating virtual counter-publics for marginal groups, SMNs can potentially 
lead to successful mobilizations. It is to those issues that this dissertation now turns.  
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Chapter 5  
 (Amplified) Voices for the Voiceless:  
Social Media Networks, Minorities, and Virtual Counterpublics  
 
“Still, it cannot be denied, based on the observation of recent processes of sociopolitical 
change, that access to and use of wireless communication technology adds a fundamental 
tool to the arsenal of those who seek to influence politics and the political process 
without being constrained by the powers that be.” 
- Castells et. al. 
5.0 Introduction 
Chapter 4 explained both the possibilities and limitations of digital mobilization 
through Social Media Networks. While they diffuse information quickly and more 
efficiently than traditional modes of organization and communication, and while they 
lower certain costs and barriers to collective action, Social Media Networks themselves 
cannot bring about the revolution. If Chapter 3 explained the impact on the media 
environment, and Chapter 4 explained the impact on mobilization, Chapter 5 will explain 
how both the collective action and media effects of SMNs can combine to impact public 
discourse. The chapter will explain how, even taking the limitations outlined in previous 
chapters into consideration, Social Media Networks can impact public discourse and 
serve as channels for mobilization for marginalized groups in Egyptian society. These 
effects are realized, as in Chapters 3 and 4, through digitally-enhanced networks of 
journalists, elite bloggers, and the properties of information diffusion explained in 
Chapter 2.  Again though, as in Chapters 3 and 4, changes in discourse or even 
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mobilization do not necessarily lead to changes in policy. This chapter is crucial for 
building theory about SMNs, since Chapters 3 and 4 largely detailed the efforts of 
individuals who can be considered elites (i.e. bilingual international journalists, and 
educated, Cairo-based student activists). Arriving at a theoretically-informed explanation 
of the impact of SMNs on marginalized groups and individuals will help construct a 
generalizable theory of Social Media Networks under authoritarianism.    
In Egypt, public discourse is still dominated by government-owned or controlled 
media, like the newspaper giant Al-Ahram and the TV station Nile Television. 
Independent newspapers, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, have changed this equation, but 
the circulation figures still favor the government-owned and aligned media outlets. As 
one might expect in such an authoritarian regime, many groups and individuals have 
difficulty accessing the public sphere. This exclusion might be due to social factors, as in 
the case of religious minorities like Coptic Christians and Baha’is, or it might be due to 
the political exclusion as in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. Whatever the source of 
exclusion, such groups have had great difficulty having their voices heard as part of a 
robust public sphere. Since the growth of the Internet in the mid-90s, scholars have 
looked for signs that the digital world might provide a haven for the growth of alternative 
public spheres for such groups, conceptualized as “electronic public spheres,” explicitly 
borrowing the concept of the public sphere from Habermas and applying it to the Internet. 
They do so in recognition that, as Palczewski argues, “Social movement and 
counterpublic sphere theories have recognized the importance of identity creation and 
self-expression to the disempowered” (2001, 165). Blogs themselves have long been 
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posited as “the voice of the voiceless,” a way to democratize public life and add the 
voices of ordinary people to those of the elites. While this may be true, earlier chapters 
suggest that those voices are only heard or amplified through critical nodes of elite 
journalists and bloggers.  
The findings of Chapter 4 indicate that while Social Media Networks can be 
important tools of coordination and mobilization, they cannot mobilize in the absence of 
grassroots organizing, and they cannot challenge established institutions of 
authoritarianism. What they can do, however, as noted in Chapter 2, is connect diffuse 
actors with common interests. To test whether these dynamics hold in authoritarian 
systems, this chapter will evaluate and explain the impact of Social Media Network 
activity on two minorities in Egypt through the exploration of two case studies: the case 
of ID cards for Baha’is; and the growth of web sites and blogs dedicated to Muslim 
Brothers. The case studies will seek to answer two questions: 1) Are social media 
creating electronic public spheres or counterpublics for these groups; and 2) What is the 
actual political or social impact of these efforts? In other words, while existing studies 
have usually merely documented the electronic activity of subordinated groups, this study 
treats such activity as sui generis and seeks to build theories about the conditions under 
which social media might alter the material political conditions for subordinated 
minorities. Such a recognition does not preclude an appropriate recognition of the 
importance of self-expression and identity for subordinated minorities, but argues that in 
addition to these important functions, Social Media Networks are the critical missing 
variable in explaining the impact of the Internet on minorities. The null hypothesis is that 
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whatever their contributions to deliberation and building democratic values (and even 
these hypotheses are suspect given recent research by Sunstein (2008) and Hindman 
(2008), Egyptian social media practitioners are doing little to nothing to change the 
political environment for subordinated minorities like women, Baha’is and Muslim 
Brothers. The alternative hypothesis advanced here, is that SMNs transmit information 
from electronic public spheres into larger spheres, either national or global, and thereby 
impact perceptions of subordinated minorities and under certain circumstances, lead to 
mobilizations. They do so, once again, through critical “nodes” of elite blogger-activists 
and their connections to the mainstream Egyptian media. The competing hypotheses will 
be evaluated against the evidence presented below in the hopes of arriving at an 
explanation and building theory.  
5.1 Politics in the Online Public Sphere  
Since the rise of Internet advocacy in the 1990s, scholars have sought to 
categorize and explain the impact of electronic communities on politics and society, in 
the U.S. and abroad. One of the most popular subjects of scholarly inquiry has been the 
use of the Internet by marginalized groups – diasporas, ethnic, religious and political 
minorities, and revolutionary groups. These inquiries are usually couched in language 
borrowed from Jurgen Habermas, in The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere.  Habermas defined the public sphere as “A domain of our social life in which 
such a thing as public opinion can be formed. ” (1989, cited in Al Saggaf 2006). The 
public sphere as it developed in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries was imagined as a 
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place where previously excluded groups and individuals could have their voices heard, 
through conversations in cafes, salons, and newspapers (Poor 2005). It is this latter aspect 
that makes it so difficult to theorize online public spheres as Habermasian public spheres, 
especially in authoritarian or impoverished contexts. However, Habermas’s third element, 
that “ideas presented in the public sphere were considered on the basis of their merits, 
and not on the social standing of the speaker” (Poor 2005, 1) does appear to apply to the 
Internet. Theorists of online public spheres are particularly apt to seize on this last point, 
since in theory blogs, chat rooms, and community Web sites are open to anyone – both 
for formation and participation.   
Dahlberg (2001), however, offers a full set of reasons that online public spheres 
fail to meet the standards delineated by Habermas. Such reasons include the increasing 
commercialization of the digital world, the lack of civility and deliberation online, the 
difficulty of ascertaining the veracity of information, and the exclusion of certain groups 
and individuals because of unequal access to digital communications. One might add 
Hindman’s (2008) finding that the American blogosphere has merely crowned a new elite, 
since many prominent bloggers and activists are the graduates of Ivy League universities, 
are well-known journalists, or can be thought of in other ways as elites. As chapter 3 
demonstrated, however, such elites, through the dynamics of networks and power laws, 
can be the critical nodes in the dissemination of information into the wider public sphere. 
Therefore this chapter will not be investigating whether Habermasian public spheres exist 
as such, but rather whether and how Social Media Networks successfully introduce 
Baha’is and Muslim Brothers into the public discourse. 
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Other scholars have characterized the use of the Internet by subordinated groups 
as “virtual counterpublics” or “cyber-movements” (Palczewski 2001, 165). Counterpublic 
theory may be a particularly appropriate way to analyze the use of Social Media 
Networks in Egypt. Fraser (1992), defines  counterpublics as “parallel discursive arenas 
where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs.” 
Counterpublics are theorized as operating in distinction from, and opposition to, the 
borgouise public sphere of Habermasian theory, inasmuch as the public sphere itself can 
be exclusionary. Asen and Brouwer note that counterpublics have a dual nature – on the 
one hand they operate as sites of debate, identity-formation, and refuge from the public 
sphere, while on the other, they serve as sites of training and resistance for activism in the 
broader public sphere (2001, 7). Ideas of exclusion, oppression, and resistance are key for 
counterpublic theory. Thus in Egypt, the study of Muslim Brothers, Baha’is, and women, 
can usefully be characterized as the study of multiple public spheres, or counterpublics. 
Each group is struggling to constitute identities in the face of powerful state and 
corporate interests that seek to impose conceptions of identity and action upon them. And 
for all, the digital world of Social Media Networks offers the possibility of, at minimum, 
a discursive arena where ideas and practices of resistance can be developed, and senses of 
community fostered. As states like China have proven, however, that arena can be 
delimited by determined state authorities, and made to be substantially unfree. 
Blogs also might offer a kind of updated literary public sphere. Habermas 
outlined two kinds of public spheres – the literary and the political. The former emerged 
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through the development of novels out of letter-writing, and led to the development of 
interiority. Habermas argued that the development of novels in 18th-century Europe 
restructured “the intimacy of the private realm,” which came to be seen as “the authentic 
space of human existence” (Edgar 36). The public nature of the novel meant that no one 
with the means to purchase them could be excluded from reading them. As will be seen 
later with the blogging of Baha’is and Muslim Brothers, one of the animating goals of 
bloggers from subordinated minorities is precisely to humanize the Other, to allow access 
to the interiority of demonized groups, and to give them “an authentic space of human 
existence.” At the same time, those blogs offer not only a glimpse into the inner lives of 
the Other, but they also provide their authors with the ability to critically comment on the 
affairs of the state. As Edgar notes,  
…the truth of the public sphere, is realized in the critical examination to which 
the public sphere subjects government policy and law” (37).   
It was not always thus. Until developments in the 17th century in Britain and 
France, it was unheard of for ordinary citizens to have a say in the affairs of the state 
(Edgar 37). In Britain, the repeal of censorship laws led to the development of journals 
and reviews which featured prominent commentary by noted authors like Daniel Defoe. 
Together with the provision of access to parliamentary proceedings in 1803, these 
developments led to the creation of the fourth estate – a class of individuals whose 
profession was to watch over the affairs of the state and to engage the public, in much the 
same way that European legal reform proceeded from “the separation of the private realm 
of the family and civil society….from state interference,” (38). 
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Today, the public spheres of bloggers become both literary, in their provision of 
access to the interiority of subordinated groups, and political, in lending the individuals in 
those groups the ability to critically comment on the affairs of the day, to contest the 
passage of laws and the injustice of existing laws, and to agitate for better conditions and 
treatment. At the same time, the development of mobile networking technologies means 
that there are multiple channels of access to the Web itself, making it more difficult for 
authoritarian states to interfere with the development of these public spheres. These 
technologies “bypass political or business control of communication” and create 
“autonomous process of social and political mobilization that do not rely on formal 
politics….” (Castells et. al. 2007, 209). This is particularly important in places like Egypt, 
where formal politics offer limited or non-existent channels of participation in public life.  
Thus conceptualized as virtual counterpublics, electronic communities in 
authoritarian regimes in Egypt and places like Egypt can be categorized, studied and 
better understood. Such studies can be valuable contributions to our store of knowledge 
about democracy, deliberation, and citizenship, among many other important topics. They 
do not, however, go very far toward answering the research question of this study, 
namely “What is the impact of the use of social media?”  To answer this question, 
researchers must go beyond reading and parsing the material on these sites, and engage 
with the larger context in which the sites exist. Doing that requires tracing debates around 
issue-areas, examining the larger media context for signs that Social Media Networks are 
generating press attention and mobilization  
  
 
157
A way of framing the impact of SMNs on Egyptian public life would be through 
Maratea's concept of "carrying capacity" for public debate. Maratea argues that "the 
emergence of social problems results from a competitive process in which claims-makers 
vie for public attention by promoting problem claims in public arenas" (2008, 140). 
However, traditional avenues of leveling claims in society have traditionally been limited 
- newspaper op-ed pages, demonstrations, and the mainstream media. The blogosphere, 
however, has been able to introduce new claims-makers into the public arena (what 
others might call the public sphere), by offering citizens publishing tools at very low cost 
(Maratea 2008, 142).  The introduction of new claims-makers often takes the form of 
blogs providing journalists with "a trove of available claims" (2008, 147). While Maratea 
was writing strictly about the blogosphere, the rise in importance of other Social Media 
Networks since 2008 only serves to provide elite journalists with more potential "troves" 
of claims and claims-makers. And in authoritarian contexts like Egypt, the carrying 
capacity of traditional public arenas is even lower, due to repression, censorship, and self-
censorship. So SMNs might play a particularly important role in such societies, 
transmitting claims from groups like Baha'is and Muslim Brothers to elite journalists, 
where they reach the public sphere. This study argues, again, that it is the links between 
elite journalists and SMN activists in Egypt that explains a great deal of the impact of 
these technologies on Egyptian public life. 
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5.3 Bahai’s and virtual identity-formation 
The position of small religious minorities in Egypt has long been precarious. 
While Christians and, theoretically, Jews, enjoy some protections under the law, other 
groups – non Ahl al-Kitab (people of the book) enjoy neither protection nor respect in 
Egyptian society. One such group is the tiny religious minority of Baha’is. Founded in 
Iran in the 1860s by the man now known as Baha’ullah, the Baha’is believe that all 
persecuted not just in Egypt, but in other parts of the Middle East as well, particularly 
Iran. The growth of the Baha’i community in Egypt appears to date to around 1895, when 
a Persian scholar named Mirza Abu'l-Fadl Gulpaygani  arrived to lecture at Al-Azhar. A 
small community quickly converted to the faith.117 Over the next few decades, the 
community, while still tiny, grew enough to see the National Spiritual Assembly of the 
Baha’is founded in Egypt in 1924. Always seen by Muslims as a heretical offshoot of 
Islam, Baha'is exist in a more vulnerable position than protected Ahl al-Kitab (This is not 
in any way to suggest that the position of Egypt’s sizable Coptic minority or its miniscule 
Jewish population is secure). Combined with their exceptionally small numbers in Egypt, 
this renders Baha'is quite vulnerable to official repression, unofficial persecution, and all 
manner of legal and illegal discrimination. For instance, married Baha'i couples may not 
rent hotel rooms, since the state does not recognize their marriages, and unwed couples 
are disallowed from renting rooms together (Westerners are often exempt from this 
prohibition unless they are traveling with an Egyptian). Baha'is received some 
recognition of their status in Egypt until 1960, when they were made to identify as 
 
117 “Baha’i Faith: Early Days in Egypt.” Baha’i Faith in Egypt. June 6th, 2006. http://www.bahai-
egypt.org/2006/06/bahai-faith-early-days-in-egypt.html 
  
 
159
                                                
Muslim, Christian, or Jew. They were also prevented from practicing their religion in 
public, a serious violation of their religious freedom. 
One of the controversies surrounding the Bahai’s involves the issuing of national 
identity cards, which for all Egyptians includes a listing for faith. In March 2009, Baha’is 
won a long-running legal battle to have their entry for religious faith removed from those 
ID cards, arguing that listing the Baha’i faith on the ID card opened the card-holder to a 
host of discriminatory work and housing practices. The state on principle refused to grant 
the Baha’is an exception, arguing that since all other Egyptian citizens were required to 
list their religious orientation on their ID cards, there should be no exceptions for anyone, 
since granting an exception would then constitute a form of special treatment. A lower 
court ruling in 2006 in favor of the Baha’is was immediately appealed by the government, 
and in a rare show of unity between the NDP and the opposition in parliament, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling party agreed that the rules should not be changed for 
Baha’is. As Religious Endowments Minister Mahmoud Zakzouk told the Daily News 
Egypt, Baha’ism is “not a revealed religion” for Muslims and thus not subject to special 
protection in Egypt.118 In the parliamentary debate that followed the ruling, at least one 
member of parliament argued that Baha’is should be killed as apostates. This long legal 
battle, begun in 2006, with a number of reversals for Baha’is, including a negative ruling 
in December 2006, finally ended in victory in March of 2009, when the administrative 
court ruled that they could leave the religion line blank on their identification cards. The 
first recipient of one of these new cards declared the Baha’is right to leave that line blank 
 
118 “State to Appeal Ruling that Favors Egypt’s Baha’is.” Daily News Egypt. May 5th, 2006. 
http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1394 
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“a victory for the citizen and the civilization of Egypt.”119 It is almost certainly more of a 
moral than a strategic victory, since a blank “religious affiliation” line can now mean 
only one thing: that the cardholder is in fact a Baha’i.  
In the battle over ID cards, Baha’i blogs and electronic media outlets in Egypt and 
abroad played a role in writing about, publicizing, and articulating the needs of the Baha’i 
community in Egypt. One element of that role was and remains the presentation of Baha’i 
identity to Egyptian and global publics, what Asen and Brouwer called the “outward” 
manifestation of the counterpublic. One Baha’i blogger described the intent of his work 
as follows:  
And since then, I didn’t want it to be a blog about the Baha’i Faith, I wanted it to 
be a blog about a Baha’i person, what does it mean to be a Baha’i in Egypt. I tried 
so much to keep it personal, I tried to comment on the news from my point of 
view, not just report the news, and not to go into issues of the Faith itself, it was 
not my intention to you spread the religion or tell people about the Baha’i faith, 
just about me and setting the facts straight and answering any misinformation in 
the media.120 
Shady offers a refrain familiar to scholars who have sought to understand the 
motives of popular bloggers – a desire to correct the public record in some way, to alter 
popular representations of one’s identity group, and to create a virtual counterpublic that 
leaves space for discussion and dissent while hoping to reach a larger audience and to 
change attitudes. Individuals who are part of subordinated groups often express deep 
frustration at being misunderstood by larger segments of society. So whereas Muslim 
 
119 Bayoumi, Amr and Mohamed Azzam.  “Baha’i twins receive first national ID card with a “blank” for 
religious affiliation. Their father considers it a rescue from “civil death.” Al-Masry Al-Youm. August 9th, 
2009. http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=221981 
120 Interview with Samir Shady. Cairo, Egypt, April 21st, 2008. 
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Brothers often express exasperation with being treated in popular culture as fanatical, 
ascetic terrorists, Baha’is resent popular misrepresentations of their beliefs in the 
dominant culture. As Samir Shady, the author of Egyptian Baha’i, wrote in a 2008 post: 
From the beginning of the blog, I was determined not to write anything far from 
the basic goal: to present my personal thoughts, as an Egyptian Baha’i…I focused 
on correcting mistaken thinking seen on blogs and the traditional media.121  
To that end, Shady frequently comments on media items and statements by 
leading figures in Egyptian public life, like the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. Typical posts on such 
topics might garner in excess of 70 comments, such as when the author deconstructed an 
interview by the Sheikh with Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2008.122 While the comments reflect 
the perils of pseudonymity that make the Internet a frequently uncivil medium, they also 
reflect, on occasion, genuine back-and-forth discussion about the nature of Baha’ism, the 
position of Islam on non-recognized religions, and other issues. Likewise, the Baha’i blog 
“Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra (Another Viewpoint), argued in its very first post in 2006 that it 
wanted to offer “another viewpoint to what is published in the Arab media and the 
Western media.”123  
The distribution of participation and viewership is not necessarily between many 
comments versus zero, as some blogs in the middle often post 10 to 15 comments on 
certain entries, suggesting a small, if stable readership. Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra, for instance, 
is one of these blogs (although it should be noted that her blog is composed from Chicago, 
 
121 “On the Baha’is and the Crusades.” Egyptian Baha’i. February 23rd, 2008. Author’s translation. 
122 “Ya Shaykh?” Egyptian Baha’i. January 29th, 2008. 
http://egyptianbahai.wordpress.com/2008/01/29/oh_sheikh/#more-110 
123 “Introduction.” Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra. August 3rd, 2006. 
http://fromdifferentangle.blogspot.com/2006_08_01_archive.html 
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Illinois). Shabab Baha’i occasionally gets in excess of 10 comments, though the majority 
of the posts on the site receive zero comments. This might be because Shebab Baha’i, 
like many personal blogs in the Arab world, intersperses political discussion with other 
topics and ideas, including poetry. This lack of posting stability can make it hard to 
attract and maintain readership in an information-rich environment. The English-
language blog “Baha’I Faith in Egypt,” for instance, despite quite literate and informative 
posts, rarely garners more than a handful of comments. In fact, frequently the site gets the 
dreaded “zero comments” identified by Lovink (2008). The posts of Egyptian Baha’i are 
thus a kind of focal point for the global community of Baha’i writers and activists 
interested in the plight of the Baha’i community in Egypt. Network theory would have us 
believe that this is largely due to the advantage of first-movership, but the profiles in this 
dissertation also suggest that one overarching reason for the power of certain blogger-
activists is their position in the larger community of Egyptian journalists and international 
human rights networks. A small number of individuals appear able to move freely 
between these worlds, accepting jobs as journalists while still maintaining blogs and 
profiles in the international rights community 
Their blogs are therefore a way of forming their identities – both for themselves, 
and against the predominant culture that refuses to allow them space for their private 
selves. It is also the case that virtual selves sometimes have more power and cache than 
their actual selves. Individuals who have no particular power in public discourse in the 
real world, or no particularly influential social or economic power, can become leading 
bloggers and opinion-makers, at least within their own communities, if not in the culture 
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at large. Blogs can also be seen as a way of articulating history for subordinated groups, 
which had no official guardian since the National Spiritual Assembly was abolished in 
1960. Baha’is in Egypt have therefore been deprived, for decades, of their place in the 
Egyptian national narrative. As one blogger wrote, the younger generation knows very 
little about the community’s history, and his only knowledge comes from “stories told to 
me by adults since I was young.”124 To be able to blog about their histories, to post 
photos and videos, and have those links be shared among a community of interested co-
religionists, is of substantial importance in understanding how a community as small as 
the Baha’is might come together to articulate their interests against a powerful state and a 
hostile society. 
The growth of Baha’i blogging in Egypt coincided with the battle over national 
ID cards in 2006. In fact it would appear that some were started explicitly to take part in 
the debate over that issue. The English-language blog Baha’i Faith in Egypt devoted its 
second post to a recap of the controversy. As the author noted,  
Because of this recently instituted computerized national ID system in Egypt, 
followers of the Baha'i Faith are deprived of their basic human rights, including 
admission to universities, obtaining birth and death certificates, marriage 
certificates, driver's licenses, purchasing property, obtaining public health care, 
employment, obtaining social services, pension and inheritance, travel documents, 
etc....125 
However, as valuable as these web spheres may be to Baha'is in Egypt and abroad in and 
of themselves, it is only when claims-makers are able to transmit their claims to national 
 
124 “The Radwan Holiday in Egypt.” Egyptian Baha’i. April 28th, 
2008. http://egyptianbahai.wordpress.com/2008/04/28/ridwan_in_egyp/ Author’s translation. 
125 “Egyptian Bah’ais and ID cards.” Baha’i Faith in Egypt. June 2nd, 2006. http://www.bahai-
egypt.org/search?updated-max=2006-07-09T19%3A01%3A00-05%3A00&max-results=50 
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and international audiences that popular attention is turned to their plight. It is also true, 
as Maratea (2008) argues, that high-profile public events can focus attention on claims-
makers. It appears that this was the case with the April 2009 home-burnings in Upper 
Egypt, an event that brought international condemnation and re-focused attention on the 
somewhat obscure and difficult to transmit effort on behalf of the Baha'is to allow them 
to leave their ID cards blank for religious affiliation.  
5.4 Power Law Dynamics and Baha’i Blogging 
Consistent with the expectations of network theory outlined in Chapter 2, there 
are a handful of influential and well-known Baha’i blogs, as well as a small number of 
activist-bloggers known to be supportive of Baha’i causes in Egypt. The blogger-activists 
include “Living in Egypt Without ID; Egyptian Baha’i, Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra, the Baha’i 
blog ring, and others. It is primarily material drawn from these sources that will be used 
to develop theory about the place of subordinated minority bloggers in Egypt.  
In Chapter 3, I argued that the small elite of Egyptian power bloggers has an 
outsized influence in Egyptian politics due to their access to traditional journalist elites. It 
does not appear as though the Baha’i bloggers have this same kind of influence, because 
of their much more marginal position in Egyptian society than even the most secular and 
pro-Western bloggers. But what does seem clear is that the Baha’i bloggers have 
influence in, or at least the ears of, the Egyptian power bloggers, and thus second-order 
access to the Egyptian journalist elite. Unquestionably the most important of those 
supporters is Nora Younis, who has appeared in this project in every chapter. As if to 
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underscore the importance of these elite bloggers to the Baha’i cause, when Younis was 
awarded the 2008 Human Rights Award by Human Rights First, which specifically 
mentioned her advocacy for the Baha’is in the award. The blog Egyptian Baha’i made 
special mention of Younis and her efforts on their behalf.126 Her work for Baha’is has not 
been lost on traditional media practitioners, either. Al-Masry Al-Youm Deputy Editor 
Ehab El-Zalaky told me,  
there is no coverage or negative coverage for this case in the traditional 
media…some independent TV stations, but no one knows exactly what this thing 
is about, no one knows exactly what the Baha’i people are, some Bahaii blogs 
appeared on the Internet, wrote about their religion their faith and their right to 
choose their religion, this is the first time you can find this kind of expression of 
views in the Egyptian media at all, and on the other hand, many many of the 
bloggers are making a campaign to support the Bahaii demands, and they have 
designed logos to put on the blogs and they are in some cases they are attending 
some proceedings….like publishing a photographs of the stands to support the 
Bahaiis and was led by the bloggers, and was led by a very famous blogger Nora 
Younis….127 
Younis and El-Zelaky know each other personally, and that El-Zelaky’s 
newspaper, Al-Masry Al-Youm, has provided some of the most extensive coverage of the 
Baha’i issue in the Egyptian press, notably sending a reporter to Washington, D.C. to 
interview American Baha’is, who were at the time exerting pressure on the Egyptian 
government to implement an administrative court ruling that the Baha’is had the right not 
to register as Muslim on their ID cards. The article reported an interview with one of 
those leaders: 
Kit Bigelow, director of external affairs, National Spiritual Assembly of the 
Baha’is of the United States, said that Baha’is only demand the government to 
 
126 “http://egyptianbahai.wordpress.com/2008/10/30/the_beautifu/2969734075_d676420219/.  
127 Interview with Ehab El-Zalaky, Cairo, Egypt, April 11th, 2008. 
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allow them to have ID’s as other Egyptian citizens. She hoped that the 
government will execute the verdict so that they can practice their life affairs 
normally. 
She added that no Baha’i so far was able to get an ID, unless he pretends to 
embrace either Islam or Christianity. She stressed that Baha’is will be grateful if 
the government would strike through the field of religion, leave it vacant, register 
their real faith, or write ‘others’ in that field.128 
Nora Younis was not the only Egyptian “power blogger” to take up the cause of 
the Baha’is – nearly the entire core of the early blogging movement that drew so much 
international attention – The Sandmonkey, Manal and Alaa, Amr Gharbeia, all posted 
sympathetic pieces at one point or another about the Baha’is, with many clustered around 
the court decision in 2006. On December 17th, 2006, the Sandmonkey related the story of 
a Baha’i man who had to go through a terrible ordeal to get his recently-deceased wife 
buried. He lamented, “Stories like this one are not the exception when it comes to what 
the Baha'is go through on day to day basis, and things will only get worse for them as 
time goes by.”129 Manal and Alaa posted a link to the protest event including the image 
below.130 They also posted a lament in 2008 entitled “Yes, they will f—k your sister” 
which linked a negative ruling on the Baha’i ID file with the imprisonment of Kareem 
Amr and the general atmosphere of oppression in Egypt at the time.131 (It should be noted 
Alaa later posted a lament about the focus on minority rights in the blogging community 
when the majority was suffering so much as well. As he asked, “Why defend the 
 
sister
128 Izz Ed-Din, Ahmed. “Leaders of American Baha’is demand the implementation of administrative court 
ruling on ID cards…and estimate the number of Baha’is in Egypt at 2000.” Al-Masry Al-Youm, August 21st, 
2008. Author’s translation. 
129 “Today’s Baha’i Protest.” Rantings of a Sandmonkey. December 17th, 2006. 
http://www.sandmonkey.org/2006/12/17/todays-bahai-protest/ 
130 “Waqfa tadamuniyya min al-baha'iyin al-masriyin min ajli haqqihim fi ithbat diyanatihim aw kitaba 
(ukhra) fi khanat al-diyanah fi-l-awraq al-rasmiyya” http://www.manalaa.net/node/84324 
131 “Ba‘d al-hukm ‘ala ‘Abd al-Karim wa-l-baha’iyin al-kuffar hayniku 
ukhtak” http://www.manalaa.net/the_heathen_and_your_ .  
 minorities if we can’t defend the majority?”132). Amr Gharbeia posted a poll asking 
readers “What should we do after the court prevented the Baha’is from providing their 
religion on ID cards?”133 Issandr El-Amrani also added a post about the ruling, on 
December 17th, 2006, arguing wearily, “It’s sad to see such a confluence of bigotry and 
Gestapo mentality: the Sheikhs cling onto some abstract idea of what’s a religion or not, 
while the security types are too attached to their system and too obsessed with religion to 
change the system.”134 Hossam El-Hamalawy also devoted countless posts to their battle 
over the ID cards. Before a pivotal court decision in December 2006, El-Hamalawy 
posted a call to action in front of the courthouse. El-Hamalawy’s call to action included 
the visual frame posted below, which appeared on a number of blogs and electronic Web 
sites: 
 
Figure 5.1: Call to action prior to court decision, December 2006.  
                                                 
132 “Kuntum fein lamma Faransa” http://www.manalaa.net/where_where_you_when_france 
133 “Ni‘mil eih fi-l-baha’iyin ba‘d ma mana‘athum al-mahkama min ithbat dinahum fi al-’awraq al-
thubutiyya?” Gharbeia.net. December 17th, 2006. http://gharbeia.net/node/179.  
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In one particularly well-known incident, El-Hamalawy, together with Younis and 
fellow blogger and Ibn Abdel-Aziz, attended the court ruling, expecting bad news, and 
held a silent protest outside the building after the court ruled against the Baha’is (they 
would later win on appeal). Abdel-Aziz, in a lengthy blog post on the day’s events, 
corrected a number of errors in Al-Masry Al-Youm’s coverage of the event.135 The 
newspaper falsely identified the protestors as Baha’is themselves (none of the four 
bloggers demonstrating in sympathy was Baha’i) and specifically argued that Nora 
Younis herself was a Baha’i. Such mistakes lent credence to the view that no one outside 
the Baha’i community particularly cared one way or the other about the outcome of that 
court case itself. El-Hamalawy and Abdel-Aziz both noted wryly the presence of 
protestors for the other side, who they presumed were Islamists, cheering when the 
verdict was read and treating it as a victory for God. Much as in Younis’ account of the 
Sudanese refugee massacre in December 2006 (just weeks away at the time of this 
incident), the bloggers themselves offered equally caustic indictments of the behavior of 
bystanders and passers-by as they did of the state itself. El-Hamalawy detailed what he 
saw as one particularly egregious person’s behavior: 
Another veiled woman, joined in the chanting. “God’s religion is Islam! Bahaai’s 
are infidels! They are infidels! Allahu Akbar!” The woman then knelt and kissed 
the floor. She then stood up, and continued her hysterical outcry outside the court 
room in the corridor. “Bahaai’s are the cause of problems in Iraq! They also 
destroyed Lebanon!!” she kept on screaming. I had no clue what the heck she was 
 
135 El-Zelaky himself later admitted that there were errors in the coverage of his paper, but argued his 
reporters were doing their best. Interview with Ehab El-Zelaky, Cairo, Egypt. 
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talking about, and did not know if I should laugh or cry. It was pure bigotry. 
“They are germs in our society!”136 
While the solidarity actions of these four bloggers almost certainly represented a 
tiny minority within mainstream Egyptian public opinion on the issue of Baha’is in Egypt, 
their protest garnered press attention and helped introduce, as Maratea would argue, new 
claims-makers into Egyptian politics, even if the immediate effect is to scorn those 
claims-makers and their supporters as outside of the political and social consensus of 
society. Maratea’s expectations about claims-makers, together with Drezner and Farrell’s 
insights about the journalistic impact of powerful bloggers, seem to come together in this 
particular instance – elite bloggers, many with heavy connections inside the world of 
mainstream journalism, are able to help introduce the claims of minority bloggers to a 
wider audience. International journalists have followed the Baha’is cause with interest, 
and wrote positive articles when they finally won their court case in March of 2009.  The 
Guardian’s Brian Whitaker called the ruling “a small but important step toward freedom 
of belief and equal rights.”137 Liam Stack, writing for the Christian Science Monitor, 
wrote a piece entitled “Egyptians win right to drop religion from ID cards.” (Stack, a 
personal friend, lived in Egypt for years and has extensive ties with the Egyptian activist 
network).138 The New York Times’ Michael Slackman argued that the case represented 
“hints of pluralism” in Egypt and quoted the lawyer who submitted the case for the 
 
ism/
136 El-Hamalawy, Hossam. “Bigotry and sectarianism par excellence.” 3Arabawy. December 16th, 
2006. http://arabist.net/arabawy/2006/12/16/anti-bahaais-bigotry-and-sectarian  
 
137 Whitaker, Brian. “Egypt’s step toward freedom of belief.” The Guardian. March 17th, 2009. 
138 Stack, Liam. “Egyptians win right to drop religion from ID cards” Christian Science Monitor, April 20th, 
2009. P. 6 
 Baha’is.139 However, as Maratea notes, it may also take a particularly spectacular event, 
such as the 2009 burning of Baha’i homes in Upper Egypt, to create a kind of “focal 
point” that draws international attention to the plight of the Baha’is, in spite of the best 
efforts of SMN activists inside and outside of the country. Therefore, the Baha’i case 
appears to provide evidence for the hypothesis that SMNs can provide access to the 
public sphere for marginalized groups in authoritarian countries. 
 
Figure 5.2: Nora Younis and another blogger hold enlarged copies of a Baha’i ID 
card in protest against an Administrative Court ruling upholding the government’s 
right to deny cards to Baha’is who refuse to select Islam, Christianity or Judaism as 
their religion. December 16th, 2006.  
The reactions of observers in the courtroom, suggest that Bahai’s have not, in 
Egyptian political and social discourse, achieved the kind “authentic space of human 
existence” provided by the existence of a literary or political public sphere. Denied access 
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to normal life in a political system whose channels for participation are already limited, 
Baha’is are easily demonized and othered by accusations of heresy by Muslims. In Egypt, 
Islamist researchers have charged that Baha’ism is a “Zionist movement aiming to spread 
corruption and immorality.”140 The use of the common trope that Baha’is serve Zionist 
goals, from the pen of the Sheikh of Azhar, Dr. Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, is a staple of 
anti-Baha’i discourse from Egypt to Iran, where the group is even more persecuted. By 
lumping them together with Zionists, Baha’i detractors are able to dehumanize them. This 
is not to say, of course, that Baha’is don’t have their defenders in the media. As Ahmed 
Abd El-Maki wrote for Al-Masry Al-Youm about a draft law that would have essentially 
criminalized Baha’ism, “an assault on the Constitution and an attack on Egypt’s 
reputation.”141 
 
140 “Majma‘ al-buhuth al-islamiyya: al-baha’iya haraka suhyuniyya tas‘a li-nashr al-fasad wa-l-radhila” Al 
Masry Al-Youm, May 30th, 2009. http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=213030 
141 “Ahmed ‘Abd al-Mu‘ti yaktub: mushkilatuna ma’a al-usuliyyin.” Al-Masry Al-Youm. May 7th, 2009. 
http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=210026 
  
Figure 5.3: An Egyptian national ID card with a “blank” for religion. Courtesty of 
Egyptian Baha’i.  
Whatever the cause, it is unquestionable that the cause of the Baha’is has become 
part of serious public discourse in Egypt. Since little has changed in regards to the 
position of Baha’is in public life since the 1952 revolution, causality must be attributed to 
a combination of SMNs and the mid-decade political ferment in the country. This can be 
seen simply from the chart below, which tracks the number of stories in the Egyptian 
press about Baha’is. It can also be seen in the evolution of public discourse on the issue. 
In 2005, for instance, one of the few mentions of the Baha’is was in Rose Al-Yusef, which 
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derided opposition candidate Ayman Nour as “Ghazil al-Baha’iyin, al-Aqbat, , al-Sa‘idi” 
(The Courter of Baha’is, Copts, and Saidis)142. : 
2005: 7 
2006: 87 
2007: 45 
2008: 84 
2009*: 233 
*As of October 23rd, 2009. 
By 2009 the Baha’is had a number of supporters in the press, who wrote 
frequently for liberal outlets like Al-Masry Al-Youm and El-Badeel. In 2009, indeed, two 
of Egypt’s power bloggers were in fact working for Al-Masry Al-Youm, giving the 
Baha’is two prominent voices inside the newsroom of the most powerful and influential 
opposition newspaper in Egypt.  Such independent media outlets are of particular 
importance, since government press outlets still frequently feature attacks on Baha’is. 
The most frequent argument is that Baha’is are “enemies of Islam” and that focusing on 
their plight distracts from other, more important tasks for the Egyptian state. 143 Other 
state outlets frequently lump Baha’is in with “apostates of Islam” during attacks on the 
 
142 Basha, Ahmed. “Ghazil al-Baha’iyin, al-Aqbat, wa al-Sa‘idi. Ayman Nour: Shoo?” Rose Al-Yusef, 
September 3rd, 2005. p.27.  
143 Abdal Rahim, Gemal. “Ayn al-qanun salamat al-ghatha’a?” Al-Gumhuriyya. October 6th, 2009. P.16.  
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West or Zionism.144And advocacy groups, in the form of either diasporas (i.e. Coptic 
Christians in the U.S.) or co-religionists. While there are at most a few thousand Baha’is 
in Egypt, there are many more in the U.S., with their own lobbying arm in Washington 
D.C. Other religious NGOs have appealed to U.S. President Barack Obama to raise the 
issue of human rights for Baha’is and Coptic Christians145. The work of such groups 
serves to amplify the domestic claims of local actors, and to increase the carrying 
capacity of the Egyptian public sphere.  
5.5 SMNs and The Muslim Brothers  
As one of the most popular political and social organizations in Egypt, the 
Muslim Brothers occupy a radically different position in Egyptian public life than the 
Baha'is. However, the decades-long political persecution of the Muslim Brothers is quite 
well-documented, punctuated by a pattern of repression followed by periodic re-
integration into public life that has been repeated several times even before the coup that 
brought the Free Officers to power in 1952. The pattern has been repeated so many times, 
in such a similar fashion, that the Brothers can not be conceptualized as part of normal 
political life in the country; rather, the group has occupied a precarious perch in both civil 
society and the public sphere, operating on the margins, its leadership hounded into 
submission, and its young members expecting to serve prison time at some point. In Lust-
Okar’s “divided structure” of political contestation (Lust-Okar 2007), the Brotherhood 
 
144 See for instance Abd al-Rahim, Gamal. “Shahidat al-hijab fi duwal al-irhab”. Al-Gumhuriya. July 7th, 
2009. P. 14. 
145“al-Huriyat al-Diniya al-Amrikiya tutalib Obama bi itharat qadaya al-Aqbat wa-l-Baha’iyin.” Al Masry 
Al-Youm, August 13th, 2009. http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=222433 
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has found itself both on the inside and outside, but more often the latter. This repression 
has taken place in spite of widespread scholarly agreement that both the leadership and 
membership of the Muslim Brotherhood adheres to democratic values and expresses 
adherence to the norms of electoral participation (Harnisch and Mecham 2009; 
Aclimandos 2007; Leiken and Brooke 2007; Shehata and Stacher, 2006).  
Lust-Okar provides one possible explanation for the Brotherhood’s moderation, 
and the moderation of more radical groups in general. Her theory extends the typical 
typology of inclusion/exclusion to encompass relations between opposition groups in 
authoritarian societies. Societies in which all opposition groups are either excluded or 
included in the political system are termed “unified” structures of contestation, whereas 
regimes which include some (typically moderate) opposition forces and exclude other 
(typically more radical) groups feature “divided structures of contestation.” The included 
groups therefore have incentives to preserve their own prerogatives and perquisites 
within the system. (In important ways this formulation seems quite similar to Brownlee’s 
argument that dominant parties unite fractious oppositions and create a cohesive “in 
group” that can withstand outside challenges). In situations of prolonged economic crisis, 
included moderates will side with the regime against excluded radicals, and neither 
opposition group will be able to press its demands with the state. With some variations 
depending on the situation, this is how the Mubarak regime has been able to so 
successfully exclude the Brotherhood – by including other opposition groups in the 
formal political system, and by refusing to distinguish, rhetorically, between the 
Brotherhood and the more violent, anti-system groups like the Islamic Group.  
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The Brotherhood has surely sensed that it is a group on the outside looking in, 
despite its popularity, and that to win inclusion in the system, it would have to moderate 
its platform and core beliefs, granting leadership to reformist moderates like Khairat el-
Shater. This is the advice the group has been getting from Western scholars and 
strategists for years, and it is behind the group’s willingness, even eagerness to meet with 
anyone visiting the country – scholars, journalists, graduate students, undergraduates. 
This strategy, however successful it has been in convincing scholars that the group’s 
behavior has been altered, has not been successful in winning a change in the long-term 
stance of the regime vis-à-vis the organization, indicating that the regime was never 
interested in the ideological makeup of the Brotherhood per se, but rather that it has 
always seen it as the most threatening competitor for executive power in the system. The 
regime, therefore, will likely adapt to seek ways to exclude the Brotherhood no matter 
what ideological stance it strikes – just as moderate secular groups like Ghad Party are 
persecuted even though, or perhaps because, they are clearly committed to the rules of 
electoral democracy.  
As part of its campaign of normalization both inside and outside of Egypt, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an organization with a well-developed grassroots presence, also 
features a diverse network of Social Media sites, including comprehensive Web sites in 
English and Arabic, Ikwhanweb3 and Ikhwanonline4. While the Brotherhood was a late 
entrant into the medium of blogging, which was dominated in the early days by secular 
bloggers writing in English, the organization’s bloggers soon became influential both 
inside and outside the organization (Lynch 2007), with the young, networked blogging 
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corps having a substantial effect on internal debates in the organization. As Lynch argues, 
“In each of the major political controversies surrounding the Brotherhood in recent years, 
the bloggers have taken an active role" (2007). Lynch argues that the young brothers 
were particularly influential in the debate surrounding the release of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s party platform in the fall of 2007. This platform was released in the 
context of renewed confrontation between the regime and the organization, as the MB 
appeared to be making great efforts toward becoming a normalized political party 
(Hamzawy 2007). However, to the disappointment of the organization’s young Cairo-
based youth (as opposed to the more conservative youth elsewhere), the draft party 
platform contained a number of provisions that set off alarm bells for democratic 
observers. Notably, the platform called for the implementation of Islamic law, prohibited 
women and Copts from assuming the presidency, and refused to contemplate a separation 
between a MB political party and the organization itself (Hamzawy 2007). The element 
of the platform that was most at odds with the spirit of democratic practice was the idea 
that senior scholars in the organization might have the power to veto legislation that was 
deemed to be at odds with Islamic Law. Taken together, these elements pointed to a 
Muslim Brotherhood in turmoil, which refused to take the necessary steps to mollify 
observers within the regime or potential external patrons. The document appeared to 
please precisely no one, particularly the young bloggers, who attacked it and debated one 
another about the direction the organization should take. However, Lynch notes that even 
in this internal debate, it is not at all clear that the young bloggers were victorious (Lynch 
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2007), inasmuch as the platform itself was not received well by more important and 
powerful forces in Egyptian society and international observers.  
The bloggers, which are tolerated and even encouraged by the senior leadership, 
do not appear to take direct orders from the organization. Mohamed Habib was 
circumspect on this point in an interview, refusing to say whether the organization’s 
bloggers were or were not under control: 
Of course bloggers have a role, first they convey the ideas and actions of the 
brotherhood to others, which gives us a better image, second they analyze 
anything bad said against the brotherhood, and they say it from their own point of 
view and in their own way.146 
Or as one young MB activist told me, “The bloggers can’t be brought under control.”147 
However, despite this enthusiasm, it isn’t clear that the more liberal bloggers in the MB 
are positioned to take control of the organization. The leadership structure of the 
organization remains opaque. Bloggers finding their voices within the organization may 
yet turn out to be an important element of internal reform, but as of yet its impact has yet 
to be demonstrated. More important still are the organizations two substantive Web sites, 
which provide commentary, news articles, and hypermedia content for interested 
observers. The English-language Web site is a particularly important resource for 
international observers, and the organization goes to great lengths to develop journalists 
for these sites as well as to provide its editors with the resources to maintain them. It is 
also worth noting that a number of bloggers affiliated with the Brotherhood also double 
as journalists for the site. As Ikhwan Web editor Khaled Hamza says, “Around 10 
 
146 Interview with Mohamed Habib, Cairo, Egypt,February 21st, 2008. 
147 Interview with Ahmed Abdel Fatouh. Cairo, Egypt, February 16th, 2008. 
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bloggers work with us, such as Abdel Rahman Monsour…they are much more flexible 
than other journalists.”148 Even these activities, however, are unsafe for members of the 
organization. Hamza was sent to prison in 2008 for nearly two months149 for his 
stewardship of the site, and the site’s offices have been repeatedly raided by security 
forces. However, there is evidence that other electronic activities undertaken by members 
of the organization have had a more concrete impact.   
One of the most important roles of both blogs, the Web sites, and other SMNs, 
according to the practitioners themselves, is to reach international audiences with word of 
oppression against the Muslim Brotherhood. While domestic press outlets now routinely 
write about the state’s treatment of the Brotherhood and its leaders, it can still be difficult 
to change deeply entrenched beliefs about the goals and intentions of the group. As 
Abdul-Rahman Monsour argues, “The government in Egypt doesn’t want any 
government in Europe, western or anything to know what’s going on in Egypt, and 
we….explain what we are doing in Egypt.”150  
5.6 Muslim Brothers, Power Bloggers, and Social Networks 
Importantly, the most prominent Brotherhood bloggers and SMN activists are 
either current or former journalists themselves, giving them critical social network 
connections into the world of elite Egyptian journalism. One of the most notable of these 
journalists is Abdel Monam Mahmoud, who has been profiled a number of times. 
 
148 Interview with Khaled Hamza. Cairo,Egypt, April 27th, 2008. 
149 “Khaled Hamza is free.” Ikhwan Web. April 16th, 2009. 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?ID=16728&SectionID=0 
150 Interview with Abdul-Rahman Monsour, Cairo, Egypt, April 9th, 2008. 
  
 
180
                                                
Mahmoud began his blog in 2006, and called it Ana Ikhwan, which translates as “I am a 
Muslim Brother.” Monam told me that he began his blog because he wanted people to 
understand more about ordinary members of the Muslim Brotherhood – that they weren’t 
book-banning, movie-hating fanatics, but largely ordinary people who went to the cinema, 
worked normal jobs, and had the same dreams, fears, and hopes as other Egyptians.151 
His rationale for beginning a blog was remarkably similar to Samir Shady’s reasons for 
blogging about Baha’is: at heart, theirs is a project of political and social normalization, 
and of counteracting what they see as popular stereotypes about their respective groups.  
The Brotherhood bloggers have drawn a great deal of attention, but SMN activists 
have also played an important role in transmitting information about the trials of Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders in 2007-2008. Family members began blogs dedicated to their 
imprisoned loved ones, which became sites of contestation and dissent, as well as online 
platforms to coordinate action for release. One particular clearinghouse of information 
was the blog Ensaa!, which translates as “Forget!”. Ensaa published accounts of all 
sessions of the military tribunals, by various authors including Abdel Monam Mahmoud 
and other activists. These pages-long diaries included blow-by-blow accounts of the 
day’s goings on, as well as analysis and commentary. The blog itself typically featured 
text accounts and occasionally embedded photographs, as well as sidebars reproducing 
popular slogans and frames152 and the main Ikhwan site, both of which published 
 
151 Interview with Abdel Monam Mahmoud, Cairo, Egypt, April 23rd, 2008. Mahmoud kindly met me for 
coffee in downtown Cairo and talked at length about what his blog means to him. 
 
 accounts of the trial by Ahmed Abdel Fattouh and others. Fattouh described how he was 
able to gain access to the trials, even though journalists were banned from entering: 
In the military court, only one journalist can enter, that journalist is  me. And I 
enter like I am one of the family of these people and if they knew I was a 
journalist I would be under arrest.153 
 
Figure 5.4: The link on Ensaa! to a recap of the 29th session of the 
military trials of 40 senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
site features links to all 66 sessions. 
Fattouh claims that journalists from international news organizations frequently 
relied on his accounts of the trials for their reporting. As he told me, “all the journalists in 
every newspaper take from us to publish, because you don’t have any….not newspapers 
only, like Reuters, BBC, etc., they call me after the session.”154 International news 
coverage of the trials appeared sympathetic to the imprisoned leaders of the group; while 
news reports often hedged about the goals of the organization, they seemed to be careful 
to note extraconstitutionality of the trials themselves, and to seek out family members and 
others for comment155. Even briefer items tended to note that observers believed the trials 
to be unfair.156 Fattouh’s presence inside the courtroom surely had something to do with 
the positive coverage, and at the least prevented the regime from running the trials 
without any journalists having firsthand access. International reporters have continued, 
                                                 
153 Interview with Ahmed Abdel Fattouh, Cairo, Egypt, February 16th, 2008 
154 Ibid. 
155 See for instance, Stack, Liam. “Egypt targets Muslim Brotherhood moderates.” Christian Science 
Monitor, March 26th, 2008. P. 7. Stack, it must be noted, is also a personal friend with extensive ties in the 
Egyptian activist community. 
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since the trials, to publish sympathetic articles about the Brotherhood, and to note 
repression of its activists and even bloggers – in fact the arrest of bloggers gets greater 
press attention than other forms of arrest, even when the bloggers appear to have been 
arrested for reasons other than their electronic activism. This was the case in April 2009, 
when the blogger Abdel Rahman Fares was arrested for distributing materials in support 
of the April 6th General Strike.157 
In 2007, the government commenced trials for 40 prominent members of the 
Brotherhood on charges of corruption. The trials took place in military courts, part of the 
state of emergency that has remained in force in Egypt since the assassination of Sadat in 
1981. While the state has certainly faced threats from terrorism, particularly during the 
bloody confrontations between the state and armed Islamists in the 1990s, it is clear that 
the use of the law, and the relegation of MB trials to military courts is for “political as 
opposed to security reasons” (Kassem 2004, 38). Members of the Brotherhood 
themselves believe they were targeted at this time because high-ranking officials were 
beginning to sound more plausible to Western states – with the organization rhetorically 
emphasizing its commitment to democracy. As Zahra el-Shater told a reporter in 2008, 
“My father was taken because he was moderate and liked to open dialogue with Western 
people, with American people.”158  
 
0405
157 “Egypt police detain Muslim Brotherhood blogger.” Reuters. April 9th, 
2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSTRE5342BA2009  
  
158 Stack, Liam. “Egypt Targets Muslim Brotherhood Moderates.” Christian Science Monitor. March 26th, 
2008. http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0326/p07s08-wome.html?page=1 
  
 
Figure 5.5: Electronic banner supporting the release of Khairat el-Shater. 
The government’s strategy rests on convincing the international community that 
the consequences of handing power over to the Brotherhood could be dire (Kassem 2004, 
188). This became particularly true in the aftermath of 9/11, and even more so after the 
election of Hamas in Palestine, when the Bush Administration appeared to substantially 
back away from its democracy-promotion activities due to fears that the scenario could 
be repeated in Egypt. As one of the lynchpins of the geopolitical status quo between the 
Arab world and Israel, there has been very little pressure from the U.S. and its allies to 
give the Muslim Brotherhood a bigger political role in the region. The government also 
appeared threatened due to the strong showing of the Brotherhood in the 2005 
parliamentary elections and the well-regarded performance of Brotherhood MP’s in 
parliament, who became well-known for their stances against corruption and human 
rights violations within Egypt (Shehata and Stacher, 2006).  While the group’s stance on 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which calls for the abrogation of the 1978 Camp David 
accord between Egypt and Israel) would likely still prevent the group from being 
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embraced by the international community, the regime was unwilling to take that chance, 
especially since the reformist leadership, including el-Shater himself, had made 
statements in the past indicating a more accommodationist stance toward the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. If the MB were to adopt a more moderate tone on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, it would remove the Mubarak regime’s rationale for continued 
repression, at least as far as Washington is concerned. A change in administrations in 
Washington D.C. appears to have done little to change the calculus that the status quo is 
more important than risking a transference of power to the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
democracy promotion in the region in general, and Egypt in particular, has suffered.  
Ultimately, the efforts of activists and bloggers were not enough to offset the 
regime’s goal of punishing the Muslim Brotherhood in advance of elections, and of re-
establishing hegemony over the group in the wake of its strong 2005 parliamentary 
showing. While 15 of the 40 defendants were acquitted, many more received significant 
prison time, including 7 years for Khairat el-Shater, the group’s deputy chairman, 5 years 
for five defendants, and 3 years in prison for 13 others. Others were sentenced in 
absentia.159 Despite some mild protestation from the Bush Administration, relations with 
the United States were never at stake over these trials. Had they been, as Brownlee and 
others argue, it is possible that the regime might have been more careful with the 
extraconstitutional element of the trials. Even in defeat, however, SMNs transmitted 
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159 “Interview with Mohamed Baligh After Verdict.” Ikhwanonline. June 15th, 
2008. http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=1  
 
 frames of dissent and served as outlets for dissatisfaction with the heavy sentences given 
to the group’s leadership.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Electronic frame posted to the Ensaa! website as well as many other 
Brotherhood blogs decrying the sentences handed out to Muslim Brotherhood 
leaders after the April 2008 verdicts. 
 The English-language site, as noted earlier, is of particular importance to international 
audiences. As Khaled Hamza put it in an interview, “Interaction from inside Egypt is 
very small, but we had a lot interaction from American readers and western websites like 
CNN and BBC and Washington Post.” 160 The site is probably the best existing resource 
for reporters not based directly in Cairo, or for reporters in Cairo with limited Arabic 
                                                 
 
 
185
160 Interview with Khaled Hamza. Cairo, Egypt, April 27th, 2008. 
  
 
186
                                                
capabilities. It also appears that Brotherhood SMN activists have had a great deal of 
influence on the writing of international human rights reports detailing regime violations 
of rights, particularly of members of the Brotherhood. As Abdel Rahman Monsour told 
me, “The torture issue, you would find out that the reports that came up on Ikhwan web 
were used by international organizations like amnesty and human rights watch…to come 
up with reports talking about human rights in Egypt.161 The state has taken particular 
notice of this, seeking to prevent the transmission of human rights violations to 
international actors by using both traditional brute-force repression (Monsour himself 
was arrested for recording the activities of security forces in his hometown162) and more 
sophisticated measures, like tracking mobile users through their cell phones. As al-
Shammi argued, the mobile phone and its information-transmission capability is “kind of 
their own nightmare.” Or as Mohamed Habib put it,  
It definitely makes it harder for the state to impose a blockade on us….Of course, 
they try to confine them and to prevent them from communicating with others and 
to reach the world, and we use these technologies to prevent this and to help the 
group reach the world and to reach the media.163 
Electronic activists also play a role in humanizing members of the Brotherhood, 
allowing access to their interiority, in the terms of Habermas. Social Media websites like 
Facebook are one locale for this kind of activity. The imprisoned MB leader Khairat el-
Shater maintains a Facebook page with 655 “fans” (individuals who identify as followers 
of el-Shater by clicking a link on Facebook). The page includes information about el-
Shater and a link to his Web site, maintained by his son Saad El-Shater. The younger el-
 
161 Interview with Abdel Rahman Monsour. Cairo, Egypt, April 9th, 2008. 
162 Interview with Abdullah Al-Shammi, Cairo Egypt, April 9th, 2008. 
163 Interview with Mohamed Habib, Cairo Egypt, February 16th, 2008 
 Shater posted frequent pieces of poetry, reminscenses of his father, and calls to action on 
the site. In so doing, for the readers, el-Shater became neither the caricature presented by 
the state media, nor the revered leader of the organization, but rather an ordinary man and 
father being subjected to extraordinary repression for his political and social beliefs. Still, 
el-Shater’s plight never garnered as much attention in the elite Egyptian blogosphere as 
did the jailings of other Muslim Brothers.  
 
Figure 5.7: Early photo of Khairat el-Shater posted by his son on the latter’s 
birthday. 
In other cases, SMNs helped create focal points and frame alignments for 
agitating around imprisoned Brotherhood leaders or activists. When Khaled Hamza, the 
editor of Ikhwanweb, was arrested in 2008, bloggers came to his defense across the 
political spectrum, including the radical socialist El-Hamalawy. Bloggers posted these 
pictures in posts and sidebars: 
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Figure 5.8: Electronic banners calling for the release of Ikhwan Web editor Khaled 
Hamza. 
These focal points effectively solved the coordination problem inherent in trying 
to arrive at agreed-upon frames without leadership. They also posted information and 
accounts of his arrest. Nearly all of the A-list bloggers – Demagh, The Arabist, 
3Arabawy, Egypt Watchman (who played a critical role in the Al-Qursaya case), and 
others, posted calls for Hamza’s release, and reposted one of the above pictures 
(depending on primary language). These posts served to unite the Egyptian blogosphere 
around the essential injustice of Hamza’s arrest. As Snow et. al., would argue, this is a 
process of frame alignment, wherein discrete actors with diffuse interests unite around a 
common cause.  
Hamza’s arrest subsequently became not the arrest of another Brotherhood leader, 
but of someone who the community of bloggers explicitly identified with, and his 
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freedom was linked to the general practices of Egyptian authoritarianism, or as El-
Hamalawy frequently puts it, “Mubarak’s Gulag.”164 But before we grant the 
technologies themselves with the frame-making power, we should return to an 
understanding and appreciation of the importance of social networks. Hamza was, on El-
Hamalawy’s admission, a “friend.” He is personally friendly with the Cairo journalist 
elite, since many of Hamza’s writers were young, college-educated, and traveled between 
the MB world and the world of other media outlets. Hamza’s case and the agitation 
around it seems remarkably similar to the campaign to free Abdel Monam Mahmoud, 
Ana Ikhwan, who was jailed, either for blogging or for his political activities. As The 
Sandmonkey revealed in an otherwise acerbic post, Mahmoud was friends with the power 
bloggers, and not surprisingly, his arrest launched a movement “Free Monam,” replete 
with a Website, elite blog support, and international coverage. The campaign reached the 
Global Voices platform, and was cross-posted on the Free Kareem site, dedicated to the 
secular blogger Kareem Amer. Unfortunately, the Free Monem site is no longer 
operational and all that remains are the links and banners on other sites. What is clear 
though, is that the social network connections of the arrested matter when analyzing 
whether a campaign for their freedom takes place – particular attention seems to be paid, 
both in the Egyptian blogosphere and internationally, for journalists and bloggers, 
whereas ordinary members of the MB receive much less attention for their plight, in spite 
of electronic presence like el-Shater’s family Web site. The point is that social network 
connections appear to play a determinative role in coverage by elite bloggers – in other 
 
164 El-Hamalawy, Hossam. “Solidarity from the U.S. for Khaled Hamza.” 3Arabawy. February 24th, 2008. 
http://arabist.net/arabawy/2008/02/24/freekhaled_downwithmubarak/ 
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words networks don’t just change the diffusion dynamics of information, but help 
determine which information travels along those networks to begin with. 
5.7 Conclusions  
The preceding evidence can be divided into two types: evidence of community-
building, frame-alignment and identity-formation at the group level, and evidence of 
SMN-led information transmission. The former process fits well with existing 
understanding in the literature about the way the Internet is used as a discursive arena for 
groups seeking to contest hegemonies. Generally we might theorize this process in the 
following way: 
Frame-alignment ? Claim-making ? SMN activist ? National/Global public sphere 
In nearly every case, it is ultimately the networked access to the Egyptian and 
international public spheres that explains any impact by the electronic public spheres of 
subordinated Egyptian minorities. This project does not seek to contest arguments about 
the importance of identity-creation in virtual counterpublics, nor about the value of 
discursive spaces free of oppression by majority groups or state or corporate entities. 
Such spaces, should they be accessible to more individuals, could be crucial sites of 
dissent. It does, however, make an argument about the relative importance of discursive 
arenas versus networked access to the broader public sphere. In other words, as Chapter 2 
argued, information does not diffuse in a vacuum – the socially well-connected are more 
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likely both to diffuse politically relevant information, and to have an effect on their 
listeners.  
The observations in this chapter also lend further credence to the ideas of network 
theorists like Watts and Shirky, who argue that the Internet is organized according to 
power laws, and that a small number of Web sites (and thus the owners of those Web 
sites and their content) acquire an enormous amount of power and prestige. This is true 
not just for Egypt’s “power bloggers,” whose migration to new sites and platforms can 
cause hundreds or even thousands of others to do the same (on their telling), but on a 
smaller level as well. The site Egyptian Baha’i, for instance, tends to accumulate dozens 
or even more than 100 comments on a single blog post – commenting that rivals even the 
most well-read and commented-upon blogs in the U.S. – while most other Baha’i 
bloggers are lucky to get a comment or two every time they publish new work.  This is 
not just a matter of confirming theory – knowing that only a small number of blogs gets 
read – and who reads them – allows us to better understand the impact of those 
individuals on public discourse.  
However, the participation of Egyptian power bloggers in the Baha’i cause should 
give further support to their critical role in the Egyptian blogosphere in general, and in 
the promotion of human rights and rule-of-law issues in particular. The Baha’i bloggers, 
while they recognize the importance of their virtual counterpublics in and of themselves, 
also see the importance that the power bloggers and their SMNs played in the ID cards 
case. As Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra wrote, “I believe that simply calling for this support was 
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an important event in the crystallization of the role played by Egyptian bloggers in the 
electronic expression of opinions.”165 She also explicitly mentioned reports published by 
the Arab Network For Human Rights Information and the Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights (which helped bring the initial Baha’i ID case), which underscores the importance 
of information transmission and networking between Cairo-based human rights 
organizations and individual bloggers. 
In some ways, the evidence lends credence to the “fire alarm” theory advanced by 
Hindman (2008). Hindman argues that blogs (and one can imagine the argument 
extended to Social Media Networks) facilitate the creation of ad hoc coalitions when 
something in the public sphere goes wrong – when public officials or respected members 
of the public sphere violate the public trust in some grave way, or when it appears as 
though the legitimate interests of the public at large or a small public will be violated. In 
both the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Baha’is, coalitions were mobilized not 
around the ordinary abuse of power, but around what appeared to be extraordinary 
violations of rights and a breach of the day-to-day power configurations of Egyptian 
authoritarianism. In both cases, bloggers and electronic media sites were crucial 
information gathering and sharing hubs for both local and international journalists. This 
is what is so remarkable about the legal victory of the Baha’is –  there is almost no 
organized constituency for Baha’i rights in Egypt, nor would one expect the interests of 
one tiny minority to be adequately represented in such a repressive state. Nevertheless, 
 
165 “Egyptian blogs and the Baha’is.” Wijhat Nazhar Ukhra. December 13th, 
2006. http://fromdifferentangle.blogspot.com/2006_12_01_archive.html. Her site does not provide stable 
URL links to each blog entry. 
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the sustained SMN attention the plight of Baha’is appears to have led directly to the kind 
of local and global press attention that made it difficult for the Egyptian regime to 
countenance the continued violation of Baha’i rights.  
Again though, we run into problems of establishing cause and effect. It is 
impossible to ascertain whether elite blogger agitation led to the releases of Khaled 
Hamza or Abdel Monam Mahmoud from prison. And there is no way to quantify the 
effect of Baha’i blogging on the way the ID card court case wound its way through the 
court system. Even if we see an uptick in attention to these issues in the Egyptian or 
international press, we cannot say for sure that it is due to the efforts of Baha’i or Muslim 
Brotherhood bloggers, or to the effects of elite blogger agitation through SMNs. What 
this project can do, however, is build on theorizing in places with better available data on 
social networking, like the U.S., and build on the data that has been presented – the fact 
that Egyptian journalists do appear to read blogs, that they report stories that first appear 
on the blogs, and that the same small handful of bloggers is cited again and again in 
interviews for this project, and in national and international stories about blogs. In so 
doing, we can estimate more precisely the kinds of authoritarian contexts that are likely 
to see an impact from blogging, and what contexts are likely to see bloggers writing in 
vain, or having their activities restricted to identity-building and counter-public-forming. 
Chapter 6 now seeks to apply this theory to other authoritarian contexts. 
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Chapter 6 
Cascades, Colors, and Contingencies: 
Social Media Networks and Authoritarianism in Global Perspective 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Thus far this project has theorized and confirmed limited but substantive changes 
in Egyptian politics as a result of Social Media Networks. Chapter 2 established the 
mechanisms by which Social Media Networks reduce the amount of private information 
about the preferences and behavior of other individuals in extended social networks in 
authoritarian environments, thereby triggering informational cascades that meet 
individuals’ revolutionary thresholds. Chapter 3 argued that Social Media Networks, with 
the aid of independent journalists and global rights activists, created informational 
cascades that led to media events inside Egypt, restructuring discourses on sexual 
harassment, torture, and refugees. Chapter 4 demonstrated the utility of Social Media 
Networks for short-term collaboration, cooperation and coordination under conditions of 
severe repression, but also explained why large-scale mobilization required either an 
external shock or ties to popular grassroots organizing, even in the event of informational 
cascades. And Chapter 5 demonstrated the discursive potentialities of Social Media 
Networks for groups without stable access to the public sphere in authoritarian societies. 
In Chapter 6, I seek to apply the theories outlined in the preceding chapters to the broader 
universe of authoritarian societies, engaging the very limited literature on the subject, and 
offering some preliminary expectations.  
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The most pertinent variables when gauging the impact of Social Media Networks 
appear to be the: 1) the capacity and will of repressive forces; 2) the presence or absence 
of independent media practitioners in the authoritarian public sphere who can transmit the 
claims of elite bloggers and SMN activists (i.e. the open or closed nature of 
mediaspheres) ; 3) the mobilizing capacity of SMN activists and 4) the relative level of 
connectivity to the Internet in a given society. For our purposes, I will define “high 
connectivity” as 25% or more of the population having access to the Internet – anything 
below that will be defined “low connectivity.” For Egypt, those forces are as follows:  
extremely capable and willful repressive apparatus, a robust if constantly harassed 
independent mediasphere, mixed mobilizing capacity for SMN activists, and low 
connectivity to the Internet.  
For definitional purposes, open mediaspheres are ranked as “free” by Freedom 
House, contested mediaspheres are “partly free” and closed mediaspheres are “not free.” 
Highly repressive security apparatuses are “not free” in the FH “freedom rankings, while 
moderately repressive regimes are “partly free” and non-repressive apparatuses are 
“free.” Pertinent rankings for the project are presented in the table below: 
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 Egypt 2008  Ukraine 2004  Moldova 2009  Iran       2009  Kenya    2007
Political 
Freedom  
6 
(Not Free)  
4 
(Partly Free)  
4 
(Partly Free)  
6 
(Not Free)  
4 
(Partly Free) 
Media 
Freedom  
59   
(Partly Free)  
68 
(Not Free)  
66 
(Not Free)  
85 
(Not Free)  
60 
(Partly Free) 
Internet 
Access166  
15.4%  <5%  19.7%  48.5 %  8.5%  
 
Figure 6.1: Relevant rankings 
This chapter will use the measures compiled by Freedom House to categorize 
states on media freedom and political freedom. And to best test this confluence of 
variables, I will apply the theory to the following out-of-Egypt cases: the mobilization 
against the 2009 presidential election results in Iran; the change of government in 
Ukraine in 2004, the mobilization around contested election results in Kenya in 2008, and 
the so-called 2009 “Twitter Revolution” in Moldova. These cases were selected for the 
following reasons: first, they include two cases in which mobilization succeeded in 
changing governments, and two in which those efforts failed. These cases have been 
                                                 
166 Data from Internet World Stats. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 
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extensively detailed through case studies by journalists and area specialists and offer rich 
data in the form of first-hand and second-hand accounts of the events in question.  
 This chapter should also provide a framework for evaluating competing theories 
of the durability of authoritarianism. Lust-Okar argues that divided structures of 
contestation (SoC), whereby certain groups are included, and certain groups excluded, 
from the political sphere, provide more stable means to withstand economic crises. As 
she argues, “where incumbent elites have fostered a division between legal moderates 
and illegal radicals, moderates become less likely to mobilize the masses and demand 
reforms as the crises continue” (2005, 172). While Lust-Okar’s theory was geared toward 
economic crises, there is no reason it cannot be evaluated against the political crises to be 
explored in this chapter. Brownlee, meanwhile, argues that the presence of a robust ruling 
party serves as a channel to satisfy elite demands and leads to regime stability during 
crisis situations. Brownlee challenges the idea that “strong opposition movements can 
simply push elites out of power” (2007, 206). These two theories overlap partially, but 
not fully.  Both theories would anticipate Egypt being perhaps the most durable 
authoritarian regime under consideration here. They would also anticipate Ukraine, and 
Kenya, neither of which had robust institutional ruling parties, as the most susceptible to 
unrest. However, Lust-Okar would likely argue that Iran’s divided structure of 
contestation would successfully pit Iran’s included and excluded elites against one 
another, whereas Brownlee explicitly expected Iran to be susceptible to elite divisions 
during moments of crisis. This chapter will seek to provide evidence for and against these 
competing theories. 
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 Divided Structure of 
Contestation  
Unified Structure of 
Contestation  
Robust Ruling Party  Egypt  Moldova 
No Ruling Party  Iran  Ukraine, Kenya  
 
Figure 6.2 Party and contestation arrangements in the cases  
The theory advanced by this project posits the idea that SMNs are most useful in 
short-run coordination and communication during times of strife. It also argues that such 
moments are most likely to arise in competitive authoritarian regimes, centered around 
elections. This can be formulated in hypothesis form as 
H1: Social Media Networks can trigger informational cascades even the tightly-
controlled media environments of authoritarian regimes 
They are able to do so because, as Mary Joyce argues, “the networked nature of 
the digital world allows for people to communicate and take action outside of – and 
sometimes in opposition to – traditional hierarchical power structures (Joyce 2010).My 
theory indicates that the networked structure of SMNs – whether on Facebook or on cell 
phones – vastly increased the speed of diffusing information, particularly across social 
clusters, and also decreases the costs of creating and sharing that information.  SMNs 
shrink the already-small worlds of human social networks, and reduce the barriers erected 
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by authoritarian regimes to open information sharing.  they can trigger informational 
cascades, as outlined in Chapter 2. Those informational cascades can take many forms – 
in Egypt on April 6th, 2008, it meant the swift diffusion of information about and support 
for a sympathy strike on Facebook, and then subsequently through the public sphere. This 
chapter will evaluate the ability of SMNs to trigger informational cascades in other 
settings – primarily during the course of power struggles following contested elections in 
competitive authoritarian regimes. I also argue that the technologies themselves will be 
unable to ensure the desired change in power, or to affect serious change in the face of 
sustained institutional resistance to activist demands. In other words, SMNs are likely to 
generate substantial press coverage, and to facilitate protest and organization. Such 
linkages are likely to be not just between individual activists within authoritarian regimes 
but also between activists and international journalists and elites. This generates the 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Competitive authoritarian regimes with contested mediaspheres are more likely 
to be the sites of SMN-mediated activism. 
Where individual moments of mobilization go from there, however, depends on 
domestic press environments and elite commitments to repression. Chapter 3 argued that 
it was the presence of an independent mediasphere in Egypt that made it possible for 
online informational cascades to generate press coverage and contestation in the real 
world. Therefore I argue here that countries with independent media outlets are more 
likely to be the sites of informational cascades triggered by SMNs. This leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
  
 
200
H3: SMN usage will have little effect on the ultimate outcomes of struggles in 
authoritarian countries  
If the expectations of this hypothesis are correct, SMNs have little to no effect at 
all, we should expect SMNs to play marginal roles in the unfolding of events in 
competitive authoritarian regimes. In the cases that follow, I will seek to disentangle the 
role attributed to the technologies by popular press outlets from their actual effects on the 
ground in authoritarian regimes. Overall these hypotheses are designed to lead to better 
understandings of when and where Social Media Networks are likely to generate 
successful activism, and to challenge technological deterministic understandings of new 
media activism which assume positive outcomes for digital activism. They will also shed 
light on ongoing debates in the study of authoritarian durability. 
H4: SMN activism is likely to generate greater repression.  
In a quantitative analysis, Whitten-Woodring (2009) argues that by providing 
sources of information to regime elites, independent media outlets can actually lead to 
greater levels of repression. If this is true, it must also be true that increased use of SMNs 
for organizing and protest might also lead directly to repression. Therefore, I posit a 
tradeoff between the openness of SMNs and regimes’ ability to use the information that’s 
easily attainable from them for repressive purposes. We should thus expect repression to 
increase in tandem with the success or perceived success of the activists themselves. The 
null hypothesis would be that levels of repression are constant.  
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6.1 SMNs and “The Green Revolution” in Iran 
On June 12th, 2009, The Islamic Republic of Iran, held elections for the 
presidency, which turned into what Abbas Milani calls “an electoral coup” (2009, 11). 
Iran, an authoritarian regime which is considered “unfree” in the Freedom House political 
and media variables identified above, holds regular, competitive elections for the 
presidency.  The Supreme Leader, and the Guardian Council, an unelected body of 
religious leaders, nevertheless possess what amounts to veto power over the candidacies 
of individuals, severely curtailing freedom of competition over the executive. The 
elections themselves ultimately come down to different candidates approved by the 
Guardian Council competing for control over an unusually weak presidency. 
Nevertheless, Iranian elections are spirited affairs that engender heavy turnout by 
regional and global standards, and which take on many of the trappings of fully 
democratic executive elections. In past elections, reformist candidates have been 
unexpectedly elected, ushering in periods of hope for greater reform. However, because 
the Iranian president possesses quite limited power in the context of the regime itself 
(Poulson 2009, 29), those hopes have been frequently dashed, particularly with the 
election of Mohamed Khatami in 1997. Khatami was seen as a reformist, someone with 
whom the international community, and particularly the United States, might work 
(Poulson 2009, 29). While some détente occurred during the Clinton Administration, it is 
widely felt within Iran that overtures made towards the United States after 9/11 were 
rebuffed by the Bush Administration. The election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in 2004 
was seen as both a rebuke to the reformers and a repudiation of the Bush 
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Administration’s continued refusal to engage even reformist elements in Iran in dialogue. 
In 2009, the sitting President, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, battled challenger Mir Hussein 
Mousavi for the presidency, in what observers expected would be a close election that 
nevertheless favored the incumbent. On election day, it became clear that the result was 
bound to be contested, as allegations of fraud preceded the announcement of election 
results that showed Ahmedinejad an overwhelming victor. Almost immediately, forces of 
the opposition began to organize protests and send reports out of the country via blogs, 
videos, and Twitter.  
The scenes of protest, violence, and chaos inside Iran captivated global audiences 
for weeks. Theatrical elements like the chanting of Allahu Akbar from rooftops (the same 
cry that was heard after the 1979 revolution)167 only served to make the events more 
dramatic to international audiences, where sympathies were almost entirely with the 
protestors. Millions of protestors took to the streets to demand new elections in the kind 
of informational cascade theorized in Chapter 2  and in accordance with the first 
hypothesis presented above. The two defeated candidates, Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, 
led the movement, which was dubbed “the Green Revolution,” since many protestors 
wore or carried signs, garments or banners in that particular color. The United States 
government, while refusing to intervene in the situation, condemned the Iranian regime’s 
crackdown on the protestors. 70 individuals were killed in the ferment following the 
events, according to movement leaders, but the protestors were unable to affect a re-vote. 
Supreme Leader Ali Khameini certified the election in August, and Ahmedinejad 
 
167 “How Iran’s opposition inverts old slogans.” BBC News Online, December 7th, 
2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8386335.stm. Accessed December 30th, 2009. 
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assumed office for another term as President. However, while protests tapered off, they 
continued to flare on and off during the months following the election, as the protest 
movement, once awakened, seemingly would not die. With explicitly anti-regime protests 
banned, the movement according to the BBC has “…adopted the tactic of using the 
relative safety of officially-sanctioned demonstrations on important days in the religious 
and political calendar to come out in big numbers and turn the official rallies into a show 
of force of its own, with an entirely different and opposing set of slogans.”168 Protestors 
captured Quds Day – typically a demonstration of solidarity with the Palestinians – for 
their own ends. Typical of this tactic were the protests that occurred on the day of 
Ayatollah Ali Hossein Montazeri’s funeral.169 Montazeri had been known as a critic of 
the Iranian regime. This most recent flare-up took  place in December.   
What has been the contribution of SMNs like Twitter to these events? As the 
Egyptian activist Ahmed Abdel Fattouh writes, one of Twitter’s great advantages is the 
multiple channels of access it offers to its updates. Because you can receive Twitter 
updates on your cell phone, and make Twitter updates through mobile telephony as well 
as the Internet, regimes must eradicate multiple channels of communication at the same 
time to put a stop to updates that take place via Twitter.170 The Iranian regime even 
threatened Twitter users with prison if they used the site to disseminate information about 
the uprising; however, users continued to rather unapologetically use the site for this very 
 
168 Ibid.  
169 Coughlin, Con. “Why the Mullahs are Vulnerable.” The Wall Street Journal. December 29th, 
2009. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703278604574624191585240728.html. Acce
December 30th, 2009. 
ssed 
170 Abdel Fattouh, Ahmed. “Limatha Lem tastati’a Iran qama’a ath-thowra al-khadara’?” (Why couldn’t 
Iran crush the Green Revolution?” Personal correspondence. August 16th, 2009.  
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purpose. One further advantage for Twitter users is the ability to update the site through 
mobile telephones and to hide the users’ phone number.171  Given the sheer number of 
individuals posting Twitter updates at any given time, the regime’s task effectively 
became impossible – it simply could not carry out the delicate task of maintaining order 
while simultaneously repressing individual Twitter users who numbered in the tens of 
thousands. This is how and why Iranian Twitter users became the primary source for on-
the-ground updates during the events following the elections. But the multiplicity of 
access points to the service is not the only reason it was so useful during the Iran events – 
more useful than other tools like blogs and Facebook. Another substantial factor for 
Twitter is the service’s filtering and crowdsourcing potential, achieved through what are 
known as “hashtags.” By placing the symbol “#” before a subject tag, users can aggregate 
posts around a particular subject area, and thus spread information out of network. So for 
instance the tag “#greenrevolution” can be used to aggregate posts by users on that 
subject – even users who do not know one another and are not connected as “friends” as 
you must be for similar action on Facebook.172 The particular hashtag adopted by the 
Green Revolutionaries was #gr88.173 Hashtags eliminate the need for interested observers 
or participants to spend time and energy collating information. 
The international press certainly noticed the prominence of Twitter during the 
post-election tumult. Year-end press round-ups inevitably mentioned the Iranian election 
protests and Twitter’s role therein, as one of the defining events of 2009. One paper even 
 
171 Ibid. 
172 Pfeifle, Mark. “A Nobel Peace Prize for Twitter?” The Christian Science Monitor. July 6th, 2009. 
173 “Internet Brings Events in Iran to Life.” BBC News Online. June 15th, 
2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8099579.stm. Accessed December 30th, 2009.  
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called 2009 “The Year of Twitter.”174 With their own journalists barred from the country, 
news organizations relied on the Twitter reporters and their interlocutors for information. 
This is in spite of the fact that it was unclear how much Twitter was being used by Farsi-
language activists, since Twitter did not support Farsi at the time.175 Some reports even 
included a reference to the case of the imprisoned Egyptian journalist who Tweeted his 
way out of prison, mentioned in Chapter 4. During the initial stages of the aborted 
revolution, CNN’s correspondent Octavia Nasr was reading the Twitter posts of Iranian 
live on the air.176 In addition to Twitter, individuals seeking information about the day’s 
events turned to Facebook, where groups sprouted and where Mousavi’s  “fan” page soon 
had more than 50,000 members.177 International tech elites, some of them located as far 
away as California, helped collaborate with Iranians to provide proxy servers, which 
avoid the regime’s blocking of certain Web sites and ISPs.178 As Jonathan Zittrain told 
the New York Times, “The qualities that make Twitter seem inane and half-baked are 
what make it so powerful.” Zittrain is referring to the very short messages that Twitter 
allows users to send, which made it from the start easy to dismiss as a boutique service 
that allows people to broadcast mundane updates about their daily activities.  
The accelerant for all the press coverage of Iranian Twitter users, however, was 
not the Iranians but rather their supporters in the elite global mediasphere, particularly the 
British-born American blogger Andrew Sullivan. Sullivan’s blog became a “one-stop 
 
174 The Straits Times. “Surviving The Year of Twitter.” December 27th, 2009. 
175 Musgrove, Mike. “Twitter is a Player in Iran’s Drama”. The Washington Post. June 17th, 2009. P. A10.  
176 The Guardian. Interview with Gordon Brown. June 19th, 2009. FINISH CITE. 
177 Stone, Brad, and Cohen, Norm. “Social Networks Spread Iranian Defiance Online.” The New York 
Times. June 16th, 2009. P. 11.  
178 Stone and Cohen. 
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shop” for all updates out of the Iranian Twitter universe, and gave support to media 
claims that Twitter was responsible for the protests themselves, or at least a critical 
component of them (Morozov 2009, 9). Sullivan used his very well-trafficked English-
language blog to post update after update from Iran, many simply cut-and-pasted or 
translated directly from the source material. Of particular importance were the bilingual 
bloggers and Twitterers, who could act as mediators between the Farsi-language 
mediasphere and the English-speaking Western world eager to consume bytes of 
information about what was happening in the streets of Tehran. In many cases, these 
intermediaries were Iranian political exiles in the ever-growing diaspora who engaged in 
“flooding the country's throttled Internet and heavily controlled airwaves with news, 
videos and insight.”179 One Washington-based Iranian exile, using Youtube, claims that 
more than 500,000 Iranians had seen the daily videos he posted to the video-sharing Web 
site.180 The Iranian case appears to corroborate findings in Chapters 3-6 about the 
importance of elite bloggers (domestic and foreign), particularly well-connected, 
multilingual local bloggers.  
Ultimately, however, the mobilizations against the elections were unsuccessful in 
forcing the regime to relinquish power. International journalists and observers belatedly 
took note of the inability of the tools themselves to affect actual change on the ground. 
Mozorov has dubbed ineffective Facebook and Twitter campaigns as “slacktivism.” He 
defines slacktivism as when “our digital effort make us feel very useful and important but 
 
179 Daragahi, Barzou. “Exiled, but still insiders;  
The latest wave in Iran's diaspora is tech-savvy and playing a key role in countering hard-liners at home.” 
Los Angeles Times. December 10th, 2009. P.1.  
180 Ibid.  
  
 
207
                                                
have zero social impact. When the marginal cost of joining yet another Facebook group 
are low, we click “yes” without even blinking, but the truth is that it may distract us from 
helping the same cause in more productive ways” (Mozorov 2009). As The Daily 
Telegraph’s Will Heaven noted in an acerbic December op-ed, “There has been no 
revolution in Iran.”181 Heaven went so far as to argue that the government’s sophisticated 
cyber-security techniques were greater than the activists’ and the Internet might be a 
boon to their repressive efforts as much as it is an aid to the activists. As if to underscore 
this concern, Twitter was hacked in December by a group that may be affiliated with the 
regime. And there is no question that the government used Twitter to monitor the 
activities of protestors.182  Indeed as time wore on, and more and more members of the 
opposition were arrested, some for their activities online, it looked like the usefulness of 
Twitter had bumped up against the tradeoff between openness and repression to which 
SMNs are subject in such environments. With no independent media to speak of in Iran 
(which receives the lowest FH ranking for press freedom), no one in the country was able 
to contest this crackdown. 
  To explain the subsequent events, we must rely on the more familiar theories and 
explanations from comparative democratization. With the executive unified and with 
softliners unable to exert control over the armed forces, the Green Revolution has so far 
petered out far short of its goal of a new election. This conclusion to the summer’s events 
had nothing to do with the mobilizational capabilities of the technologies themselves and 
everything to do with larger institutional arrangements in Iranian politics and society 
 
181 Heaven, Will. “The fatal folly of the online revolutionaries;  Smug Twitter activists are wrong to think 
they are liberating Iran, says Will Heaven.” The Daily Telegraph. December 29th, 2009. P. 16.  
182 “Twitter Taken Over By Iranian Cyber Army.” Brand Republic News Releases. December 24th, 2009. 
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beyond the control of SMN activists or even Mousavi himself. Milani, for instance, 
situates the ongoing protests within splits internal to the regime (2009, 11-15). 
Boroumand, on the other hand, locates the success of the protests in organization 
undertaken by civil society groups over a period of years (2009, 20). While the U.S. took 
a number of steps to informally side itself with the opposition, Mousavi’s history also 
suggests that the U.S. foreign policy elite was not convinced that his government would 
be substantively all that different from the one that currently rules. But even had the U.S. 
been convinced that Mousavi would have represented a break with the Iranian status quo, 
it is unclear if anything concrete could have been done to support the opposition. The 
regime’s dedicated security forces – particularly the Revolutionary Guards – seemed 
unwilling to defect to the opposition. Absent such a defection, the means of violence 
remain in the state’s hands, no matter the volume of Twitter posts at home and admiring 
blog posts from the quarters of the international elite.  
6.2 Tent Cities, Elections, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine  
In the winter of 2004, shortly after the bitterly contested U.S. elections narrowly 
won by George W. Bush, the world was transfixed by what appeared to be a similarly 
bitter and narrowly-won contest in Ukraine. The election, which broke down along ethnic 
lines as well as political ones, featured Party of Regions candidate Viktor Yanukovych, 
the successor to post-communist dictator Leonard Kuchma and the favorite of both 
Russia and the ethnically Russian Eastern Ukraine, in a very close election against the 
opposition candidate, the independent Victor Yuschenko. Yuschenko was aligned with 
the US and the EU, and favored NATO membership for Ukraine, while Yanukovych was 
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supported by Russia and favored a more Eastward orientation (Lane 2008, 527). Ukraine 
at the time was considered “partly free” by Freedom House. The period following 
independence from the USSR was marked by continued autocracy under Kuchma, as 
well as intense economic dislocation during the transition to a more market-oriented 
economy. By 2005, the economy, measured by GDP, was still far below the level of 1989, 
creating widespread dissatisfaction with the government, and resentment against 
economic elites (Lane 2008, 525).  
In addition to its bitter ethnic features and high-stakes democratization 
implications, the election featured a sinister plot against Yuschenko that seemed straight 
out of a Hollywood thriller. Only months before the election, Yuschenko fell gravely ill 
after a dinner, and it was later determined that he had been poisoned, probably by forces 
of the regime.183 Yuschenko, who had been a handsome, dashing young reformer, was 
transformed seemingly overnight into a brittle older man, and it was said that he was in 
so much pain that he traveled during the campaign with a spinal painkiller IV. Of course, 
there are still dissenting voices who suggest that Yuschenko was not poisoned, and that it 
was part of a stunt by opposition forces. The truth of the matter is difficult to determine, 
but there is no doubt that the poisoning allegations added an element of theatricality to 
the proceedings, and generated widespread sympathy for Mr. Yuschenko.  On election 
day, official returns gave Yanukovych a narrow, 54% to 46% victory, which was 
immediately charged as suspect by neutral observers. Opposition forces rallied and set up 
camp in downtown Kiev, in Independence Square. And there they stayed, in the 
 
183 “Yuschenko and the Poison Theory.” BBC News Online. December 11th, 
2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4041321.stm. Accessed December 18th, 2009. 
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unforgiving Ukraine winter weather, for 11 days and nights, the crowd growing to as 
many as 500,000, camped out in tents, surrounded by uneasy security forces of the 
regime. They demanded not an immediate revolution, but merely a re-vote, since by that 
time the actual results of the original election were greatly in doubt. Still, it was clear that 
simply giving the election to either candidate at this point would have caused a massive 
crisis of leadership legitimacy, since both camps would have regarded the election as 
stolen. 
A re-vote was eventually granted, and Yuschenko emerged victorious. Observers 
dubbed the events in the Ukraine The Orange Revolution, and the tactics of the Ukraine 
protestors would be mimicked and adopted in places as far away as Lebanon and Iran – 
the coordinated color campaign, the non-violent street protests, and the demands for new 
votes after crooked elections.  (These tactics, and the scholarship they have inspired, are 
far from uncontroversial. As David Lane argues, “The literature on these phenomena, 
however, is often journalistic in approach, partisan in orientation and normative rather 
than objective in content” (2008, 526).) Bunce and Wolchik call this “the electoral 
model,” which they define as “a distinctive and unprecedented set of activities that are 
consciously designed to maximize the prospects for an opposition victory at the polls….” 
(2009, 70).  
What was the role of SMNs in the election contest? Michael McFaul’s oft-cited 
argument that the Orange Revolution “may have been the first in history to be organized 
mostly online” (McFaul 2005; also quoted in Goldstein 2007) is bold but so far largely 
unsubstantiated in precisely the same way that Iran’s “Twitter Revolution” is a finding in 
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search of empirics. Goldstein argues that Ukraine, while a competitive authoritarian 
regime, nevertheless featured a mainstream media environment that was almost entirely 
controlled, directly or indirectly by the regime. One prominent method of control was 
self-censorship, punctuated by occasional acts of violence by the regime against the 
opposition. A climate of fear was reinforced by the 2000 murder of Georgiy Gongadze, 
an opposition journalist who used the Internet as a platform for dissent. Gongadze’s 
murder, almost certainly at the hands of Kuchma allies, sent an unmistakable signal to 
opposition journalists that pursuing the truth could put their lives in danger. However, it 
also spurred such journalists to continue using the Internet as a site of dissent, and in the 
years between Gongadze’s murder and the 2004 elections, such online news sites (as 
opposed to blogs in other locales) grew in importance, despite the tiny number of 
Ukrainians using the Internet at this time (Goldstein 2007, 5).  
Goldstein uses the Katz and Lazerfield Two Step Flow model of information – in 
which the mass media influences a select few opinion leaders, who then influence their 
friends – to come to essentially the same conclusion that this chapter arrived at in Chapter 
3 – that bloggers and online journalists can still have immense importance in a society 
even if very small numbers of people are online. This is due to the influence of “Online 
Political Citizens,” people who consume blogs and online information sources and then 
disseminate that information to mass publics. In Egypt this happened through the 
independent media, whereas in the Ukraine the argument is that it happened through 
existing social networks. Observers of the Ukraine revolution also believe that the 
existence of independent media outlets played an important role in the events, with 
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McFaul (2005) going so far as to generalize the existence of independent media as a 
direct causal contributor to all of the so-called “color revolutions”.  
Goldstein also argues that the protest group Pora made particularly good use of 
the Internet before, during and after the elections, In particular, the well-developed 
network of text-messages was activated early in the crisis and played a significant role in 
organizing and coordinating the tent cities which played such a vital role in bringing 
international attention to the plight of the Ukrainian protestors (7-8). Sites like the online 
opposition site Pravda provided real-time updates as protestors across Ukraine (including 
groups outside of the capital city of Kiev) set up their own tent cities and joined the 
growing protest movement. This is similar to the role played by the 6th of April Web site 
and the various opposition Twitter activists on April 6th, 2008 in Egypt. Goldstein ends 
his research note with a question: “are these tools inherently conducive to the expansion 
of civic engagement and democratization, or will authoritarian governments adapt the 
technology to their own advantage?” The answer to this question, explored more fully in 
the conclusion to this chapter, argues that the efficacy of SMN activism depends deeply 
on institutional features of existing authoritarian regimes. 
The technologies themselves cannot explain the defection of the Ukrainian 
security services, nor the refusal of the Kuchma government to unleash violence on the 
protestors. The regime could conceivably have chosen to break up the protests before 
they reached the level of hundreds of thousands. It was the diffusion dynamics of SMNs 
(which helped generate the initial gatherings), together with the fateful decision to allow 
the protestors to camp out in Independence Square, gathering momentum and 
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international press attention, that probably doomed the regime’s attempts to rig the 
election. This lends substantial support to my first hypothesis, as well as to the second. It 
may also have been Western support for the favored opposition which tipped the scales 
against the regime, providing support for hypothesis 3 (that outcomes are independent of 
mobilizations themselves). The apparent lack of repression of activists, though, appears 
to contradict the fourth hypothesis – that levels of repression will increase with greater 
use of SMNs. 
6.3 The Twitter Revolution in Moldova 
In April 2009, the communist party of Moldova (PCRM) appeared to sweep 
parliamentary elections. Moldova was one of a handful of remaining post-Soviet 
states that were still ruled by the vestiges of the ancien regime – vestiges which had 
actually returned to power via what were considered free elections in 2001. But since that 
time, Moldova’s democratic situation has deteriorated (Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 139). 
This backsliding, which accelerated after 2001, took place despite sustained democracy-
building efforts by European organizations (McDonagh 2008, 143). Similar to many 
post-Soviet states, Moldova is divided by rivalry between a Russian-speaking minority 
(in this case concentrated in the breakaway province of Transnistria) and an indigenous 
majority. This conflict has been so potentially destabilizing that the EU has not promoted 
membership for Moldova. There seems to be a consensus that offering incentives for EU 
membership positively affects the level of political and civil rights in Eastern Europe 
(McDonagh 2008, 159). This conflict has manifested itself in electoral politics via the 
support by ethnic Russians for the PCRM and by younger Moldovans (ethnically 
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Romanian) who support opposition parties. In practice, this split is almost identical to the 
split between European-oriented Western Ukraine, and Russian-oriented Eastern Ukraine. 
In the April 2009 parliamentary elections, a coalition of opposition parties also claimed 
victory and accused the communists of rigging the elections, by fabricating votes by 
people who had left the country (impoverished Moldova has a very high rate of out-
migration, particularly to EU-member and neighbor Romania). The opposition parties 
differed on many issues, including the relationship of Moldova to Romania (some parties 
like the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) want to reunite with Romania) but they all 
shared a fundamentally pro-EU outlook that clashed severely with the Eastward 
orientation of the PCRM (Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 142).  
The capital of Chişinău was soon gripped by the kinds of organized people-power 
demonstrations that took down regimes in Ukraine and Georgia. The woman credited 
with organizing the protests claims not to have had any idea that her call to demonstrate 
would resonate with so many people. As she told the Guardian, “we expected at the most 
a couple of hundred friends, friends of friends, and colleagues", she said. "When we went 
to the square, there were 20,000 people waiting there. It was unbelievable.”184 Such a 
swelling from initial, low expectations, to sudden, mass protest can only be characterized 
as an informational cascade. The low barriers to the transmission of information on 
SMNs meant that Natalie’s message reached a huge number of people instantaneously. 
Aware of their friends’ preferences and intentions (the revelation of private information), 
individuals were therefore more likely to act on their desire to contest the fraudulent 
                                                 
184 Stack, Graham. “Leader of Moldova's 'Twitter revolution' goes into hiding: Fugitive surprised by size of 
protest fears arrest: Organiser says Kremlin behind police targeting.” The Guardian. April 16th, 2009. Pg. 
19.  
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elections. In other words, the diffusion of this information increased expectations of 
turnout to protest, thereby meeting the revolutionary thresholds of individual protestors.  
While the official media cloaked the events in a shroud of silence, word spread, 
both within Moldova and outside the country, via the now-familiar pathways of Twitter, 
Youtube, and text message. Observers estimate that as many as 30,000 people descended 
on the capital’s center to express their dissatisfaction with the results. Like Georgia, 
however, the demonstrations were not entirely peaceful, as demonstrators stormed and 
then burned down the parliament building. Still, an OSCE report argued that the April 
parliamentary elections had been fair, while members of the opposition denounced 
Russian influence in the OSCE (Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 139). In any case, the 
communists remained in power, and commenced a massive crackdown on the opposition. 
Activists and journalists were arrested. The regime tightened control over the media, 
expelled foreign journalists, and blocked access to Romanian media sources (Pippidi and 
Munteanu 2009, 140). However with only 60 of the 101 seats in parliament, the 
communists were unable to secure the election of a new president as per Moldovan law.  
The opposition managed to block the election of a new communist president, an 
impasse which continued for months as then-President Vladimir Voronin continued to 
rule. Because of that, new elections were scheduled for later in the summer, and in fact 
took place. However the street presence of the opposition gradually waned, as the EU 
appeared to throw its support behind the legitimacy of the elections. The crucial fulcrum 
shifted then from the activists in the streets to the opposition members in parliament, 
whose demands for a new election had to be met. In the meantime, however, the putative 
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organizer of the Flash Mob that led to the burning of the parliament, went into hiding. 
Natalie Morar, who had been thrown out of Russia for making print allegations about the 
murder of a prominent Russian central bank leader, apparently also feared retribution 
from Russia, which sided with the regime.185 While she later returned from hiding, a 
cloud of legal uncertainty remained over her head. 
Security forces appeared quite ineffectual overall, however. While the ruling party 
held fast at first, over the course of the summer, as global attention was fixated on Iran, it 
eventually relented and agreed to new elections. While still winning a plurality of votes, 
the Communists were unable to maintain their grip on power, as a coalition of opposition 
parties cobbled together enough victories to unseat the communists from power. While 
the “Twitter Revolution” in Moldova hasn’t received nearly the level of attention as 
similar events (perhaps because Moldova, an impoverished country of 5 million that is 
both strategically and culturally marginal), the events of 2009 are no less instructive 
about the effects of SMNs on political outcomes. The regime’s initially successful 
attempt to retain power appears to corroborate hypothesis 3 presented above, that 
informational cascades triggered by SMNs are not predictive of outcomes.  
Indeed, the Moldova case highlights the enduring importance of authoritarian 
institutions. While the state, on paper, still possessed the capability to deploy violence 
against its own citizens, it lacked the will to do so, at least in the long run. Clearly SMN 
activists in Moldova were no more clever or brave than their counterparts in Iran – their 
success was not due to short-run contingencies or unique strategies like the burning of 
                                                 
185 Ibid. 
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government buildings. As Schell argues, power comes not when violence is deployed, but 
rather when individuals act together in concert (2008, 218) . The case thus confirms the 
importance of SMNs for reducing the costs associated with the collective action problem.  
Conversely, the success of non-violent action depends not on the characteristics of 
the actors but rather on the unwillingness or inability of the state to defeat them violently 
in the streets. While the state employed moderate violence (including a handful of fatal 
casualties), it was certainly capable of greater harm. After the events, the Moldovan 
president, Vladimir Voronin, expelled the leader of the National Democratic Institute, a 
Washington-based NGO that was involved in many of the other “color revolutions” 
(Pippidi and Munteanu 2009, 139). However, the degree to which the NDI was actually 
involved in the Moldovan unrest is difficult to determine. If anything, in this geostrategic 
backwater, the state could conceivably have cracked down violently with little to no 
consequences from the international community. Certainly, even in the context of 
wrangling with Russia (which may have influenced the case of Georgia and certainly had 
influence in Ukraine), Moldova was of far less consequence than Ukraine. Therefore 
international variables alone cannot explain the outcome here. In fact, because the 
“revolution” appeared to fail at the outset, observers appear to have drawn all the wrong 
conclusions from the events. Writing in July 2009, just months after the initial unrest, 
Pippidi and Munteanu drew the unsurprising conclusion that “The Moldovan case 
underlines the lesson that democratization cannot make progress in strongly unfavorable 
external environments” (2009, 141). Because Russia was so invested in the success of the 
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Communists, this line of thinking goes, activists were powerless to affect a non-violent 
transfer of power to the opposition 
However, if the PCRM remained in control of events and the security services, 
why were new elections ordered? Why submit to opposition demands for new elections 
when they could easily have simply foisted a new communist president on the opposition 
by fiat? This is a question that Pippidi and Munteanu left unanswered. Clearly, though, 
there are steps that even parties and factions allied with Russia are unwilling to take in 
the light of international attention. In fact, subsequent events demonstrate that in fact 
oppositions can make headway in spite of “strongly unfavorable external environments.” 
Those events also underscore the reality that in such situations, SMNs can influence the 
coordination and execution of protest, and can reach outside observers and media 
organizations with their work, but that they cannot fundamentally control the shape of 
subsequent decision-making processes. Those decisions depend on, among many other 
things, contingent decisions of relevant actors, which can be explained within the elite 
decision-making models of Schmitter, O’Donnell, Przeworski, and others. Again, as with 
Iran, the attribution of the revolution to Twitter alone can lead to dangerous 
misunderstandings of the actual capabilities of these technologies. What, for instance, 
would have happened if Yanukovych had won his run-off with Yuschenko? Would the 
Orange Revolutionaries have put another 500,000 people in the streets until they obtained 
the desired result? Don’t both cases, in fact, demonstrate the same outcome? Perhaps the 
Russians, nervous about the thousands of Moldovans in the streets, about the potential 
involvement of Romania and the EU in its Transnistria problem, submitted to new 
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elections, figuring that as long as they controlled the breakaway province, their interests 
in Moldova were more or less assured. In other words, let us not reify our understandings 
and preconceptions about the geopolitics of these transitions – three of which now, the 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova , have taken place despite strong and vocal Russian 
criticism. 
6.4 Violence and Narrative-control in the Kenya Election Crisis 
To disentangle some of these factors highlighted by events in post-Soviet 
countries, it would be useful to step out-of-area to Africa, where a violent electoral crisis 
gripped Kenya, and where SMNs played a role, both positive and negative, in the 
subsequent events. In stark contrast to the crises described above, the Kenya crisis led to 
widespread violence and suffering, with more than 1,000 people killed and hundreds of 
thousands turned into IDPs (Goldstein and Rotich 2008, 3). The situation was all the 
more alarming and dismaying given Kenya’s international reputation as one of the more 
successful post-colonial states in Africa (Kiai 2008, 162). This reputation existed in spite 
of great corruption within Kenya, where the President is granted immense, super-
presidential privileges, and in which legislators have enormous salaries that dwarf the 
average per capita income in ways that have sparked outrage (Kiai 2007, 164). The 
disputed election was grafted onto a longstanding ethnic rivalry between the Kikuyu, who 
had been privileged during and after the period of British colonialism, and other groups.  
On December 27th, 2007, the incumbent government of Mwai Kibaki won what 
appeared to be a narrow victory over the opposition, led by Raila Odinga. Kibaki’s 
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victory was certified quickly by Kenya’s electoral commission186. Particularly 
problematic was the apparent last-minute swing in the election totals, which took days. 
As of December 29th, Odinga and his allies were cruising toward a huge victory, with an 
18% lead in the count halfway through.187 Kibaki was supported by the Kikuyu, and his 
disputed victory ignited the tragic violence that followed the elections. It was largely 
Kikuyu residents who were expelled from their homes in the Rift Valley (where the 
violence was centralized).The valley is one of Kenya’s most troublesome areas – a 
Presidential Task Force recommended, in 2004, the formation of a Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation panel to help resolve the region’s longstanding grievances, but the body 
was never formed (Riai 2008, 165). Luo’s were also victims of violence in different parts 
of the country.188 SMS messaging was used to spread messages of hatred and violence, 
much as radio was used in the Rwandan genocide to mobilize violence (Goldstein and 
Rotich 2008, 5). However, government officials were persuaded to keep the mobile 
network running, in the hopes that messages of peace sent by the provider Safaricom 
might counteract the more predatory messages being spread by would-be genocidaires.  
The opposition and its supporters also organized huge street protests, which were 
brutally suppressed by the government, which had adopted a “zero tolerance” policy.189 
Clashes between police and protestors frequently turned deadly, as members of the 
opposition, and in a move familiar from other cases, the government harassed foreign 
 
186 Maloney, Brenna. “A Disputed Election Leads To Violence; Hundreds Killed as Two of the Country’s 
Ethnic Groups Clash. Washington Post. January 7th, 2008. P. C12.  
187 Gettleman, Jeffrey. “With Half of Vote Counted, Kenyan Opposition is Poised to Sweep.” The New 
York Times. December 29th, 2007. P. 9.  
188 Maloney 2008. 
189 Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Kenya’s Opposition Switches its Tactics From Street Protests to Business 
Boycotts.” The New York Times, January 19th, 2008. P. 6.  
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journalists, particularly those following Odinga.190 Non-partisan observers, including 
Kenyan civil society groups, Transparency International, and American diplomats, 
declared the elections fraudulent. Ultimately the government refused to step down, and in 
fact the human rights situation for members of the opposition continued to be quite 
fragile, with human rights activists under protection, and several killings suspected of 
being perpetrated by the state itself.191  
Goldstein and Rotich note the effectiveness of blogs for countering official 
narratives in Kenya. While the official state media peddled the government’s line, 
bloggers – and their connections abroad and in the Kenyan diaspora – helped decouple 
the horrific violence taking place in the Rift Valley from what they saw as the 
unanswered question of election-rigging. As in other cases, perhaps the most important 
use of the technology was information dissemination. As the state media tried to 
downplay the violence, citizen journalists wielding cell phone cameras posted videos and 
first-hand accounts of what was actually happening in the streets. Again it was cell 
phones rather than the Internet per se that had the greatest impact, since at the time only 
3.2% of Kenyans had Internet access.192 SMS messages transmitted from ordinary 
Kenyans were posted both on prominent Kenyan online sites, as well as international 
forums like BBC’s Have Your Say.193 This information exchange boomeranged back into 
the Kenyan press environment, leading one prominent Kenyan blogger to argue that “I’m 
 
190 Ibid.  
191 Kenya Human Rights Commission. “Kenya; Unprecedent State of Violence.” Africa News. May 21st, 
2009.  
192 Biz-Community. “Kenya; Bloggers Keep World Informed.” Africa News. January 4, 2008. 
193 “Blogs, SMS, and the Kenyan Election.” Internet & Democracy 
Blog. http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/idblog/2008/01/03/blogs-sms-and-the-kenyan-election/ Accessed 
December 2 st1 , 2009. 
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getting more news from BBC than from anywhere else right now. “194 And the 
prominence of English-language bloggers like Kenya Pundit highlights the importance, 
noted in Chapter 3, of these bilingual bridge bloggers, who are able to translate events in 
far-flung places for global audiences, giving them enormous power over the shape of the 
debates that take place in the international public sphere. This is particularly true when 
the state temporarily turns off the information spigot. On the other hand, it is also 
instructive, and should serve as a further note of caution, that the state was successfully 
able to disable the SMS network when it so desired. The state also maintained the 
capacity to track individuals sending text messages, and threatened to prosecute anyone 
caught sending inflammatory messages to others. 
The Kenya case further underlines the reality that the effects of SMN activism are 
contingent. In some circumstances, SMNs can help topple unsteady regimes (Ukraine, 
Moldova) and in others they can put together the organizing that threatens more 
entrenched authoritarian regimes (Iran). And in still others, they can both instigate and 
mitigate violence, as well as document abuses and organize demonstrations against 
crooked election results.  
6.5 Conclusions 
The case material presented above appears to lend at least qualified support to the 
four hypotheses outlined at the beginning of the chapter. First, the cases lend support to 
the hypothesis that Social Media Networks can trigger informational cascades in 
authoritarian countries. Cascades appear to be the mechanism for each of the cases 
 
194 Kenya Pundit. “Post-media blackout update, January 1, 4:30 p.m.” 
http://www.kenyanpundit.com/2008/01/01/post-media-blackout-update-jan-1-430-pm/ 
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discussed above. I would further argue that electoral authoritarian regimes are likely to 
have better chances post-transition than non-competitive regimes. This is because 
parliaments, elections, and parties create routinized sites of contestation, debate, and 
coalition-forming before democratic transitions. However, these sites do not actually 
structure the opportunities for transitions themselves, which depend on factors beyond the 
capabilities of opposition actors to put people in the streets. Still, that does not mean that 
such competition is meaningless. Brownlee (2009) argues that competitive and 
hegemonic authoritarian regimes have better chances of successfully consolidating 
democracy after a transition from authoritarianism.  
But what about the way that such institutional arrangements might structure the 
ability of SMNs to structure contestation prior to transitions in authoritarian countries? It 
also seems to be the case that those sites of contestation serve as ideal platforms for 
opposition elites seeking to contest the hegemonic role of the state using Social Media 
Networks. This may be why many of the most heavily-documented instance of SMN 
mobilization have taken place in and around elections in competitive authoritarian 
regimes, and why such mobilizations have been sporadic or non-existent in the many 
authoritarian countries that do not undertake periodic exercises in controlled contestation. 
The cases under examination here would seem to challenge both institutional 
theories presented earlier. Brownlee’s expectations that the Iranian regime would be 
vulnerable to elite divisions have not been borne out by the 2009-2010 electoral crisis (at 
least not yet). Indeed, while the regime has witnessed substantial intra-elite division, it 
has tenaciously clung to power, for reasons that are not yet clear to observers. And Lust-
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Okar’s expectation that regimes unified structures of contestation are most vulnerable 
during prolonged crises does not seem supported by the case of Kenya, which allowed all 
groups to participate and yet also weathered its electoral crisis. The collapse of the 
Moldovan regime and its ruling communist party also appears to challenge Brownlee, 
whereas the survival of the Egyptian regime and the collapse of the Ukrainian regime 
appear to lend support to both Brownlee and Lust-Okar’s theories. Overall, the set of 
outcomes here leads me to conclude that neither the presence of political parties, nor 
structures of contestation are determinative of outcomes during electoral crises in 
authoritarian regimes. 
Second, SMNs themselves appear to have no direct relationship to the success or 
failure of activism in a given authoritarian context. The divergent outcomes of SMN-
driven activism in Kenya, Ukraine, Moldova, and Iran demonstrate that scholars and 
observers cannot simply assume the democratizing impact of SMNs. Indeed, in Kenya, 
the technologies were put to much more nefarious uses, whereas in Iran SMNs were 
turned on their users quite effectively  
The third hypothesis, that independent media are critical variables for the 
transmission of claims made through SMNs, is more challenging. I conclude that while 
independent media systems make it possible for SMNs to transmit claims during ordinary 
political times, those independent media outlets are not necessary variables during the 
kinds of crises discussed here, where tactical tools like Twitter and text-messaging can 
circumvent media blackouts and facilitate informational cascades. The primary effect of 
the independent media variable within authoritarian countries is to make newsworthy a 
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whole host of issues and events that would normally be unintelligible or uninteresting to 
global audiences. In other words, the routinized presence of opposition or independent 
media practitioners in authoritarian public spheres makes possible daily contestations and 
dissent, as opposed to the more sensational events – like elections and electoral fraud – 
that tend to draw the attention of international media. Thus in Egypt, independent press 
outlets were critical in the dissemination of news stories about sexual harassment, 
refugees, torture, and other issues that are rarely of great interest to global media elites. 
Rather, they are of interest to international NGOs and rights organizations with a vested 
interest in a certain kind of activism. In Kenya and Ukraine, both partly-free states with 
partly-free media systems, blogs and new media had for years served as alternative 
sources of news and information to state-run media agencies and as workaround to self-
censorship.  
However, in Moldova, bloggers and Twitter users appeared on the scene as new 
actors in state politics. Little attention was paid prior to April 2009 to bloggers, Twitter 
activists, or other individuals deploying these tools. This might be because in 2008, 
Moldova’s media system was considered “not free” by the Freedom House ranking.195 
Once the crisis arrived, however, networks of text-messagers, Twitters, and Youtubers 
were able to circumvent the regime’s media blackout and reach critical external 
audiences (even if those external audiences were not, ultimately, ready to make sacrifices 
for them). And in Iran, another media environment considered not free, the change in the 
SMN age is that the state was unable to control the information environment during these 
 
195 “2008 Freedom of the Press World Ranking.” Freedom House. 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=442&year=2008 
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critical junctures. The state no longer has the capability to close its doors and promote its 
own alternative (one might say fictional) account of what actually took place in its streets. 
With citizens aware at all times of the protests, accessing international media outlets via 
proxy servers, and sending information to international journalists, authoritarian regimes, 
even in the most closed societies which have gone to great length to control the Internet 
have been unable to control emerging media narratives around discrete events in the 
political system.  
The difficulties of transmitting claims in the absence of independent media is also 
why Syria, whose citizens are also on Facebook and Twitter, has not seen the kind of 
online-driven mobilizations witnessed in other contexts. Partly this is because Syria’s 
brand of authoritarianism is much more severe than other cases here, partly because of 
the absence of independent press outlets to transmit claims, and partly because there are 
no competitive elections around which to organize in that country. Syria’s rate of Internet 
penetration is also quite low (Pavel 2009). So while Syria has seen some coordinated 
dissent online –with one case seemingly successful in changing government policy on 
personal status law— crucially that dissent has not moved offline into the realm of real-
life politics. Syria can also persecute its online citizens, which it does ruthlessly (Pavel 
2009). So while SMNs might “constitute a direct challenge to highly centralized 
authoritarian regimes such as Syria,”as Pavel argues, they have yet to demonstrate their 
utility in combating the policies of noncompetitive authoritarian regimes. There appears 
to be very little material on the web documenting Syrian  police abuses, for instance, the 
kind of videos and pictures that appear in the thousands about Egypt. This is also clear 
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when the case of China is introduced, where citizens have repeatedly organized ad-hoc 
events and demonstrations using new media, but where a concerted effort by the state, 
and a total absence of independent media, has resulted in a near-perfect filtration and 
surveillance system. 
Finally, the substantial repression of activists generated in Kenya, Moldova, and 
Iran suggests that at the least we cannot reject the hypothesis that increased SMN 
activism leads to increased repression. Together with the evidence from the Egyptian 
case, the Ukraine case (which saw little repression during and after the electoral crisis) 
appears to be the outlier. The implications of this hypothesis are discussed below. 
6.6 Coda 
On December 16th, 2009, Wael Abbas was sentenced, in absentia, to six years in 
prison, for sedition. Abbas, whose home was ransacked while he was at a conference in 
Beirut, decided not to return to Egypt for fear of his personal safety. His “arrest” and 
prosecution are chilling harbingers of things to come for online activists in Egypt, who 
have long operated in a legal and institutional gray zone. Abbas has been Twittering and 
Facebooking his ordeal ever since it began. The Abbas case suggests that the Egyptian 
government may no longer be satisfied with piecemeal harassment and imprisonment of 
its activists, but may rather be moving toward a more long-term strategy of ending online 
politics as an avenue of dissent altogether, perhaps in anticipation of what could be a 
tumultuous presidential election period in 2011. It also answers a puzzle that has only 
grown more difficult since online activism took off in 2005 – why, since many SMN 
activists operate so openly in Egypt, has the state not cracked down more brutally on 
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them? Perhaps the state feared the mid-decade interest of the U.S. in regional democratic 
development and feared a backlash, and perhaps now calculates that the US can’t spare 
the diplomatic capital to make an international incident out of the plight of a single 
blogger. But if Abbas is allowed to be driven from public Egyptian life, it will likely 
discourage others of similar beliefs and intentions from taking part in citizen journalism, 
and deprive the Egyptian public sphere of one of its most vibrant and courageous voices. 
The fact that the regime has so far succeeded in this endeavor suggests once again that 
institutional features of authoritarianism are every bit as important as the structural 
features of digital activism in understanding the impact of these activities and predicting 
their future trajectories. 
The exile of Wael Abbas, and the increasingly dire outlook for Egyptian digital 
media activists, points to an observation first made by Jenifer Whitten-Woodring. She 
argues that far from being a panacea for authoritarianism, independent mediaspheres 
might actually contribute to greater repression (Whitten-Woodring 2009). This counter-
intuitive observation rests on the durability of apparatuses of repression, and the kind of 
open-source intelligence provided by SMNs and independent press outlets in 
authoritarian regimes. By allowing a modicum of press freedom, the state might be 
playing a double game – forcing (or tempting) activists to reveal themselves and their 
networks, and simultaneously deploying the full force of state power against them. It 
must also be the case that the information that diffuses through SMNs also reaches 
authoritarian elites, by crossing social clusters via informational cascade. Whitten-
Woodring’s hypothesis squares with the idea advanced here, that there is a tradeoff 
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between online openness and networking, and a regime’s ability to use that information 
against individuals and activists. We should be careful, then, about making 
recommendations to such practitioners, whose lives or personal safety are likely to be 
placed accordingly in jeopardy. Egypt may yet play host to the kind of successful ferment 
seen in places like Ukraine and Georgia, or even to unsuccessful mass mobilizations like 
those in Kenya or Iran. However, the lesson of this study is that we should not take a 
technologically deterministic approach to understanding the use of SMNs, in Egypt or 
anywhere else. Outcomes still depend on political, social, economic, and even natural 
forces, which can’t be predicted in advance, and which we will almost certainly struggle 
to understand if and when they are unleashed.  
This dissertation began with a story about a Facebook group, and asked how that 
group might impact politics in Egypt. I believe the answers have been provided here. The 
Mohamed ElBaradei Facebook group can do many things – alert individuals to the 
preferences of their friends and acquaintances, build shared meaning about ElBaradei’s 
presidential candidacy, even disseminate calls to action and facilitate debate. However, 
we know that levels of commitment to this group are likely to be quite low, and that 
without organizing on the ground by committed individuals with ties into the non-
networked mass of poorer Egyptians, is unlikely to play a direct role in any succession 
crisis. That crisis organizing, should it come, may be augmented by text-messaging, 
Twitter, the independent media, and the blogosphere, but absent changes in Egyptian 
political institutions, such mobilization is unlikely to be determinative. However, we 
should not dismiss the importance of this activity either. We simply do not know the 
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ultimately, long-term consequences of this kind of networked, public dissent, and can 
only imagine its implications for compliance with authoritarianism. These media – 
particularly those written and analyzed in Arabic, give us an important glimpse into the 
everyday in Egyptian society, and give their users the means of expression and 
organization which they have long been denied. Even as savvy a regime as Egypt cannot 
fully shut down this discourse, nor can it predict the consequences of its flowering. In 
short, there can be no revolutions without revolutionaries. But neither can there be 
authoritarianism with no means to control information. The way that this struggle plays 
out in the years ahead should be of continued interest to scholars and policymakers alike. 
 
David M. Faris 
April 19th, 2010. 
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